Rescue the Americans With Disabilities Act from Restrictive Interpretations: Alcoholism as an Illustration

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We alcoholics are men and women who have lost the ability to control our drinking. We know that no real alcoholic ever recovers control. All of us felt at times that we were regaining control, but such intervals — usually brief — were inevitably followed by still less control, which led in time to pitiful and incomprehensible demoralization. We are convinced to a man that alcoholics of our type are in the grip of a progressive illness. Over any considerable period we get worse, never better. We are like men who have lost their legs; they never grow new ones.¹

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¹ ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS 30 (3d ed. 1976).

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court has narrowed the doorway into the protected class for the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) in virtually every employment case. Taking their cue from the Supreme Court, the lower courts have been concerned principally with who is “disabled” and thus protected by the ADA. The answer today is not many people. The courts


4. See infra Section IV.B.2.

generally have been so hostile to ADA plaintiffs that it is difficult now to find a case in which the plaintiff was able to prove that he was disabled.\(^6\)

Congress contemplated that some impairments would always be disabling.\(^7\) The Supreme Court, however, has so narrowly construed the term "significantly limited in a major life activity," which defines the protected class, that many impairments formerly considered to be inevitably disabling, such as alcoholism, are no longer protected by the ADA.\(^8\) Congress referred to alcoholism many times in the legislative history,\(^9\) and

\(\text{SEE INFRA NOTE 312.}
\)

\(\text{id. at 59 ("it is not possible to include in the legislation a list of all the specific conditions, diseases, or infections that would constitute physical or mental impairments . . . . the term includes, however, such conditions, diseases, and infections as: . . . drug addiction, and alcoholism.")}; \text{s. rep. no. 101-116, at 106 (1989) ("[i]t is intended that rehabilitated alcoholics and drug users will be protected under this law."); americans with disabilities act: hearing before the h. comm. on small business, 101st cong. 63 (1990) (statement of}
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included a specific reference to alcoholism in the statute. For this reason, and because alcoholics tend to be discriminated against because they are not perceived to have a "real illness," I have chosen alcoholism to illustrate the extreme difficulty of proving a disability under the current case law.

The ADA was enacted to "provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with

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Rep. Tom Delay, Member, House Comm. on Small Business) ("The intent of the ADA is to protect the disabled. The bill now covers more than 900 unknown (sic) disabilities. This broad application includes drug addicts, alcoholics, people with contagious diseases and individuals with "voluntary" conditions such as being overweight.");

It is important to emphasize that we continue to protect applicants and employees who have overcome or are successfully being treated for drug or alcohol problems. Retaining these crucial protections for persons who have recovered or are in treatment is consistent with our national drug strategy and our longstanding commitment to supporting the treatment of those with drug and alcohol problems and working to ensure the full reintegration of former drug and alcohol abusers into the working world.

135 CONG. REC. S10800-10801 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Simon); 136 CONG. REC. H2316 (daily ed. May 15, 1990) (statement of Rep. Delay) ("Those that are former drug addicts and alcoholics, even though they may be reformed, cannot be discriminated against. They are considered as disabled.");

The bill excludes from protection individuals who are current drug users and it removes protections for current drug users under the Rehabilitation Act. However, the bill explicitly retains protections for recovered persons, individuals who have successfully completed treatment, and persons currently in drug or alcohol treatment, who are not using drugs illegally. The bill also protects persons who are erroneously regarded as current illegal users of drugs . . . .

This bill strikes a delicate balance. It recognizes the need to protect employers, workers, and the public from persons whose current illegal drug use impairs their ability to perform a job and whose employment could result in serious harm to the lives or property of others. At the same time, the bill recognizes that treatment for those in the grips of substance abuse is not only the compassionate thing to do but an essential component of a comprehensive attack on drugs. Treatment can save the lives of individual abusers, and it can also return them to productive roles in society, which strengthens our families, our communities, our economy, and our ability to meet the competitive challenges of the growing international marketplace. By providing protections against discrimination for recovered substance abusers and those in treatment or recovery who are no longer engaged in illegal drug use, the bill provides an incentive for treatment.


Today that mandate is not being fulfilled, especially in the employment area. The ADA was modeled on the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the Rehabilitation Act). Although the ADA specifically provides that it should not be construed to apply a lesser standard than that applied under the Rehabilitation Act, employees who sought protection under that Act before the ADA was adopted did not have the problems proving that they were disabled that employees are having today under the ADA. In almost every case involving Title I, the part of the ADA that applies to employment, the Supreme Court has interpreted the ADA so restrictively that to qualify for its protections one would have to be so impaired that he would generally be unable to work at all. However, when the Court has dealt with non-employment cases, it has been much more generous.

The ADA prohibits discrimination against a qualified person with disabilities. To be classified as disabled, a person must 1) have an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; or 2) have a record of such an impairment; or 3) be regarded as having such an impairment. Major life activities include such things as seeing, hearing, and taking care of oneself.

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13. Employment rates for impaired people have actually declined since the ADA was enacted. See Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1807, 1812-13 (2005).
16. See Stefan, supra note 7, at 301 (“Defendants in Section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act] cases rarely contested the issue of whether a plaintiff was handicapped under the Act [footnote omitted] . . . . Plaintiffs were found to be disabled under the Rehabilitation Act with conditions nearly identical to those presently being found by courts to not constitute disabilities under the ADA . . . .”); see also Colker, Windfall, supra note 5, at 160; Kaiser, supra note 5, at 742.
17. See infra Section III.B.
18. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998); PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001). See Waterstone, supra note 13, at 1838-42, for a discussion of non-employment cases in which the plaintiff was treated more favorably than in employment cases.
perform essential job duties of the position with or without reasonable accommodation. 22

At first blush, it would seem that the ADA itself set up a “catch-22” for employees to qualify for the protected class by requiring that they be substantially limited in a major life activity, yet still able to perform the essential duties of the job. 23 However, it is the courts that have recently created the dilemma by requiring an employee to be so substantially limited in a major life activity that he will generally be precluded from being able to perform the job. 24 The class of disabled people today is virtually limited to people who are completely blind, deaf, or in a wheelchair because, in essence, they are totally limited in a major life activity. 25 Many of them cannot work at all. People with less obvious impairments, such as alcoholism, diabetes, back injuries, and mental illness, who can work, usually are not determined to be sufficiently limited in a major life activity under the Court’s narrow interpretations. 26 Because Congress spent considerable time discussing protecting persons with such impairments, it is clear that the ADA was not intended to be restricted to impairments that are totally limiting. 27 Congress was particularly concerned about “stereotypic assumptions” that created myths and fears about disabled people. 28

Alcoholism is a disability about which stereotypic assumptions are particularly problematic. Alcoholics in particular suffer from the “systematic prejudice, stereotypes, and neglect” that were the central concerns of the ADA. 29 They are more likely to be discriminated against because they

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24. See infra Section III.B.

25. See Kaiser, supra note 5, at 736; infra discussion accompanying note 312.

26. See infra Section IV.B and note 312.


28. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 Va. L. Rev. 397, 445-48 (2000) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Subordination]. “The statutory ‘disability’ category should embrace those actual, past, and perceived impairments that subject people to systematic disadvantages in society. And the concept of stigma should play an important evidentiary role.” Id. at 445. The author suggests that impairments such as HIV and epilepsy should always be considered disabilities because of their stigmatizing effect, and that the agencies that administer the Act should be able to identify such impairments. Id. at 527.

29. See Bagenstos, Subordination, supra note 28, at 426. Even physicians have negative views about alcoholics. Physicians often see alcoholism as a problem of willpower or conduct because of the lack of attention paid to the disease in medical schools. See
are often not perceived to be suffering from a "real" illness.\textsuperscript{30} Alcoholics have also historically been subjected to ridicule and contempt:

Throughout most of recorded history, excessive use of ALCOHOL was viewed as a willful act leading to intoxication and other sinful behaviors. The Bible warns against drunkenness; Islam bans alcohol use entirely. Since the early nineteenth century, the moral perspective has competed with a conceptualization of excessive use of alcohol as a disease or disorder, not necessarily a moral failing.\textsuperscript{31}

Congress obviously assumed that alcoholics would be protected by the ADA because the Act provides that an alcoholic must be able to comply with all employment requirements.\textsuperscript{32} Nevertheless, under current case law, it is difficult to imagine how an alcoholic could be determined to be disabled and yet still be employable. If an alcoholic is in recovery his impairment is not significantly affecting any major life activity under the Court's strict interpretations of those terms.\textsuperscript{33} Surely the ADA did not intend that recovering addicts and alcoholics, as well as other people with impairments who are striving to overcome their limitations, such as

\textsuperscript{30} See Jaffe & Meyer, supra note 11; see, e.g., Evans v. Federal Express Corp., 133 F.3d 137, 141 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that alcoholism was a less "sympathetic" case than cluster migraines).

\textsuperscript{31} Jaffe & Meyer, supra note 11, at 398.

\textsuperscript{32} 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c) (2000) provides in part as follows:
\begin{itemize}
  \item [(c)] Authority of covered entity
  \begin{itemize}
    \item [(1)] may prohibit the illegal use of drugs and the use of alcohol at the workplace by all employees;
    \item [(2)] may require that employees shall not be under the influence of alcohol or be engaging in the illegal use of drugs at the workplace;
    \item [(3)] may require that employees behave in conformance with the requirements established under the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988 (41 U.S.C. 701 et seq.);
    \item [(4)] may hold an employee who engages in the illegal use of drugs or who is an alcoholic to the same qualification standards for employment or job performance and behavior that such entity holds other employees, even if any unsatisfactory performance or behavior is related to the drug use or alcoholism of such employee . . . .
  \end{itemize}
\end{itemize}

\textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{33} See infra Section IV.B.2.a.1). Even if an alcoholic is in active addiction, courts more often than not find that even then there is no significant impairment of a major life activity. \textit{Id.}
diabetics, should not receive the benefit of reasonable accommodations that would allow them to work. With regard to alcoholism, as with most other impairments today, if the plaintiff is able to prove that he is disabled, he generally would be so impaired that he would be unable to perform the essential functions of the job. In other words, he would be too impaired to work.

A recovering alcoholic or an active alcoholic whose work performance is not affected could argue that he was 1) perceived as being disabled, or 2) has a record of disability, as alternative paths to meeting the requirement of having a disability for the purposes of the ADA. Although the courts' interpretations likewise make these avenues unlikely, if an alcoholic plaintiff were to succeed at this point, under neither path would he likely be entitled to a reasonable accommodation.

At the present time, most employers believe that they must accommodate an alcoholic and give him leave to go to treatment. However, as this article illustrates, courts are not protecting alcoholics under the ADA, which will eventually lead to employers refusing the accommodation of leave to go to treatment that has saved countless people from becoming totally disabled by this debilitating illness. The threat of losing one's job is a powerful incentive to get sober, and this will no longer be available.

Obviously, the ADA is asking the wrong question for alcoholism and other similar impairments, such as diabetes and high blood pressure, that without proper management are inevitably disabling. With proper treatment and management, under the courts' restrictive interpretations, such impairments are not disabling. The question should be, how do we enable such impaired employees to keep working? Congress clearly

35. In the case of alcoholics, these accommodations would include leave to go to treatment, AA meetings, and/or counseling, and a second chance in the event of relapse. See infra Section IV.B.2.c.
36. Cases usually end today with the court deciding that the plaintiff is not disabled, so the question of whether he could perform the duties of the job generally does not arise. See infra Section IV.B.2.a.1)-3).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
38. See infra Section IV.B.2.a.2)-3).
39. See infra Section IV.B.2.c.
40. As indeed they must under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611-2615 (2000), but not under the ADA. Also, the FMLA defines employer as a person who employs 50 or more employees and the ADA defines employer as a person who employs 15 or more employees, so the FMLA covers fewer employers than the ADA. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A) (2000) with 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2000). The fact that intended beneficiaries of the ADA are protected by another statute is not a satisfactory solution.
41. ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 1, at 141-42.
intended in enacting the ADA to enable disabled people to work. The courts have disconnected the ADA from its intent by construing the protected class so narrowly that people who are managing their illnesses, and who may need the smallest accommodations to do so, are excluded. Inevitably, when it becomes common knowledge that alcoholics are not protected by the ADA, they will simply be fired when they need to go to treatment.

This result is even more likely because, as one author has pointed out, discrimination against the disabled is rational — that is, it may in fact cost the employer more in time, money, and trouble to employ the disabled — whereas other types of discrimination, such as race and sex discrimination, are irrational forms of discrimination and cost the employer nothing to avoid. Another author has opined that critics of the ADA view it as “in effect work[ing] as a subsidy paid by employers through ‘reasonable accommodation,’ a subsidy likely to be borne disparately within the labor market.” This author points out that this view does not take into account that disability discrimination costs the U.S. billions of dollars and that there are other hidden benefits to employing the disabled.

This article will examine the disease of alcoholism generally in Section II, the ADA generally in Section III, and Supreme Court cases interpreting the ADA and the lower court cases concerning alcoholism and the ADA in Section IV. These sections will show that judicial interpretations have virtually eliminated alcoholism as a disability, contrary to obvious Congressional intent. While this phenomenon is not limited to alcoholism, it is a useful illustration of the damage judicial activism has caused in this area.

Section V will analyze and propose a solution that can be accomplished without a change in the legislation. Requiring the plaintiff to prove that he has an impairment that significantly limits a major life activity has become an obstacle for most plaintiffs, but there are two alternatives to entry into the protected class of disabled persons: being regarded as disabled or having a record of a disability. These provisions should be interpreted more generously to prevent people from being discriminated

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42. Congress was concerned about the high unemployment rate among the disabled, which according to one survey was thirty-nine percent. See Olsky, supra note 34, at 1841.
43. See infra Section IV.B.2.
44. See Bagenstos, Supreme Court, supra note 3, at 946-47. See Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost of Older Workers, Disparate Impact, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 FLA. L. REV. 229, 238-40 (1990) (discussing occasions when it may be economically rational to classify employees by protected groups, although such classification is prohibited by law).
45. See Anderson, supra note 27, at 119.
46. Id. at 119-20.
47. See Section IV.B.2.a.2)-3).
against because of perceived disabilities. People who are regarded as
disabled or who have a record of a disability are people who can work but
are being discriminated against because the employer thinks they cannot do
the job. Congress was very clear that this was the type of discrimination
that was intended to be especially prevented.48

Section VI concludes that once employers discover that their employ-
ees with impairments such as alcoholism are no longer protected by the
ADA, such employees may be terminated with impunity. The cost of this
eventuality is high in economic, as well as human, terms.

II. ALCOHOLISM GENERALLY

Alcoholism is a primary, chronic disease with genetic, psy-
chosocial, and environmental factors influencing its devel-
opment and manifestations. The disease is often progres-
sive and fatal. It is characterized by continuous or periodic
impaired control over drinking, preoccupation with the
drug alcohol, use of alcohol despite adverse consequences,
and distortions in thinking, mostly notable denial.49

There is no cure, and the only known treatment includes complete
abstinence.50 Alcoholics remain as such, whether drinking or not; thus,
alcoholics are in either active addiction or in recovery for life.51 The
rehabilitation process, whether inpatient or outpatient, requires two to four
weeks of intensive treatment, followed by three to six months of less
intense care.52 In order to prevent relapse after rehabilitation, most
alcoholics, especially those in early recovery, require frequent attendance at

48. See Arlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the “Regarded As” Prong: Giving Effect to Congressional Intent, 42 VILL. L. REV. 587, 592 (1997). In addition, the author notes that the Supreme Court recognized that “the ‘regarded as’ prong acknowledges that society’s accumulated myths and fears about disability and diseases are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment.” Id. (citing School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987)).


50. See Marc A. Schuckit, Alcohol-Related Disorders, in 1 KAPLAN & SADOCK’S COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 969 (Benjamin J. Sadock & Virginia A. Sadock eds., 7th ed. 1999).

51. See id.

52. See id.
meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous and/or counseling. Even then, relapse is not uncommon and must be considered part of the syndrome.

The principal societal belief is that alcoholics have caused their own impairment. While this can be said of many impairments, such as diabetes and heart disease, society particularly frowns on alcoholics. Because there is a genetic component to alcoholism that has yet to be fully understood, the idea that alcoholics are responsible for their own impairment must be questioned. Further, since alcoholics probably have a predisposition to the disease, the only probable way to avoid its manifestation, which is characterized by a loss of control and denial, is to never take the first drink. Because ninety percent of the population of Western countries drink alcohol at some time in their lives, generally beginning in their early to mid-teens, alcohol consumption is "an almost ubiquitous

53. See id.
54. See id. "[R]ecovery is a process of trial and error; patients use slips when they occur to identify high-risk [for relapse] situations and to develop more appropriate coping techniques." Id.
55. Smoking contributes to heart disease, as does being overweight. See Russell L. Blaylock, Health and Nutrition Secrets That Can Save Your Life 220 (2002). Obesity is also an important factor in the development of diabetes. Id. at 181.
56. See, e.g., Hobbs supra note 29. However, these attitudes may be changing. "A recent Gallup poll found that almost 90 percent of Americans believe that alcoholism is a disease." Id.
57. See Schuckit, supra note 50, at 958-59.
One finding supporting the genetic conclusion is the threefold to fourfold increased risk for severe alcohol problems in close relatives of alcoholic persons . . . The rate of similarity or concordance for severe alcohol-related problems is significantly higher in identical twins of alcoholic individuals than in fraternal twins in most studies. The adoption-type studies have all revealed a significantly enhanced risk for alcoholism in the off-spring of alcoholic parents, even when the children had been separated from their biological parents close to birth and raised without any knowledge of the problems within the biological family.
Id.
58. See Hobbs, supra note 29.
59. Id.
[Thirty] percent or more of drinkers develop temporary alcohol-related life problems. Severe, repetitive alcohol-related life impairment (i.e., alcohol dependence) is observed at some time during the lives of approximately 10 percent of men and 3 to 5 percent of women, with an additional 5 to 10 percent of each sex developing persistent but less intense alcohol-related life problems that are diagnosed as abuse. Because high levels of alcohol intake can cause diverse medical and psychiatric problems, it has been estimated that 20 to 35 percent of people seeking help from a health care provider have alcohol abuse or dependence. Thus, alcohol-related problems are very common in society.
Id. at 953.
phenomenon" in Western society. Society is blaming the victim in the case of alcoholics even though they are simply conforming to the norm in their original consumption of alcohol. Thus, the stereotypical view of alcoholism as a volitional condition is most likely false.

The stereotypical alcoholic street person is also a false stereotype. Alcoholics usually have jobs and function moderately well in family settings. Because recovering alcoholics are likely to be able to work, they generally may need three types of accommodations. The first is a leave of absence to attend residential treatment. The second is some accommodation that allows the employee to attend AA meetings and/or counseling sessions. I would also venture to suggest a third accommodation, and that is, a second chance if the alcoholic relapses. Because relapse is part of the

60. Id. at 958.

The common perception of alcohol and drug addiction as self-inflicted conditions accounts in large part for the social stigma that attaches to them. This perception is largely unjust; addiction is a disease with a documented biological mechanism. Tendencies toward addiction may also have a genetic component, which further undercuts the idea of voluntariness.

Id. at 2335.

The instinct to blame the addict seems particularly arbitrary and unfair. The underlying hypocrisy behind the blame-the-addict approach is most apparent with respect to alcohol, a product that is used openly and without shame by most adult Americans. The stigma of addiction thus does not attach merely to the behaviors giving rise to the illness, but to the illness itself. The alcoholic is viewed in some way as weak—that is, not capable of "handling" a substance that so many others have the ability to enjoy casually.

Id. at 2337.

62. "[T]he stereotypical alcoholic person who is a homeless bum is very much the exception rather than the rule, representing only 5 percent of all persons with severe, recurring alcohol-related difficulties." Schuckit, supra note 50, at 954.
63. Id. at 953.
64. Id. at 969.
65. Alcoholics may be better off asking for a reasonable accommodation under Title VII. Ironically, reasonable accommodation under the religion provisions of Title VII was specifically referred to in the ADA as not sufficiently generous to use as an analogy for reasonable accommodation under the ADA. See infra text accompanying notes 88-89 and note 93. However, because of the difficulties of proving a case under the ADA, an alcoholic plaintiff might be better off asking for an accommodation to attend AA meetings under Title VII. While AA is a spiritual, not a religious program, ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 1, at 44-57, its belief in a power greater than oneself would qualify it as a religion under Title VII. See C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2006) (religious practices include "moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views.").
syndrome,66 alcoholics should be given at least one second chance. The line has to be drawn, however, between second chances and multiple chances, which may enable the alcoholic to continue to drink.

Congress expressly referred to alcoholism in the ADA.67 The cases under the Rehabilitation Act recognized alcoholism as a per se disability, and the early ADA cases followed suit.68 Recent cases have uniformly rejected the contention that alcoholism is disabling, however, leaving alcoholism unprotected by the ADA. To understand how this has evolved, I will turn to an explanation of the ADA generally, followed by the pertinent cases.

III. THE ADA

A. STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The ADA is a comprehensive act to protect people with disabilities from discrimination in public services, accommodations and telecommunications, as well as employment.69 Title I applies to employment discrimination.70 The ADA essentially follows the law developed under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,71 which applied to federal contractors, the federal government and federal grantees,72 as well as the law73 developed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.74 The ADA’s substantive provisions are a combination of those statutory provisions as well.75

The coverage is the same as Title VII, that is, the ADA applies to employers with more than fifteen employees.76 The protected class consists of any “qualified individual with a disability” who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job.77 Disability

66. See supra text accompanying note 54.
68. See infra notes 256-57.
72. See Long, supra note 71, at 607-610; FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 2, at 793.
73. See Long, supra note 71, at 604; FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 2, at 793.
75. See FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 2, at 793.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000). The section provides as follows:
(8) Qualified individual with a disability
means a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of an individual's major life activities, a record of impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment.\footnote{78} Many of the provisions of the ADA were taken from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,\footnote{79} however, the discrimination provisions of the ADA are much more specific. The ADA provides, analogously to Title VII, that the employer may not discriminate against qualified persons with disabilities on the basis of disability in job application procedures, hiring, advancement, compensation, training and other terms or conditions of employment.\footnote{80} The ADA adds specific provisions that prohibit employers from asking questions regarding disabilities in pre-employment procedures\footnote{81} and limit the employer's ability to require pre-employment physicals,\footnote{82} except for drug tests.\footnote{83}

The ADA also includes a provision identical to the provision of Title VII that is the basis for disparate impact,\footnote{84} which forbids practices that limit opportunities for the disabled.\footnote{85} In addition, the ADA has language that more expressly codifies the disparate impact theory by forbidding practices that screen out or tend to screen out people with disabilities and practices

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{78} The term "qualified individual with a disability" means an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires. For the purposes of this subchapter, consideration shall be given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job. \textit{Id.}

\footnote{79} 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000). The provision reads as follows: The term "disability" means, with respect to an individual—
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment. \textit{Id.}


\footnote{82} 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3) (2000). A pre-employment physical examination may only be conducted after the employer has made an offer of employment and only if all employees are required to take a physical. The provision imposes other restrictions on how the information is used. \textit{Id.}

\footnote{83} 42 U.S.C. § 12114(d) (2000) provides that "a test to determine the illegal use of drugs shall not be considered a medical examination."


\end{footnotes}
that have the effect of discriminating, unless they are shown to be justified by business necessity.\textsuperscript{86}

Defenses to an ADA claim include allowing the employer to demonstrate that any selection criterion that screens out “an individual with a disability has been shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity, and such performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation . . . ”\textsuperscript{87} Although the requirement for reasonable accommodation that does not amount to an undue hardship mirrors the Title VII requirement for religious accommodation,\textsuperscript{88} the ADA provides that undue hardship is not to be defined with reference to Title VII.\textsuperscript{89} The ADA does not define reasonable accommodation but rather lists possibilities such as: redesigning facilities to make them accessible; restructuring the work environment, requirements, assignments, schedules, and equipment; and providing readers or interpreters.\textsuperscript{90} While reasonable accommodation is not specifically defined in the act, the examples given of reasonable accommodations make it clear that a reasonable accommodation can be fairly burdensome.\textsuperscript{91}

Undue hardship “means an action requiring significant difficulty or expense” on the part of the employer, when considered in light of a list of factors, including the nature and cost of accommodation and the financial resources of the facility.\textsuperscript{92} The obvious conclusion is that Congress intended that the burden of proving undue hardship be onerous.\textsuperscript{93}

\textsuperscript{85} Rescuing the ADA from Restrictive Interpretations

\begin{itemize}
  \item 42 U.S.C. \textsection{} 12112(b)(6) (2000).
  \item 42 U.S.C. \textsection{} 12113(a) (2000).
  \item The Court has interpreted the reasonable accommodation requirement for religion to be minimal. See infra note 93.
  \item 42 U.S.C. \textsection{} 12111(9) (2000).
  \item Id.
  \item The term “reasonable accommodation” may include—
    \begin{itemize}
      \item (A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
      \item (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.
    \end{itemize}
  \item Id.
  \item 42 U.S.C. \textsection{} 12111(10)(B) (2000). Subsection (B), which lists some of the factors, states as follows:
    \begin{itemize}
      \item In determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered include—
        \begin{itemize}
          \item (i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this chapter;
          \item (ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the
The other defenses to the ADA differ from Title VII. The ADA does not contain a defense for bona fide seniority systems\(^94\) or for a bona fide occupational qualification.\(^95\) Furthermore, unlike Title VII, under the ADA the employer may require “that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety” of other persons in the workplace.\(^96\)

Title VII's charge-filing and other enforcement procedures are incorporated into the ADA by the employment provisions of the ADA.\(^97\) The

impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity.


94. The Supreme Court has, nevertheless, interpreted the ADA to provide a bona fide seniority defense. US Airways, Inc., 535 U.S. at 391.


96. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2000). In addition, an employer may refuse to employ one with certain infectious diseases in food handling occupations. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(d) (2000).

97. 42 U.S.C. § 12209(5) (2000). Subsection (5) states as follows:
(5) Enforcement of employment rights
Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII and the ADA to provide for compensatory and punitive damages in intentional discrimination cases.98

The remedies and procedures set forth in section 2000e-16 of this title shall be available to any employee of an instrumentality of the Congress who alleges a violation of the rights and protections under sections 12112 through 12114 of this title that are made applicable by this section, except that the authorities of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall be exercised by the chief official of the instrumentality of the Congress.

Id.

The ADA also provides as follows:

(b) Coordination


98. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000) provides in pertinent part as follows:

(a) Right of recovery
(1) Civil rights . . . .
(2) Disability
In an action brought by a complaining party under the powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in section 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000e-5, 2000e-16] (as provided in section 107(a) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12117(a)), and section 794a(a)(1) of title 29, respectively) against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) under section 791 of title 29 and the regulations implementing section 791 of Title 29, or who violated the requirements of section 791 of title 29 or the regulations implementing section 791 of Title 29 concerning the provision of a reasonable accommodation, or section 102 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12112), or committed a violation of section 102(b)(5) of the Act, against an individual, the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b) of this section, in addition to any relief authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent.
(3) Reasonable accommodation and good faith effort
In cases where a discriminatory practice involves the provision of a rea-
sonable accommodation pursuant to section 102(b)(5) of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 [42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(5)] or regulations im-
plementing section 791 of title 29, damages may not be awarded under
this section where the covered entity demonstrates good faith efforts, in
consultation with the person with the disability who has informed the
covered entity that accommodation is needed, to identify and make a
reasonable accommodation that would provide such individual with an
equally effective opportunity and would not cause an undue hardship on
the operation of the business.

(b) Compensatory and punitive damages
(1) Determination of punitive damages
A complaining party may recover punitive damages under this section
against a respondent (other than a government, government agency or
political subdivision) if the complaining party demonstrates that the re-
spondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory prac-
tices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected
rights of an aggrieved individual.

(2) Exclusions from compensatory damages
Compensatory damages awarded under this section shall not include
backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type of relief authorized un-
der section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000e-
5(g)].

(3) Limitations
The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this
section for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconven-
ience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary
losses, and the amount of punitive damages awarded under this section,
shall not exceed, for each complaining party—
(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than
101 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, $50,000;
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer than
201 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, $100,000; and
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than
501 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, $200,000; and
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees in
each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar
year, $300,000.

(4) Construction
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the scope of, or the re-
lief available under, section 1981 of this title.

(c) Jury trial
If a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive damages under
this section—
(1) any party may demand a trial by jury; and
(2) the court shall not inform the jury of the limitations described in sub-
section (b)(3) of this section.
However, the Amendment provides that if the employer acts in good faith to provide a reasonable accommodation, the employer has a defense to the imposition of damages. 99

Although the ADA specifically provides that it shall not be interpreted less generously than its predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act, 100 the Supreme Court has not taken this provision very seriously. The Court has substantially narrowed the interpretation of the term “disability” under the ADA in all but one case, and that case is not an employment case. 101

B. SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATIONS

1. An individual with disabilities 102

   a. Bragdon v. Abbott

   The Supreme Court’s first foray into the ADA battle in 1998 appeared to signal that it would read the Act expansively. The question in Bragdon v. Abbott was whether a healthcare professional had the right to refuse to

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(d) Definitions
As used in this section:
(1) Complaining party
   The term “complaining party” means--
   (A) in the case of a person seeking to bring an action under subsection
       (a)(1) of this section, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
       the Attorney General, or a person who may bring an action or proceed-
       ing under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et
       seq.); or
   (B) in the case of a person seeking to bring an action under subsection
       (a)(2) of this section, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
       the Attorney General, a person who may bring an action or proceeding
       under section 794a(a)(1) of title 29, or a person who may bring an action
       or proceeding under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
       1990 [42 U.S.C. 12111 et seq.].
(2) Discriminatory practice
   The term “discriminatory practice” means the discrimination described
   in paragraph (1), or the discrimination or the violation described in para-
   graph (2), of subsection (a) of this section.

treat an HIV positive patient in his office. The Court explained that in
order to be protected by the ADA, the plaintiff had to be an individual with
a disability, which is defined as having an impairment that substantially
limits a major life activity. The Court noted that the definition of
disability was derived from the Rehabilitation Act and further noted that
the ADA requires that the definition be construed according to the law and
regulations developed under the Rehabilitation Act. Consequently, the
Court adopted the definition of impairment that developed under the
regulations of the Rehabilitation Act, which is a mental or physical
condition that affects one or more body systems. The Court found that
HIV was an impairment at every stage because of the immediacy with
which the virus infects the blood cells and the severity of the disease.

Having determined that the plaintiff had an impairment, the Court then
considered whether the impairment substantially affected a major life
activity. The Court cited the regulations, noting again that the ADA

103. Id. (involving a dentist who offered to treat the patient in a hospital, but not in
his office).
104. Id. at 630.
105. Id. at 631.
106. Id.
107. The regulations referred to were promulgated by the HEW (Department of
Health, Education and Welfare) because this was a public accommodation case, not an
employment case. Id. at 632. The EEOC regulations in this regard are identical. See 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(h).

The Court quoted the regulations and commented as follows:
(A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, includ-
ing speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-
urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; or (B) any mental or
psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syn-
drome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities." 45

Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 632.
In issuing these regulations, HEW decided against including a list of
disorders constituting physical or mental impairments, out of concern
that any specific enumeration might not be comprehensive. 42 Fed.Reg.
commentary accompanying the regulations, however, contains a repre-
sentative list of disorders and conditions constituting physical impair-
ments, including such diseases and conditions as orthopedic, visual,
speech, and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dys-
trophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retarda-
tion, emotional illness, and drug addiction and alcoholism.

108. Id. at 633.
109. Id. at 632.
110. Id.
must be construed consistently with the Rehabilitation Act regulations.\textsuperscript{111} The ADA regulations, copied from the Rehabilitation Act regulations, provide a representative list of major life activities which include "functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."\textsuperscript{112} The Court reasoned that reproduction, the major life activity alleged to be limited in this case, is central to life and should be considered a major life activity.\textsuperscript{113} The Court said that the regulations did not help to determine the meaning of "substantially limited,"\textsuperscript{114} but concluded that "substantially limited" does not mean utter inability.\textsuperscript{115} The plaintiff was found to be substantially limited because reproduction was dangerous to public health.\textsuperscript{116} The Court also bolstered its conclusion that asymptomatic AIDS was a handicap or disability by reference to all of the courts and agencies that had so held under the Rehabilitation Act.\textsuperscript{117} The Court stopped short of holding that AIDS is a per se disability; nor did it hold that the determination of disability would require an individualized inquiry, except by saying that, in this case, the plaintiff alleged that she was substantially limited in reproduction.\textsuperscript{118} The implication was that if reproduction were not at issue, a plaintiff would have to identify another major life activity in which she was substantially limited. The idea that an individualized inquiry would be

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{111} \textit{Id.} at 638.
\item \textsuperscript{112} \textit{Id.} at 638-39 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997); 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(2) (1997)). The dissent disagreed that reproduction is a major life activity, but agreed that this list is incorporated by reference into the ADA. \textit{Bragdon}, 524 U.S. at 659 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
\item \textsuperscript{113} \textit{Bragdon}, 524 U.S. at 638.
\item \textsuperscript{114} \textit{Id.} at 639-41. However, the EEOC regulations have a definition of substantially limited. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii) (2000).
\item \textsuperscript{115} \textit{Bragdon}, 524 U.S. at 641.
\item \textsuperscript{116} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{117} \textit{Id.} at 642-45. The Court reasoned:
\begin{quote}
We find the uniformity of the administrative and judicial precedent construing the definition significant. When administrative and judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its administrative and judicial interpretations as well. See, e.g., Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81. The uniform body of administrative and judicial precedent confirms the conclusion we reach today as the most faithful way to effect the congressional design.
\end{quote}
\textit{Bragdon}, 524 U.S. at 645.
\item \textsuperscript{118} The ADA also requires that in order to be covered by the ADA, the person not pose a direct threat. The Court ultimately decided that whether the plaintiff posed a direct threat must be decided based on objective reasonableness, not the health care professional's subjective judgment. \textit{Id.} at 649. To make this determination, the Court remanded for more conclusive evidence. See \textit{id.} at 655.
\end{itemize}
required in every case originated in the dissent.\textsuperscript{119} The Court made it clear in a subsequent case that a strict individualized inquiry is necessary to determine whether the plaintiff is disabled and that there are no per se or presumptively disabling impairments.\textsuperscript{120}

\textbf{b. Sutton v. United Air Lines and Companions}

\textit{1) Sutton}

\textit{Sutton v. United Air Lines} involved two sisters who applied for jobs as commercial airline pilots.\textsuperscript{121} They were told that they did not meet the minimum requirement for uncorrected eyesight, which was 20/100.\textsuperscript{122} The plaintiffs' eyesight was significantly worse than that, although it was corrected to 20/20 with corrective lenses.\textsuperscript{123} The first question before the Court was whether the plaintiffs' visual impairment would be viewed in its corrected or uncorrected state to determine whether the plaintiffs were disabled under the ADA.\textsuperscript{124}

The Court started out by saying that the EEOC had issued regulations defining disability, although no agency had been delegated authority to do so.\textsuperscript{125} The conflict was not with regard to the regulations, but with the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{119} Id. at 657 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id. at 664-65 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.). In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999), the Court cited Bragdon to support its adoption of a strict individualized test:
  The definition of disability also requires that disabilities be evaluated "with respect to an individual" and be determined based on whether an impairment substantially limits the "major life activities of such individual." § 12102(2). Thus, whether a person has a disability under the ADA is an individualized inquiry. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641-642, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998) (declining to consider whether HIV infection is a \textit{per se} disability under the ADA).
\item \textsuperscript{120} Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
\item \textsuperscript{121} Id. at 475.
\item \textsuperscript{122} Id. at 476.
\item \textsuperscript{123} Id. at 475.
\item \textsuperscript{124} Id. at 477-78. For an interesting view on how the Court crafted the decision, see Mark C. Rahdert, Arline's Ghost: Some Notes on Working as a Major Life Activity Under the ADA, 9 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 303 (2000).
\item \textsuperscript{125} Sutton, 527 U.S. at 481. This statement seems to contradict Bragdon v. Abbott, in which the Court noted that the Act required it to construe the ADA according to the HEW regulations defining disability. See supra discussion accompanying note 107. For a good discussion of the issue of the deference owed to the EEOC regulations under the ADA, see Lisa Eichhorn, The Chevron Two-Step and the Toyota Sidestep: Dancing Around the EEOC's "Disability" Regulations under the ADA, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 177 (2004) [hereinafter Eichhorn, Dancing].
\end{itemize}
EEOC guidance interpreting the regulations. The Court noted that the EEOC defined disability, as did the ADA, as “‘A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of such the major life activities of such individual; B) a record of an impairment; or C) being regarded as having such an impairment.’”126 The plaintiffs alleged first that they were disabled under subsection A), the first prong of the disability test, because they suffered from an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity.127 The EEOC guidance directed that disability should be determined in its uncorrected state.128 Because the plaintiffs were severely myopic, they clearly would be disabled if the measure was made in reference to the uncorrected state. The Court, however, decided that the EEOC guidance conflicted with the plain language of the ADA, and to evaluate persons “in their hypothetical uncorrected state . . . is an impermissible interpretation of the ADA.”129 The Court reasoned that the statute expressed disability in the present tense, “substantially limits;”130 and that the inquiry is individualized, so that the question is whether the individual is currently disabled.131 However, the Court was unduly impressed by the fact that Congress had determined that 43 million people were disabled, and if mitigating measures were not considered, the figure would be much higher.132

Thus, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs had an impairment which, in its corrected state, did not substantially limit any major life activity.133 Thus, the plaintiffs were not disabled under the first prong of the Act.

126. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 478 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994)).
127. See id. at 481.
128. Id. at 481.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 482.
131. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483.
132. Id. at 487.
133. See id. at 482-83, 485, 487. The Court made this determination by using three provisions of the ADA:

[1] The Act defines a “disability” as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities” of an individual. § 12102(2)(A) (emphasis added). Because the phrase “substantially limits” appears in the Act in the present indicative verb form, we think the language is properly read as requiring that a person be presently—not potentially or hypothetically—substantially limited in order to demonstrate a disability. A “disability” exists only where an impairment “substantially limits” a major life activity, not where it “might,” “could,” or “would” be substantially limiting if mitigating measures were not taken. A person whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by medication or other measures does not have an impairment that presently “substantially limits” a major life activity.

Id. at 482-83.
The plaintiffs argued alternatively under subsection (C) of the disability test that they were regarded as disabled by the employer. The Court said that there were two possibilities that could arise under this part of the ADA; either the employee has an impairment that is not substantially limiting, or the employee has no impairment at all.

In either situation, the employer must believe that the impairment is substantially limiting. The plaintiffs alleged that the employer regarded them as disabled in the major life activity of working.

The Court restricted the category of “working” very narrowly, based on the EEOC regulations. Thus, being substantially limited in the major life activity of working, the Court said, requires:

at a minimum, that plaintiffs allege they are unable to work in a broad class of jobs. Reflecting this requirement, the EEOC uses a specialized definition of the term “substantially limits” when referring to the major life activity of working: “significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a

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[2] The definition of disability also requires that disabilities be evaluated “with respect to an individual” and be determined based on whether an impairment substantially limits the “major life activities of such individual.” § 12102(2) . . . The agency guidelines’ directive that persons be judged in their uncorrected or unmitigated state runs directly counter to the individualized inquiry mandated by the ADA. The agency approach would often require courts and employers to speculate about a person’s condition and would, in many cases, force them to make a disability determination based on general information about how an uncorrected impairment usually affects individuals, rather than on the individual’s actual condition.

Id. at 483.

[3] “Congress found that ‘some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities . . .’ § 12101(a)(1).” Bragdon, 527 U.S. at 484. Had Congress intended to include all persons with corrected physical limitations among those covered by the Act, it undoubtedly would have cited a much higher number of disabled persons in the findings. That it did not is evidence that the ADA’s coverage is restricted to only those whose impairments are not mitigated by corrective measures.

Id. at 487.

134. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489.
135. See id. at 489.
136. Id. at 489. It should be noted that the Court had said earlier that the EEOC did not have authority to issue the regulations. Id. at 481. At this point, the guidance suited the Court’s purpose, so it was assumed without deciding that they were valid. Id. at 492-93.
137. Id. at 490.
single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working." 139

The Court concluded that the plaintiffs were only precluded from one job, that of global airline pilot, so they were not regarded as substantially limited in working. 140 The Court expressed reluctance to even regard "working" as a major life activity.

Because the parties accept that the term "major life activities" includes working, we do not determine the validity of the cited regulations. We note, however, that there may be some conceptual difficulty in defining "major life activities" to include work, for it seems "to argue in a circle to say that if one is excluded, for instance, by reason of [an impairment, from working with others]... then that exclusion constitutes an impairment, when the question you're asking is, whether the exclusion itself is by reason of handicap." 141

The Court then "assumed without deciding" that working is a major life activity 142 and has continued to do so since. 143

2) Implications of Sutton

The Court's refusal to fully accept working as a major life activity is inconsistent with the Court's acceptance of the identical language in the HEW regulations construing the Rehabilitation Act and cited in Bragdon v.

139. Id. at 491 (citing § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). The Court further noted:
The EEOC further identifies several factors that courts should consider when determining whether an individual is substantially limited in the major life activity of working, including the geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access, and "the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within the geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified." §§ 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(A), (B). To be substantially limited in the major life activity of working, then, one must be precluded from more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice. If jobs utilizing an individual's skills (but perhaps not his or her unique talents) are available, one is not precluded from a broad range of jobs.

Id. at 491-92.

140. Id. at 493.

141. Id. at 492.

142. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492.

Abbott as controlling. In addition, there is no question that working represents an activity of central importance to most people’s lives; as one commentator has stated, “[w]orking is a major part of being ‘normal’ in our society.” Comparing working to the other life activities that the Court has recognized as “major life activities,” such as “household chores, bathing and brushing one’s teeth,” and reproduction, working must certainly be included from a rational point of view. Furthermore, the agency interpretations, which are binding under the ADA, have always included it. Therefore, the Court did not continue its indulgent interpretation of the ADA that originated in Bragdon.

The Court in Sutton also made it clear that there were no per se disabilities, citing Bragdon v. Abbott for the proposition. In fact, Bragdon v. Abbott did not require a strict individualized inquiry, but instead relied heavily on authority that considered asymptomatic HIV a disability in every case. The only individualized inquiry was in which major life activity the plaintiff was restricted. The plaintiff in Bragdon alleged that she was restricted in reproduction, but the Court indicated that there could be other restrictions, such as sexual activity. The Court was clearly assuming in the Bragdon case that HIV would be disabling in every case, although it might affect different major life activities. Beginning with the Sutton case, however, the Court started to chart its own course, ignoring legislative

144. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 632-33. In addition, “working” was also included in the list of major life activities from the Senate and House Committee reports on the ADA. See Burgdorf, supra note 15, at 438.

145. See Bagenstos, Subordination, supra note 28, at 506 (“Working is ‘a means of proving yourself worthy in your own eyes and in the eyes of others’ . . . . People who cannot work because of their impairments are therefore likely to experience prejudice . . . and neglect. . . .”).

146. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 202.

147. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638.

148. See Bagenstos, Subordination, supra note 28, at 409-10 (citing, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994)):
The ADA expressly incorporates the regulations the Executive Branch had previously promulgated to implement the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Even if the regulations promulgated under the ADA were not themselves entitled to deference, therefore, the Court has made clear that the substantively identical regulations promulgated under the Rehabilitation act would nonetheless provide a floor below which the ADA’s coverage could not drop.

149. See Sutton, 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) (“The definition of disability also requires that disabilities be evaluated ‘with respect to an individual’ and be determined based on whether an impairment substantially limits the major life activities of such individual. § 12102(2). Thus, whether a person has a disability under the ADA is an individualized inquiry.”).

150. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 633.

history, agency regulations and guidelines, and case law developed under the Rehabilitation Act. The legislative history is clear that Congress intended that disability be determined in its uncorrected state, and all the agencies interpreting the Act had held so.152

The Court took an easy case and made bad law. No one wants the ADA to protect everyone who has to wear glasses. It obviously trivializes the protected class; however, the ramifications of Sutton go far beyond the population of people wearing corrective lenses. The Court has been criticized for placing so much reliance on the number of disabled people cited by Congress, a figure that was posited to be inclusive, rather than exclusive, of disability.153 Why did the Supreme Court exalt the figure cited by Congress of 43 million disabled people over the much more important congressionally expressed remedial objectives of the ADA?

The Sutton dissenter had the better view:

We must draw a statutory line that either (1) will include within the category of persons authorized to bring suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 some whom Congress may not have wanted to protect (those who wear ordinary eyeglasses), or (2) will exclude from the threshold category those whom Congress certainly did want to protect (those who successfully use corrective devices or medicines, such as hearing aids or prostheses or medicine for epilepsy). Faced with this dilemma, the statute's language, structure, basic purposes, and history require us to choose the former statutory line, as Justice STEVENS (whose opinion I join) well explains. I would add that, if the more generous choice of threshold led to too many lawsuits that ultimately proved without merit or otherwise drew too much time and attention away from those whom Congress clearly sought to protect, there is a remedy.154

152. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 499-502 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153. In addition, the 43 million figure was derived from sources that define disability differently from the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. See Lisa Eichhorn, Applying the ADA to Mitigating Measures Cases: A Case of Statutory Evils, 31 Ariz. St. L.J. 1071, 1113 (1999) [hereinafter Eichhorn, Mitigating]. See also Anderson, supra note 27, at 107 ("The Court majority can be criticized for over-relying on an estimate of the number of people with disabilities, an estimate whose validity was questioned by its own sources . . . . Congress's reference to 43 million individuals with disabilities should be seen as a signal of inclusion, not exclusion.").
As the dissent explained, the Act was not supposed to "weed people out" in the first instance. It would not require, for example, that airlines hire people who pose a danger to others; rather, the Act requires that employers justify their employment requirements.\(^{155}\)

3) **Companion case**

Had the Court used one of the companion cases\(^{156}\) to *Sutton* to express its unauthorized interpretation of the ADA, namely *Albertson's Inc. v. Kirkingburg*,\(^{157}\) it would have been more obvious that clearly intended beneficiaries of the ADA would lose protection. In the *Kirkingburg* case, the plaintiff suffered from amblyopia, an uncorrectable ailment that limited him to seeing out of only one eye.\(^{158}\) Kirkingburg had been erroneously hired as a truck driver because his employer required that all drivers meet the Department of Transportation requirements, yet he could not.\(^ {159}\) He drove for over a year before the mistake was discovered, and he was subsequently fired.\(^ {160}\) Kirkingburg obtained a waiver of the requirement from the Department of Transportation, but the employer would not accept it and refused to re-hire him.\(^ {161}\) The question before the Court was whether the employer was justified in relying on the DOT requirements, which a unanimous Court answered in the affirmative because the DOT waiver program was experimental and not designed to certify safe drivers.\(^ {162}\)

The pernicious part of the opinion was the Court's unscrupulous chastisement of the lower court for so easily finding that Kirkingburg was disabled in the first place.\(^ {163}\) The Court held that the lower court had made three missteps in its finding that Kirkingburg was disabled.\(^ {164}\) First, the Court said that although amblyopia is an impairment and "seeing" is a

\(^{155}.\) *Sutton*, 527 U.S. at 503-04 (majority opinion).

\(^{156}.\) The third case decided along with *Sutton* was *Murphy v. United Parcel Service*, 527 U.S. 516 (1999), in which the Court affirmed the lower court's holding that the plaintiff was not disabled by hypertension because of mitigating measures. In addition, the Court reiterated the holding in *Sutton* that to be "regarded as disabled" in the major life activity of working, the plaintiff would have been foreclosed from a range of jobs. *Murphy*, 527 U.S. at 521-522. In this case, the plaintiff was regarded as unable to perform a mechanic's job that also required driving a commercial vehicle, but he could perform other mechanic's jobs. *Id.* at 524-525.


\(^{158}.\) *Kirkingburg*, 527 U.S. at 559.

\(^{159}.\) The Act allows employers to rely on governmental requirements. *See infra* note 241.

\(^{160}.\) *Kirkingburg*, 527 U.S. at 560.

\(^{161}.\) *Id.*

\(^{162}.\) *Id.* at 558.

\(^{163}.\) *See Kirkingburg*, 527 U.S. at 573-76.

\(^{164}.\) *Id.* at 564-67.
REScue the ADA From Restrictive InterpreTations

major life activity, a person with that impairment is not necessarily substantially limited in seeing. The lower court had in fact said that “the manner in which [Kirkingburg] sees differs significantly from the manner in which most people see” because, “[t]o put it in its simplest terms [he] sees using only one eye; most people see using two.” The Court characterized this determination as the lower court appearing to be “willing to settle for a mere difference.” This clearly contradicts the lower court’s holding in this regard and ups the bar for the finding of “significantly limited” in a major life activity.

Secondly, the Court found fault with the lower court’s view that it was irrelevant whether the plaintiff had made subconscious compensation for his monocular vision. The Court reiterated from *Sutton* that mitigating measures, even if produced by the body and not by artificial aids, must be taken into account. Finally, the Court said that the lower court did not pay sufficient heed to the requirement of an individualized inquiry. The Court said, “[s]ome impairments may invariably cause a substantial limitation of a major life activity . . . . we cannot say that monocularity does.” Again, it should be noted that the lower court clearly said that

165. *Id.* at 565.

166. *Id.* at 564 (citing *Kirkingburg v. Albertson’s, Inc.*, 143 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court said that the lower court had cited the EEOC definition of “substantially limits,” which requires a “significant restriction as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity.” *Id.* at 563-64 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii) (2000)).

The lower court had also said that:

*Kirkingburg’s inability to see out of one eye affects his peripheral visions and his depth perception. Although his brain has developed subconscious mechanisms for coping with this visual impairment and thus his body compensates for his disability, the manner in which he sees differs significantly from the manner in which most people see.*

*Kirkingburg v. Albertson’s, Inc.*, 143 F.3d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 1998).


168. *Id.*

169. *Id.* at 565-66.

170. *Id.* at 566.

171. *Id.* The Court said:

[that category, as we understand it, may embrace a group whose members vary by the degree of visual acuity in the weaker eye, the age at which they suffered their vision loss, the extent of their compensating adjustments in visual techniques, and the ultimate scope of the restrictions on their visual abilities. These variables are not the stuff of a per se rule. While monocularity inevitably leads to some loss of horizontal field of vision and depth perception (footnote omitted) consequences the Ninth Circuit mentioned (citation omitted) the court did not identify the
Kirkingburg could essentially see out of only one eye; it is incredible that the Supreme Court should require more. The Court did ultimately concede that monocular vision would ordinarily be disabling, but its analysis is nevertheless very troubling. The Court was clearly requiring much more than was generally required under prior law to show that a person was substantially limited in a major life activity. The Court was not even finished in this regard, as *Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams* demonstrates.

c. *Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams*

The Court returned to defining “substantially limited” in a “major life activity” in *Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams*. The plaintiff in *Williams* had used pneumatic tools while working for the defendant, which caused her to suffer from carpal tunnel syndrome and tendonitis. She was placed on permanent work restrictions that precluded, among other things, lifting more than 20 pounds, using vibratory tools, engaging in repetitive flexion of her wrists or elbows or performing overhead work. The plaintiff was initially accommodated in a job that did not require any of this; however, extra duties were added to the job that she could not perform, and she was ultimately discharged. Clearly, the plaintiff was disabled, but she had a problem identifying the major life activity that would allow her to prove that she was disabled.

She started out arguing that her impairment substantially limited her in the major life activities of performing manual tasks, housework, gardening, playing with her children, lifting, and working. She also argued that she “had a record of a substantially limiting impairment and that she was regarded as having such an impairment.” The district court decided that playing with her children, gardening and doing housework were not major life activities, and the plaintiff did not dispute that finding. She did appeal the finding that she was not substantially limited in lifting, working

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*Id.* at 566-67.

172. *Id.* at 567.


175. *Id.* at 187-88.

176. *Id.* at 189-90. The parties disagree about how this came about. The plaintiff alleges that she was forced to continue doing the duties that caused her condition to worsen. The defendant contends that she started missing work and was fired for poor attendance. *Id.*


178. *Id.*

179. *Id.* at 190-92.
and performing manual tasks. The Sixth Circuit subsequently reversed the finding that she was not substantially limited in her ability to perform manual tasks. The Sixth Circuit said that she had shown a class of manual activities that she could not perform at work. The appellate court then cited a range of activities that she could not perform, not just in her own job, but in various related jobs. Those included assembly line jobs, manual product handling jobs, and manual building trade jobs that require gripping tools and repetitive work with hands and arms extended over the shoulder for any extended periods.

The Supreme Court limited its consideration of Williams to the “manual tasks” holding of the lower court and held that the lower court had erred in assessing whether she was disabled by looking at what work she could perform, instead of whether she could take care of her personal hygiene and carry out personal or household chores. The Court proceeded to define major life activities as those that are of central importance to daily life: “That these terms need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled is confirmed by the first section of the ADA.” The Court again cited for this proposition the reference to there being 43 million disabled persons in the U.S., which is noted in the preamble to the Act that the Court had relied on in Sutton. The Court said that to be significantly limited in a major life activity, an impairment must prevent or severely restrict the person from performing activities that are of central importance to most peoples’ lives. The Court noted that occupation-specific tasks are not necessarily of central importance to most peoples’ lives, while “household chores, bathing and brushing one’s teeth” are. Since the plaintiff had said that she could still perform all these activities, even though she had difficulty sweeping, had to occasionally have help in dressing, and could not play with her children or drive for long periods, the Court held that the plaintiff was not so “severely” restricted in activities that are of central importance to most people’s lives to amount to a “manual task” disability.

180. Id. at 191.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 192.
183. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 192. The Court expressed no opinion on whether working, lifting, and other life activities preserved for appeal below were major life activities. Id.
184. Id. at 197-98.
185. Id. at 197.
186. Id.
187. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198 (emphasis added).
188. Id. at 201-02.
189. Id. See also Curtis D. Edmonds, Snakes and Ladders: Expanding the Definition of “Major Life Activity” in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 33 Texas Tech L. Rev. 321, 325 (2002), for a good discussion of how restrictively the courts are interpreting
Having again severely restricted plaintiffs in their ability to prove that they are disabled in employment cases, the Court proceeded to decide several cases that do not deal with the definition of "disability." These cases, however, do illustrate the point that the Court has been hostile to employees in its interpretation of the ADA.

2. Other cases decided under Title I that expand the employer's ability to defeat an ADA claim

In *Chevron v. Echazabal*, the Supreme Court looked at the meaning of the "direct threat" defense.\(^{190}\) The Act defines discrimination as, among other things, using "qualification standards . . . that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability" unless the qualification standard is job-related and consistent with business necessity.\(^{191}\) The Act further provides that an employer may have a qualification standard that "an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace."\(^{192}\) The defendant in *Chevron* had rejected the plaintiff for employment based on a liver condition that the defendant's physicians said would be exacerbated by contact with toxins in the refinery where the plaintiff worked.\(^{193}\)

Upon review, the Court in *Chevron* noted that the EEOC regulations "allowed an employer to screen out a potential worker with a disability not only for risks that he would pose to others in the workplace but for risks on the job to his own health or safety as well."\(^{194}\) The Court determined that the EEOC's interpretation of the Act was reasonable.\(^{195}\) The Court did not find persuasive the legislative history of the Act that indicated Congress' concern for paternalism in enacting the Act or the plain language of the statute, that the direct threat defense was limited to a direct threat to

\(^{190}\) 536 U.S. 73 (2002).
\(^{193}\) *Chevron*, 536 U.S. at 76.
\(^{194}\) *Id.* at 78.
\(^{195}\) *Id.* at 85.
others. As in *Sutton*, the Court approved of the EEOC's interpretation when it restricted the protected class. In another defeat for plaintiffs, the Supreme Court in *Raytheon v. Hernandez*, applied its interpretation of the defense of "legitimate non-discriminatory reason" to the ADA. In the *Raytheon* case, the plaintiff had been discharged for violating work rules by testing positive for drugs. Two years later, he applied again and was denied employment. The defendant first stated it was because of the plaintiff's past drug use, but ultimately decided to interpose the defense of a neutral policy that precluded rehiring anyone who had been discharged for misconduct. The Court said that this was a legitimate non-discriminatory reason.

"Legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" was developed by the Court as a defense to intentional discrimination — commonly called disparate treatment cases under Title VII; however, it may not be an appropriate defense to intentional discrimination. See also Lisa Eichhorn, *Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities: The Failure of the "Disability" Definition in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990*, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1417-18 (1999) [hereinafter Eichhorn, *Major*] and Bagenstos, *Supreme Court*, supra note 3, at 933 for discussions of the disability movement's concern regarding paternalism.

Compare the Court's treatment of the EEOC's regulations with regard to working, *Sutton*, 527 U.S. at 492, with the Court's treatment of the EEOC guidance with regard to mitigating measures, *Sutton*, 527 U.S. at 482-83.

The plaintiff was forced by his employer to resign. *Raytheon*, 540 U.S. at 47.

Once the employer produces evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason, the plaintiff bears the burden of persuading the court that the reason given by the employer was not the true reason for the employer's action, but rather was a pretext for discrimination. *St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks*, 509 U.S. 502, 514-15 (1993). In *St. Mary's*, the Court said that the trier of fact may resolve the ultimate issue of discrimination vel non based on its disbelief of the employer's reason for its action, but that such disbelief does not necessarily satisfy the plaintiff's ultimate burden of proving discrimination. *Id.* at 518-19. The plaintiff must prove not only that the employer's reasons were untrue, but that they were a pretext for discrimination. *Id.* at 514-15.
defense to all disparate treatment cases under the ADA. Any reason that is not based on the plaintiff’s protected status is a legitimate non-discriminatory reason under Title VII. The ADA, however, provides that the employer may not have a policy that screens out people with the plaintiff’s disability unless the policy is justified by business necessity. Because the no-rehire policy screens out people with the plaintiff’s disability, the employer should have been required to justify it, even in a disparate treatment case. However, the Court has now put the burden on the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s use of the policy was not a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.

The Court criticized the court of appeals for conflating the two theories of disparate treatment and disparate impact and holding that a neutral policy is not a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason if it has a disparate impact on the protected class. The Supreme Court is actually doing the conflating by treating disparate treatment under Title VII and disparate treatment under the ADA the same. Under Title VII, the defendant discriminates if he treats a member of a protected class differently from a member of another class. Under the ADA, the defendant may be guilty of

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205. See supra discussion accompanying notes 84-85.
206. The lower court was correct in holding that because the no re-hire policy screened out former drug addicts, who are protected under the Act, the no-hire policy could not be a legitimate non-discriminatory reason. Raytheon v. Hernandez 540 U.S. 44, 49 (2003). The Supreme Court reiterated its previously stated conclusion that “legitimate non-discriminatory reason” means any reason that does not discriminate on its face; thus a neutral policy will always serve as a defense. See Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. 604. This case was decided under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, in which the Court noted that a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason or a “factor other than age” can be any reason, regardless of how improper or illegal, as long as it does not violate the particular act under which the plaintiff is suing. Id. at 610-11. The defendant’s neutral policy in the Raytheon case was thus a legitimate non-discriminatory reason that the plaintiff must prove is a pretext for discrimination. Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 53-54.
207. Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 52. The district court had characterized the plaintiff’s attack on the employer’s employment policy as based on the disparate impact theory and foreclosed the argument because of timeliness. In fact, the defendant had not interposed the neutral employment policy as the reason for its action until later in discovery, at which time the court would not allow the plaintiff to amend the complaint and allege disparate impact. Id. at 49. The Supreme Court developed the disparate impact theory under Title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), to preclude the use of neutral practices and procedures that disproportionately impact the protected class. Id. at 430. Such practices can be defended if the defendant can prove that they are job-related and consistent with business necessity. See Johnson, supra note 203, at 1410 for a discussion of disparate impact under Title VII. Unlike the model of proof for disparate treatment, however, the model of proof for disparate impact is codified in the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2000). On remand, the court decided that there was enough for a jury to believe that the employer was discriminating based on the plaintiff’s alcoholism and not because of a neutral policy. Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Systems Co., 362 F.3d 564 (2004).
discrimination if he does not treat disabled people differently from non-disabled people. The employer must offer reasonable accommodation to disabled people. In addition, the non-discrimination requirement of the ADA requires that the employer not maintain policies that screen out disabled people. The Raytheon Court determined that the latter defense is implicated only in a disparate impact case. This contradicts the decision in Chevron v. Echazabel, in which the Court allowed the defendant to interpose the business necessity defense, which is the defense to a disparate impact case, in a case that involved disparate treatment.

Having severely restricted the plaintiff’s ability to prove discrimination under the employment provisions of the ADA, the Court turned to a delineation of "reasonable accommodation without undue hardship." The Court’s entry into this area was in a non-employment case.

3. Cases interpreting “reasonable accommodation”

In PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, a professional golfer asked for an exemption from the rule that players must walk instead of use a golf cart in certain situations. The plaintiff in Martin had a degenerative circulatory disorder that had atrophied his right leg so that he could no longer walk the

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211. This is a fairly critical limitation because the employer bears the burden of justifying his employment policies. The Court seems to indicate that the employer only bears this burden if the case is classified as a disparate impact case. If, as here, the plaintiff contends that he was discriminated against because of his disability, and the defendant contends that he used a neutral employment policy, the burden of persuasion should not remain on the plaintiff to prove that the policy is a pretext for discrimination, rather the burden should shift to the defendant to defend the policy.

It should be noted that in Chevron v. Echazabel, 536 U.S. 73 (2002), the Court did not limit to a charge of disparate impact the defense of proving that the employee posed a direct threat. For a discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 190-97

What should the plaintiff have done in this case? He could have amended his complaint, if he had known in time that the defendant was relying on a neutral policy. If he had relied on alternate theories and his case had been characterized as disparate impact, he would have lost his right to recover damages, which are available only in disparate treatment cases. Traveling only under the disparate treatment theory, the plaintiff would have lost if the employer had shown that the policy was not a pretext for discrimination, even though the employer is expressly foreclosed by the ADA from having such a policy. On remand, the lower court decided that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff was discriminated against on the basis of his addiction. Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Systems Co., 362 F.3d 564, 568-69 (2004).

212. Chevron, 536 U.S. at 80.
214. Martin, 532 U.S. at 661.
golf course.\textsuperscript{215} The defendant contended that exempting the plaintiff from the rule prohibiting the use of golf carts would fundamentally alter the nature of the competition.\textsuperscript{216}

Title III of the ADA applies to public accommodations and has somewhat different language from Title I that applies to employment. Title III defines discrimination as, “the failure to make reasonable modifications unless making such reasonable modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the ‘goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodation.’”\textsuperscript{217} However, since fundamental alteration is a type of undue hardship,\textsuperscript{218} the case has implications for what a reasonable accommodation without an undue hardship is under Title I, as well.

The Court in \textit{Martin} said that the use of golf carts is not inconsistent with the fundamental character of the game, citing their ubiquitous use on golf courses and the rules of golf followed by most golfers that did not refer to the use of carts in describing the object of the game.\textsuperscript{219} The defendant contended that “the walking rule was ‘outcome determinative’ because fatigue may adversely affect performance.”\textsuperscript{220} The Supreme Court did not agree, but even assuming this was the case, the Court said that the ADA requires an individual inquiry into whether the accommodation is reasonable in a particular case.\textsuperscript{221} Because the plaintiff suffers greater fatigue than normal, the Court felt that the purpose of the walking rule would not be compromised.\textsuperscript{222} Thus, the Court held that modifying a “peripheral rule” would not fundamentally alter the game.\textsuperscript{223}

215. \textit{Id} at 667.
216. \textit{Id}. at 670.
217. \textit{Id}. at 682.
218. See Waterstone, supra note 13, at 1841. In \textit{Southeastern Community College v. Davis}, 442 U.S. 397, 410 (1979), the Supreme Court said that making a fundamental alteration is an undue hardship. Also, the EEOC guidance provides that “‘[u]ndue hardship’ refers to any accommodation that would be unduly costly, extensive, substantial, or disruptive, or that would \textit{fundamentally alter the nature of the business or operation.”\textsuperscript{29} C.F.R. 1630.2(p) (2006) (emphasis added).
220. \textit{Id}. at 688.
221. \textit{Id}.
222. \textit{Id}. at 690.
223. \textit{Id}. The dissent is interesting:
If one assumes, however, that the PGA TOUR has some legal obligation to play classic, Platonic golf . . . then we as Justices must confront what is indeed an awesome responsibility . . . . It has been rendered the solemn duty of the Supreme Court of the United States . . . to decide What is Golf. I am sure that the Framers of the Constitution, aware of the 1457 edict of James II of Scotland prohibiting golf because it interfered with the practice of archery, fully expected that sooner or later the paths of golf and government, the law and the links, would once again cross and that the judges of this august Court would some day have to wrestle
Having distributed largesse once again in a non-employment case defining Title III’s analogue to undue hardship, the Supreme Court proceeded to interpret the Act narrowly in its first reasonable accommodation/undue hardship employment case under the ADA. In *US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett*, the Supreme Court addressed the terms “reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship” for the first time under the ADA. In *Barnett*, the plaintiff’s request for an accommodation required overriding the employer’s seniority system. The Court decided that overriding the seniority system would not be a reasonable accommodation in the usual case. In reaching this decision, the Court provided insight, not only into the nature of reasonable accommodation, but also into the burden of proving reasonable accommodation and undue hardship.

With regard to the burden of proving reasonable accommodation and undue hardship, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that he need only prove that an accommodation is effective. The Court said that an effective accommodation is not necessarily reasonable for the business. Thus, the employee bears the burden of proving that an accommodation was reasonable, meaning feasible for the employer in the usual case. Once the plaintiff has met this burden, the employer must prove that the accommodation is an undue hardship in the particular case. In the *Barnett* case, then, the Court said that a violation of the seniority system would not be a reasonable accommodation in the usual case, so the employee would have to show special circumstances in order to prevail on its burden of showing reasonable accommodation.

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*Id.* at 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting).


226. *Id.* at 398. The Court said that whether collectively bargained or unilaterally imposed by the employer, seniority systems provide “important employee benefits by creating, and fulfilling, employee expectations of fair, uniform treatment.” The Court said lastly that the most important consideration was that if the employer were to have to justify its seniority system in the usual case, that, in itself, would undermine employee expectations. The Court did leave open the possibility that if the seniority system was not administered in such a way as to raise employee expectations, then there could be special circumstances in which a violation of the seniority system would be a reasonable accommodation. *Id.* at 404-05.


228. *Id.*

229. *Id.* at 400-02.

230. *Id.* at 401-02.

231. *Id.* at 406.
In other words, the employee bears the burden of proving not only that he is disabled but that he can perform the essential duties of the job with or without reasonable accommodation, and also that the accommodation is not unreasonable and not an undue hardship "in the usual case." The employer bears no burden of proof unless he has to show that the accommodation is an undue hardship in this particular case.

The net effect of the Court's cases detailed above, in addition to the restrictive interpretation of reasonable accommodation and legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, is to limit the protected class to employees who are almost totally restricted in a major life activity, which has to be important to the everyday life of most people. Thus, it is difficult to see who, other than persons who are totally unable to see, hear, or walk, will be included in the protected class. People with less restricting impairments, such as alcoholism, are now rarely able to prove that they are disabled.232

IV. ALCOHOLISM UNDER THE ADA

Because of the restrictive interpretation of "individual with a disability," few if any alcoholics could be considered to be disabled under the ADA and consequently would not be entitled to the mildest of accommodations to maintain their sobriety. The alcoholic may be put in the bind of being unable to maintain his sobriety without time to go to Alcoholics Anonymous meetings or counseling. If he relapses, he will be fired because he is not able to measure up to the requirements of the job. Under the ADA, the question for alcoholics is 1) whether they are disabled; 2) whether they can perform the essential duties of the job; 3) if so, whether they are entitled to a reasonable accommodation; and 4) what would be a reasonable accommodation?

The first problem for purposes of the ADA is, whether an alcoholic, active or recovering, can ever prove that he is disabled and thus be entitled to any of the accommodations necessary to secure and maintain his sobriety? In order to qualify for protection under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove that he is disabled, that he has an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, and that he can perform the essential duties of the job with or without reasonable accommodation.233

A. ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG ADDICTION UNDER THE ADA GENERALLY

The first question is whether an alcoholic has an impairment. The regulations define impairment as a physiological disorder or condition, as

232. See infra Section IV.B.2.
well as a mental or psychological disorder. Alcoholism is considered both a physical and psychological impairment, as discussed above. Although scientists disagree as to the exact nature of the impairment, all agree that it is an impairment of some kind, as recognized by Congress and the Rehabilitation Act. As noted, the ADA must provide no less than the protection afforded by the Rehabilitation Act.

In the ADA, Congress distinguished drug addicts from alcoholics and excluded active drug addicts from the protection of the Act, as well as employees and applicants who are currently using illegal drugs.

234. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. at 632. The regulations referred to were promulgated by the HEW because this was a public accommodation case, not an employment case. Id. at 632. The EEOC regulations in this regard are identical. See supra note 107. The Court in Bragdon quoted the regulations and commented as follows:

A) any physiological disorder or condition, any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; or

(B) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities. 45 CFR § 84.3(i)(2)(i) (1997).

In issuing these regulations, HEW decided against including a list of disorders constituting physical or mental impairments, out of concern that any specific enumeration might not be comprehensive. 42 Fed.Reg. 22685 (1977), reprinted in 45 CFR pt. 84, App. A, p. 334 (1997). The commentary accompanying the regulations, however, contains a representative list of disorders and conditions constituting physical impairments, including “such diseases and conditions as orthopedic, visual, speech, and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional illness, and . . . drug addiction and alcoholism.”

Bragdon, at 632-33.

235. See Hobbs, supra note 29.

236. Congress included specific provisions in the ADA regarding alcohol and drug addicts. See supra note 32. From these provisions, it can be seen that Congress was assuming that alcoholics and drug addicts would be covered and made special provisions for them, clearly wanting to protect those who were in recovery.

237. See infra notes 256-57.


42 U.S.C. §12114 (2000) provides as follows:

(a) For purposes of this subchapter, the term “qualified individual with a disability” shall not include any employee or applicant who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when the covered entity acts on the basis of such use.

(b) Rules of construction
Nothing in subsection (a) of this section shall be construed to exclude as a qualified individual with a disability an individual who—
(1) has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program and is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs, or has otherwise been rehabilitated successfully and is no longer engaging in such use;
(2) is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and is no longer engaging in such use; or
(3) is erroneously regarded as engaging in such use, but is not engaging in such use; except that it shall not be a violation of this chapter for a covered entity to adopt or administer reasonable policies or procedures, including but not limited to drug testing, designed to ensure that an individual described in paragraph (1) or (2) is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs.
(c) Authority of covered entity
A covered entity—
(1) may prohibit the illegal use of drugs and the use of alcohol at the workplace by all employees;
(2) may require that employees shall not be under the influence of alcohol or be engaging in the illegal use of drugs at the workplace;
(3) may require that employees behave in conformance with the requirements established under the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988 (41 U.S.C. 701 et seq.);
(4) may hold an employee who engages in the illegal use of drugs or who is an alcoholic to the same qualification standards for employment or job performance and behavior that such entity holds other employees, even if any unsatisfactory performance or behavior is related to the drug use or alcoholism of such employee; and
(5) may, with respect to Federal regulations regarding alcohol and the illegal use of drugs, require that—
(A) employees comply with the standards established in such regulations of the Department of Defense, if the employees of the covered entity are employed in an industry subject to such regulations, including complying with regulations (if any) that apply to employment in sensitive positions in such an industry, in the case of employees of the covered entity who are employed in such positions (as defined in the regulations of the Department of Defense);
(B) employees comply with the standards established in such regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, if the employees of the covered entity are employed in an industry subject to such regulations, including complying with regulations (if any) that apply to employment in sensitive positions in such an industry, in the case of employees of the covered entity who are employed in such positions (as defined in the regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission); and
(C) employees comply with the standards established in such regulations of the Department of Transportation, if the employees of the covered entity are employed in a transportation industry subject to such regulations, including complying with such regulations (if any) that apply to employment in sensitive positions in such an industry, in the case of employees of the covered entity who are employed in such positions (as defined in the regulations of the Department of Transportation).
(d) Drug testing
However, the protection of the Act is reinstated if the drug addict has done the following:

(1) successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program and is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs, or has otherwise been rehabilitated successfully and is no longer engaging in such use;

(2) is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and is no longer engaging in such use; or

(3) is erroneously regarded as engaging in such use, but is not engaging in such use.239

The employer may forbid the use of alcohol and drugs on the premises and impose the same job requirements on alcoholics and drug addicts as required of other employees, even if unsatisfactory performance is related to the drug use or alcoholism of such employee.240 The ADA also allows

(1) In general
For purposes of this subchapter, a test to determine the illegal use of drugs shall not be considered a medical examination.

(2) Construction
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to encourage, prohibit, or authorize the conducting of drug testing for the illegal use of drugs by job applicants or employees or making employment decisions based on such test results.

(e) Transportation employees
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to encourage, prohibit, restrict, or authorize the otherwise lawful exercise by entities subject to the jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation of authority to--

(1) test employees of such entities in, and applicants for, positions involving safety-sensitive duties for the illegal use of drugs and for on-duty impairment by alcohol; and

(2) remove such persons who test positive for illegal use of drugs and on-duty impairment by alcohol pursuant to paragraph (1) from safety-sensitive duties in implementing subsection (c) of this section.

239. 42 U.S.C. §12114(b) (2000). The courts are being hard on the addict in this regard also. For example, in Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2001), the plaintiff was convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicants and required to participate in a treatment program. Her employer fired her for her absence during the treatment program. The court said that she was not entitled to the safe harbor provision of the ADA that extends protection to employees who are participating in a treatment and are no longer using drugs. Id. at 1189. The court held the provision only applies to employees who have refrained from using drugs for a significant period of time. Id. at 1186. Thus, under this interpretation, the safe harbor provision will never apply. See Brown, 246 F.3d 1182.

240. See generally 42 U.S.C. §12113(a) (2000) (explaining possible defense of discrimination within the area of job qualifications and standards. This section allows for
employers to institute drug testing to ensure that a drug addict is no longer using drugs.241

For purposes of this article, I will treat recovering alcoholics and recovering drug addicts the same because both are theoretically protected by the ADA. As stated previously, the ADA protects active alcoholics, but not active drug addicts.242

such qualifications that tend to exclude disabled so long as they are shown to be job related and cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation).

241. The ADA allows drug testing of applicants, which is not considered a medical examination, an exclusion under the Act. Furthermore, the ADA provides that:

Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to encourage, prohibit, or authorize the conducting of drug testing for the illegal use of drugs by job applicants or employees or making employment decisions based on such test results.


There are other provisions regarding compliance with various other federal laws and regulations. According to § 12114(c)(5) of the ADA, an employer may require that:
(A) employees comply with the standards established in such regulations of the Department of Defense, if the employees of the covered entity are employed in an industry subject to such regulations, including complying with regulations (if any) that apply to employment in sensitive positions in such an industry, in the case of employees of the covered entity who are employed in such positions (as defined in the regulations of the Department of Defense);
(B) employees comply with the standards established in such regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, if the employees of the covered entity are employed in an industry subject to such regulations, including complying with regulations (if any) that apply to employment in sensitive positions in such an industry, in the case of employees of the covered entity who are employed in such positions (as defined in the regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission); and
(C) employees comply with the standards established in such regulations of the Department of Transportation, if the employees of the covered entity are employed in a transportation industry subject to such regulations, including complying with such regulations (if any) that apply to employment in sensitive positions in such an industry, in the case of employees of the covered entity who are employed in such positions (as defined in the regulations of the Department of Transportation).

Furthermore, the Act provides in 42 U.S.C. § 12114(e):

Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to encourage, prohibit, restrict, or authorize the otherwise lawful exercise by entities subject to the jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation of authority to--
(1) test employees of such entities in, and applicants for, positions involving safety-sensitive duties for the illegal use of drugs and for on-duty impairment by alcohol; and
(2) remove such persons who test positive for illegal use of drugs and on-duty impairment by alcohol pursuant to paragraph (1) from safety-sensitive duties in implementing subsection (c) of this section.

242. Illegal drug users face different problems under the ADA. For example, in Salley v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 977 (3d Cir. 1998), the plaintiff was fired for
misconduct relating to his drug use. He was diagnosed a current user of illegal drugs at the
time of his discharge. *Id.* at 979. While he was in treatment for the drug use, he gave the
company a written statement regarding his drug use. *Id.* The company fired him when it
learned in the statement that he had used illegal drugs. *Id.* The court held that the company
could fire him for drug-related conduct, and that his participation in the treatment program
did not protect him because he was an illegal drug user at the time of the misconduct. *Id.* at
981-82. The court noted that "current user" includes people whose abstinence is longer than
the plaintiff's three weeks. The court cited various cases where the courts found that
plaintiffs were current users in abstinence periods that were longer than the plaintiff's in this
case. *Id.* at 980 n.2.

In *Nielson v. Moroni Feed Co.* , 162 F.3d 604 (10th Cir. 1998), the plaintiff was
the president of the company and alleged that he was erroneously perceived as being
addicted to legal drugs. *Id.* at 606-07. He was evaluated at a drug treatment center, where
they determined that he was not a drug addict. *Id.* at 607. The Board of Directors
discharged him for misconduct. *Id.* The court said that the mere status of being an illegal
drug user may be protected, but the protection is not extended to one currently using drugs.
*Id.* at 609. If an addict has used drugs in the weeks or months prior to his discharge, he is a
current user and not protected unless he has successfully completed a drug rehabilitation
program and/or is participating in such a program and is no longer using illegal drugs or if
he is erroneously regarded as using illegal drugs. *Nielson*, 162 F.3d at 609-10. However,
being erroneously regarded as using illegal drugs is only considered a disability if it
substantially limits a major life activity. *Id.* at 611. The plaintiff failed to produce evidence
of anyone perceiving him as being a drug addict limited in a major life activity. The
plaintiff's contention is that the company thought his alleged drug use was severe enough to
prevent his being able to perform his duties as company president. The court said that this
was insufficient to render him substantially limited in his ability to work because it is only
one job and not a range of jobs. *Id.* at 611-12. In any event, it was clear, the court said, that
he was discharged for his misconduct and not because the company thought he was a drug
addict. *Id.* at 613.

In *Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare System, Ltd.*, 176 F.3d 847 (5th Cir. 1999), the
plaintiff pharmacist was fired after he called into work stating that he was high on cocaine,
and after he received treatment for his drug addiction. *Id.* at 852. First, the court said that
the plaintiff was a current user of illegal drugs because he was informed of the decision to
fire him five weeks after he went into treatment. *Id.* at 855-857. To support its decision, the
321 (S.D. Miss. 1995)) and three weeks (citing Shafer v. Preston Mem'l Hosp. Corp., 107
F.3d 274, 278 (4th Cir. 1997)) amounted to current use. *Id.* at 856-57. He was not entitled
to the protection of the safe harbor provision because he had not completed a treatment
program and had not been drug-free for a significant period of time. *Id.* at 857. Further-
more, the court discussed that the hospital may have reasonably believed he was not
qualified to perform his job because his drug addiction would have undermined the integrity
of the hospital pharmacy. *Zenor*, 176 F.3d at 858. The hospital was entitled to consider the
relapse rate for cocaine users, which is high, in its assessment of whether he was qualified.
*Id.* at 858. As an alternative ground for its holding, the court explained that he was not
disabled "within the meaning of the ADA." *Id.* at 859. The plaintiff argued that he was
regarded as a drug addict, and therefore should be considered disabled under the ADA,
specifically § 12102(2)(c), which is the "regarded as" or "perception" category. *Id.* The
court held that in order to fulfill the "regarded as" or "perception" category, he had to show
that he was perceived that his drug addiction substantially limited a major life activity. The
only available major life activity was working, and he could only show that employer
believed that he could not be a pharmacist. *Id.* at 860. The court said that a broad range of
The next question in deciding whether the alcoholic, active or recovering, is disabled is whether his impairment substantially limits him in a major life activity. With regard to the question of whether he has an impairment, Congress and the lower courts have always assumed that alcoholism is an impairment, and, until recently, a per se disability. The Supreme Court has not always been so generous.

B. CASES ON ALCOHOLISM

1. Supreme Court cases

The Supreme Court has not dealt with cases under the ADA that involve alcoholism, although it did decide a case involving a drug addict, as discussed earlier, in which the Court did not reach the issue of drug addiction. As discussed below, the Court has decided one case involving alcoholism under the Rehabilitation Act. Aside from the cases previously mentioned, the Court has decided only one other case involving alcoholism, and like the other cases, the Court was less than charitable toward alcoholics and addicts.

Powell v. Texas, involved whether an alcoholic could be criminally sanctioned for public drunkenness. The Court opined in this 1968 opinion that an alcoholic was better off in jail than out on the street intoxicated.

[F]acilities for the attempted treatment of indigent alcoholics are woefully lacking throughout the country. (footnote omitted) It would be tragic to return large numbers of helpless, sometimes dangerous and frequently unsanitary ine-
briates to the streets of our cities without even the opportunity to sober up adequately which a brief jail term provides.248

This opinion reflects many of the stereotypes the ADA was designed to ameliorate. Also, it could be argued that the Court’s cabined 1968 view of alcoholics and the disease of alcoholism might have changed with more advanced medical understanding of alcoholism as a disease.249 However, several years later, in a case decided under the Rehabilitation Act, the Supreme Court did not treat alcoholism more indulgently.

In Traynor v. Turnage, the question before the Court was whether, in enacting the Rehabilitation Act, Congress was rejecting the position it had taken a year earlier under the law relating to veterans, which denominated primary alcoholism as “willful misconduct” for which the plaintiffs could lose their benefits.250 Under the Veterans Administration Act, the V.A. conclusively presumed that primary alcoholism, as opposed to alcoholism that is secondary to mental illness, was “willful.”251 The plaintiff contended that this conclusive presumption was inconsistent with the Rehabilitation Act’s requirement that mandates an individualized inquiry.252 The plaintiffs argued that the V.A., in denying their benefits, was acting based on “generalized determinations that lack any substantial basis.”253 Even though the Court concluded that it did not have to decide whether alcoholism is a disease beyond the victim’s control, the Court quoted the district court’s position on the matter, and then added its own sentiment, citing:

248. Id. at 528 (citation omitted).
249. See supra Section II. Commenting on the disease concept of alcoholism, the Court in Powell noted:

[T]he inescapable fact is that there is no agreement among members of the medical profession about what it means to say that “alcoholism” is a “disease.” One of the principal works in this field states that the major difficulty in articulating a “disease concept of alcoholism” is that “alcoholism has too many definitions and disease has practically none” . . . This same author concludes that “a disease is what the medical profession recognizes as such.” . . . In other words, there is widespread agreement today that “alcoholism” is a “disease,” for the simple reason that the medical profession has concluded that it should attempt to treat those who have drinking problems. There the agreement stops. Debate rages within the medical profession as to whether “alcoholism” is a separate “disease” in any meaningful biochemical, physiological or psychological sense, or whether it represents one peculiar manifestation in some individuals of underlying psychiatric disorders.

Powell, 392 U.S. at 522 (footnotes omitted).
250. See id.
251. Id. at 545-47.
252. Id. at 550.
253. Id.
“a substantial body of medical literature that even contests the proposition that alcoholism is a disease, much less that it is a disease for which the victim bears no responsibility. . . .” Indeed, even among many who consider alcoholism a “disease” to which its victims are genetically predisposed, the consumption of alcohol is not regarded as wholly involuntary. 254

The Court ultimately concluded that for purposes of veteran’s benefits only, the Rehabilitation Act does not mandate an individualized inquiry of the factors other than mental illness contributing to primary alcoholism because Congress and the V.A. have reasonably determined that no such factors exist. 255

Despite the fact that the Supreme Court had taken positions hostile to alcoholism as a disease for purposes of the criminal law and Veterans’ Administration law, the Court has not rejected alcoholism as a disease under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. Virtually all lower courts accepted alcoholism as a disability under the Rehabilitation Act. 256 The lower courts’ position was carried over into early ADA cases, as well. 257

254. Id. (citation omitted).
255. Powell, 485 U.S. at 551.
256. See, e.g., Duda v. Bd. of Educ., 133 F.3d 1054, 1059 n.10 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing to various cases that have identified bipolar disorder as well as alcoholism as a disability). See also Leary v. Dalton, 58 F.3d 748, 752 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating it is “well settled” that alcoholism is considered a disability under the Rehabilitation Act and citing various cases that held that alcoholism is a disability under the ADA). See also Maddox v. Univ. of Tenn., 62 F.3d 843, 846 (6th Cir. 1995) (assuming without deciding that alcoholism is a disability under the Rehabilitation Act).
257. In Office of the Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office of Senate Fair Employment Practices, 95 F.3d 1102 (Fed. Cir. 1996), the court said “it is well-established that alcoholism meets the definition of a disability.” Id. at 1105.

In Renaud v. Wyoming Department of Family Services, 203 F.3d 723 (10th Cir. 2000), the court noted that it had held in previous cases that alcoholism is a disability under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act:

Our determination that alcoholism is a disability under the Rehabilitation Act may be relevant to a determination of whether alcoholism is a disability under the ADA. (citation omitted) "Congress adopted the definition of [the] term ['disability'] from the Rehabilitation Act definition of the term ‘individual with handicaps.’” By so doing, Congress intended that the relevant caselaw developed under the Rehabilitation Act be generally applicable to the term ‘disability’ as used in the ADA.” . . .

Id. at 729-30 n.2 (citation omitted).

Several circuits have held that alcoholism is a disability under the ADA. See, e.g., Mararri v. WCI Steel, Inc., 130 F.3d 1180, 1180 (6th Cir.1997); Buckley v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 127 F.3d 270, 273 (2d Cir.1997), vacated en banc on other grounds, 155 F.3d 150 (2d Cir.1998); Miners v. Cargill Communications, Inc., 113 F.3d 820,
2. Lower court cases on alcoholism under the ADA

_Buckley v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York_, 258 decided prior to the Court’s unfavorable interpretations of the ADA, discussed above, 259 demonstrates how the ADA was supposed to work in the context of alcoholism. 260 The plaintiff was a recovering alcoholic and drug addict, who was required to give a urine sample for drug testing. 261 Because he had a medical condition known as neurogenic bladder, he was unable to provide the required sample in the time allowed and was fired. 262 He conceded that this condition was not a disability, but argued that his drug and alcohol addiction was. 263 The court agreed. 264 Although he could not show that he was currently substantially limited in a major life activity, the court found that he had a record of a disability. 265

We, moreover, have previously held that “substance abuse is a ‘handicap’ for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act,” (citation omitted) . . . . And this is highly relevant since the ADA states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of

823 n. 5 (8th Cir.1997); Office of the Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office of Senate Fair Employment Practices, 95 F.3d 1102, 1105 (Fed.Cir.1996); cf. Despares v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635, 635 (7th Cir.1995) (noting that the parties did not deny that alcoholism is a disability under the ADA). Whether alcoholism is a disability _per se_ may raise additional issues. _See Burch v. Coca-Cola Co.,_ 119 F.3d 305, 316-17 (5th Cir.1997) (holding that alcoholism is not a _per se_ disability under the ADA and evidence that alcoholics, in general, are impaired is inadequate to show the substantial limitation of one or more major life activities), _cert. denied, _522 U.S. 1084, 118 S.Ct. 871, 139 L.Ed.2d 768 (1998); _see also Wallin v. Minnesota Dep't of Corrections_, 153 F.3d 681, 686 n. 4 (8th Cir.1998) (citing _Burch_ and requiring that a plaintiff show impairment of a major life activity), _cert. denied, _526 U.S. 1004, 119 S.Ct. 1141, 143 L.Ed.2d 209 (1999); _Buckley_, 127 F.3d at 274 (citing _Burch_ and requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate both “that he was actually addicted . . . and that this addiction substantially limited one or more of his major life activities”).

_Id. at 730 n.3.

258. 127 F.3d 270 (2d Cir. 1997).
259. _See supra_ Part III.B.
260. 127 F.3d 270 (2d Cir. 1997); _see also supra_ Section III.B. for further discussion on the court’s unfavorable interpretations of alcoholism as a disability under the ADA.

261. _Buckley_, 127 F.3d at 272.
262. _Id._
263. _Id._
264. _Id._
265. _Id._ at 274.
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (citation omitted) or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title”. . . . Furthermore, the legislative history of the ADA also indicates that the law was intended to apply to recovering addicts. The committee reports state that the term “physical or mental impairment” includes, *inter alia*, “drug addiction[ ] and alcoholism.”

The plaintiff also had to prove that his addiction substantially limited one or more major life activities in the past to prove that he had a record of a disability. The court did not elaborate but concluded that, having shown that he had a record of having an addiction, it could be assumed that he had met this prong. The court ultimately decided that the company was discriminating against recovering addicts who had the plaintiff’s bladder condition because they were required to give a urine sample more frequently. Other people who were not recovering addicts but who had the same bladder condition were not required to give a urine sample with such frequency. While it would be an undue hardship for the company to test the plaintiff less frequently because this would endanger its drug-free workplace status, the company could easily accommodate the plaintiff by giving him more time to produce the sample.

The court’s analysis in *Buckley* illustrates the way the ADA was working, and was supposed to work, in such a case, but after the Supreme Court’s unfavorable spate of decisions interpreting the ADA, the cases dealing with alcoholism are almost uniformly holding that the alcoholic plaintiff was unable to prove that he was disabled.

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266. *Buckley*, 127 F.3d at 273 (citation omitted). The court went on to say:

*The reports also make clear that “[i]n removing protection for persons who currently use illegal drugs, the Committee does not intend to affect coverage for individuals who have a past drug problem or are erroneously perceived as having a current drug problem . . . .”

Finally, the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission’s Americans With Disabilities Act, Title I Technical Assistance Manual (“EEOC Manual”) states that “[p]ersons addicted to drugs, but who are no longer using drugs illegally and are receiving treatment for drug addiction or who have been rehabilitated successfully, are protected by the ADA from discrimination on the basis of past drug addiction.”

267. *Id.* at 274.

268. *Id.*

269. *Id.* at 275.

270. *See supra* Section IV.B.1.

271. Again, alcoholism is just an example, the ADA does not function as it should with regard to many impairments previously considered to be per se disabilities. *See, e.g.*, cases cited *supra* note 312; Olsky, *supra* note 34.
Although a plaintiff has three ways of claiming protection under the ADA, the alcoholic plaintiff is currently succeeding in none of these possibilities. As discussed below, to be a member of the protected class, the plaintiff must prove that he has an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity or that he was regarded by the employer as having such an impairment or that he has a record of such an impairment.272

a. Whether the plaintiff is in the protected class

1) Whether the plaintiff has an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity

After Sutton, the courts no longer hold that alcoholism is a per se disability.273 The trend toward determining that alcoholism is not a disability, however, began prior to the Sutton case, as some courts began to restrictively interpret the meaning of disability.274 In a pre-Sutton case, Burch v. Coca Cola Co.,275 the court said that alcoholism is not a per se disability276 and required the plaintiff to show that his alcoholism significantly limited a major life activity.277 The plaintiff said that drinking affected his ability to sleep, think, walk and talk.278 The court said that his inability to perform these functions was temporary and no different from anyone who overindulges in alcohol.279 Although his alcoholism was permanent, the effects he referred to were not. The court said that the plaintiff produced no evidence of permanent alteration of gait, ability to speak properly, long-term insomnia or memory impairment when sober.280 He admitted that his work was not affected and that he never drank during working hours.281

After Sutton, virtually all courts now generally find that alcoholics are not significantly limited in any major life activity under the Supreme

274. See Catherine J. Lanctot, Ad Hoc Decision Making and Per Se Prejudice: How Individualizing the Determination of 'Disability' Undermines the ADA, 42 VILL. L. REV. 327 (1997) (asserting that courts have generally rejected the concept of per se disability with respect to many life threatening diseases).
275. 119 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 1997).
276. Id. at 315.
277. Id. at 305.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Burch, 119 F.3d at 316 n.9.
Court’s restrictive interpretation of that term. Alcoholics, especially those in recovery, have difficulty identifying a major life activity in which they are currently significantly limited. The most likely major life activity in which alcoholics may claim to be limited in performing is working, which carries its own baggage, as discussed above.

The EEOC defines a major life activity as “functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” The regulations indicate that the list is not exhaustive, and that generally “major life activities” are those basic activities that the average person in the general population can perform with little or no difficulty. A person is “substantially limited in a major life activity if he is unable to perform or is ‘significantly restricted as . . . to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform’ that activity.”

Bailey v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. is a good example of the difficulty of proving that alcoholism is a disability. In the Bailey case, the plaintiff was an active alcoholic whose attempts at recovery had been unsuccessful. Despite this fact, he had generally been able to fulfill his job duties. The plaintiff was eventually jailed for driving under the influence and asked the defendant to allow him to work on a work-release program. The plaintiff contended that he was entitled to this as a reasonable accommodation. The defendant declined and terminated the plaintiff for excessive leave.

The court decided that the plaintiff was not disabled, even though there is no question but that alcoholism is “an impairment” under the ADA. However, the court said that, although alcoholism is not excluded from the ADA, it is treated differently, noting the requirement that alcoholics be held

282. See, e.g., Nauseda v. Tootsie Roll Indus., Inc., 2003 WL 1873519 (N.D. Ill. 2003 April 15, 2003) (holding that the plaintiff was not substantially limited in such major life activities as sleeping and communicating).
283. See supra text accompanying notes 138-143.
285. Indeed the Supreme Court has indicated such, in its determination that reproduction is a major life activity. See Bryan P. Stephenson, I’m So Lonesome I Could Cry. . . . But Could I Sue? Whether Interacting with Others Is a Major Life Activity Under the ADA, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 773 (2004), for a discussion of various life activities the courts have held to be major or not.
287. Id.
288. 306 F.3d 1162 (1st Cir. 2002).
289. Id. at 1164.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 1165.
292. See id. at 1165 (inferring that plaintiff claimed an entitlement to the work-release program).
to the same standards as other employees and that they can be required to not be under the influence at work. The court said that generally alcoholism is not recognized as a per se disability under the Act so that the plaintiff must make an individualized showing.

The plaintiff contended that he was substantially limited in working, but the court said that he did not show that he was unable to perform a broad range of jobs. To prove that he was substantially limited in working, he would have had to have shown that he could not "perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities." The court noted that the Supreme Court's decision in Sutton v. United Air Lines cast doubt on whether working should be considered a major life activity. The court said that proof that one is so limited must relate to the relevant geographic area; the numbers and types of jobs in the area from which the plaintiff is foreclosed; and the types of training, skills and abilities the jobs require. The plaintiff showed only that he had difficulty performing his job, and even that showing was weak because he was usually able to perform. The fact that he was incarcerated and unable to perform was short term and not a substantial limitation.

Similarly, in Boerst v. General Mills Operations, Inc., the plaintiff, a recovering alcoholic, suffered from anxiety, fatigue, difficulty sleeping, and an inability to concentrate. The court held that he was not disabled. The court said that sleeping and working are major life activities, but that concentrating and maintaining stamina are not. The court said that he had to show that either he could not perform a major life activity which an average person could perform or that his performance was significantly restricted. The court opined that the inability to work more than eight

293. Bailey, 306 F. 3d at 1167 n.4.
294. Id. at 1167-68.
295. Id. at 1168 (quoting EEOC guidelines).
297. Bailey, 306 F.3d at 1168 n.5.
298. Id. at 1168 (citing the EEOC guidelines, specifically, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(I)).
299. Id. at 1168-69.
300. 25 F.App'x. 403 (6th Cir. 2002).
301. Id. The plaintiff was concerned that all this would cause him to relapse into active alcoholism. Id. at 404. His doctor recommended that he be excused from overtime and allowed to work no more than eight hours a day. Id. at 405. When the employer required that he work more than eight hours a day, he filed a complaint. Id.
302. Id. at 406.
303. Boerst, 25 F.App'x. at 407. He was unable to show that he was substantially limited in working because he did not make this showing with regard to a broad range of jobs. Id. Finally, he testified that taking an antidepressant had pretty much solved his
hours a day was not enough to show disability, nor did this show that he could not perform a wide range of jobs. With regard to sleeping, the plaintiff showed that he slept only from two to four hours a night. The court said that this was not sufficient to show that he was substantially limited in his ability to sleep.304

McKay v. Town and Country Cadillac, Inc.,305 illustrates another plaintiff's unsuccessful attempt to identify a substantial limitation in a major life activity.306 The plaintiff argued that he had produced substantial evidence that his alcoholism had a devastating effect on his family relations and social life.307 Never again could he go to any social event where alcohol was being served.308 This limited his ability to develop social relationships.309 The court accepted that the ability to interact with others does constitute a major life activity, although other courts have held that it does not.310 However, the court said that the plaintiff was not substantially limited in his ability to interact with others in any event just because he could not attend social events where alcohol is served. The court said that a mere alteration in lifestyle does not constitute a substantial limitation. The question was whether the plaintiff was "significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration under which he performed family or social functions as compared to the condition, manner or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform family or social functioning."311

problems, so since mitigating measures must be considered in determining whether one is disabled, he was not. Id.

304. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at *4.
308. Id.
309. Id.
311. McKay, 2002 WL 1285065, at *4. The plaintiff also contended that the court ignored evidence that it said was not presented that his recovery support groups required his absence from his family for 4-5 hours a day in early recovery. Id. at *8. Added to his work requirement, this left no time for his family. Id. He also alleged that he had no time to form friendships. Id. The plaintiff also alleged substantial limitation in ability to care for himself because he has to limit his intake of food to food that does not contain alcohol. Id. at *11. He also contended that he was substantially limited in his ability to reproduce for fear of passing on the disease. Id. at *13. Even if there were a genetic link which the plaintiff did not prove, the plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence that he is not substantially limited in reproduction. Id. The plaintiff had two children born after he established his pattern of alcohol abuse. However, the court made note that the fact that he had children did not
Alcoholic plaintiffs, indeed most plaintiffs, have been unsuccessful in proving that they are disabled because they are unable to prove that they are sufficiently limited in a major life activity. The usual problem with alcoholics is that even in recovery, they may be perceived by employers as unable to perform. Thus, the plaintiff should be able to proceed under the second prong of the ADA, that the plaintiff was "regarded as" disabled. Again, the restrictive interpretation of "significantly limited in a major life activity" virtually eliminates this possibility also.

2) Whether the plaintiff was regarded as disabled

One of the principal concerns of the ADA was discrimination based on myths and stereotypes surrounding disabilities. For this reason, Congress prohibited discrimination against persons who are regarded as disabled,
even if they are not.\textsuperscript{313} The Supreme Court in \textit{Sutton} recognized only two possibilities for the plaintiff who is trying to prove that he was regarded as disabled: Either the employee has an impairment that is not substantially limiting, or the employee has no impairment at all.\textsuperscript{314} The Court said that, in either situation, the employer must believe that the impairment is substantially limiting in a major life activity.\textsuperscript{315} There is a third possibility cited in the regulations\textsuperscript{316} that the Court did not cite, and that is that the plaintiff is substantially limited in a major life activity because of the attitude of others towards his impairment.\textsuperscript{317} This regulation was included among those that interpret the Rehabilitation Act, which were validated for purposes of the ADA.\textsuperscript{318}

Although the language of the statute applies the substantial limitation of a major life activity to all three prongs,\textsuperscript{319} the “regarded as” prong should focus primarily on how the plaintiff is treated and not on the nature of the substantial limitation.\textsuperscript{320} As noted, however, most courts require the plaintiff to prove not just that the employer acted based on stereotypes or misconceptions, but also acted on the belief that the plaintiff is substantially limited in a major life activity.\textsuperscript{321}

Consequently, as under the actual disability prong of the disability definition, plaintiffs proceeding under the “regarded as” prong are also being stymied by the requirement that they must be perceived as substantially limited in a major life activity. For example, in \textit{Bailey v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.},\textsuperscript{322} after the court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that he was actually disabled, as discussed above,\textsuperscript{323} the plaintiff argued that he should be considered disabled under the alternative provisions of the ADA.\textsuperscript{324} Concerning whether he was regarded as disabled, the court noted


\textsuperscript{314} See Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (holding that correction or mitigation of an impairment disqualifies a person from claiming that s/he is substantially limited in a major life activity).

\textsuperscript{315} Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489.

\textsuperscript{316} The EEOC took these regulations directly from the regulations issued by HEW under the Rehabilitation Act. See Burgdorf, supra note 15, at 434-35. The Supreme Court has recognized the authority of the regulations issued by HEW. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{317} See Mayerson, supra note 48, at 591-92; Simmons, supra note 313, at 75-76.

\textsuperscript{318} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{319} See Eichhorn, Mitigating, supra note 153, at 1432-33.

\textsuperscript{320} See Burgdorf, supra note 15, at 435.

\textsuperscript{321} See Mayerson, supra note 48, at 591.

\textsuperscript{322} 306 F.3d 1162 (1st Cir. 2002).

\textsuperscript{323} See supra text accompanying notes 288-99.

\textsuperscript{324} Bailey, 306 F.3d at 1169.
that the Supreme Court had provided that there were two ways of being regarded as disabled. The plaintiff was not considered disabled under either of these ways because under the major life activity of working, the employer did not believe he was disabled in performing anything but his own specific job.

Logically an employer's central concern is with an employee's ability to perform his specific job. If the test is the individual employer's perception, most employers would not be concerned with whether the employee could not care for himself or anything else. Thus, the "regarded as" avenue into the protected class would never function. In fact, one court has opined that requiring that the employer believe that the employee cannot perform a broad range of jobs has virtually eliminated the "regarded as" claim for the major life activity of working.

*Nielsen v. Moroni Feed Co.* is a good example. The plaintiff was the president of the company and was ousted for misconduct. He alleged that he was erroneously perceived as being addicted to drugs. However,

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325. *Id.* (citing *Sutton*, 527 U.S. at 489). See supra text accompanying note 135.
326. *Bailey*, 306 F.3d at 1169. Similarly, in *Burch v. Coca Cola Co.*, 119 F.3d 305, 322 (1997), the plaintiff's argued in the alternative that he was regarded as disabled.

The court said:

One is regarded as having a substantially limiting impairment if the individual (1) has an impairment which is not substantially limiting but which the employer perceives as constituting a substantially limiting impairment; (2) has an impairment which is substantially limiting only because of the attitudes of others toward such an impairment; or (3) has no impairment at all but is regarded by the employer as having a substantially limiting impairment.

*Id.* at 322 (citing *Bridges v. City of Bossier*, 92 F.3d 329, 332 (5th Cir. 1996)).

There was no other evidence that the employer regarded him as substantially limited in a broad range of jobs, as required. *Id.* While the employer may have been concerned about his inappropriate behavior, there was no evidence that this was regarded as substantially limiting. *Id.* In addition, there was no evidence that the employer discredited letters from his doctors showing that he would be able to refrain from such behavior. *Id.* However, even if the employer regarded his alcoholism as an impediment, there was no showing that the employer regarded him as significantly limited in his ability to perform an entire class of jobs, just his job as an area service manager with responsibility for 20 employees. *Id.* at 323.


328. 162 F.3d 604 (10th Cir. 1998).
329. *Id.* at 606. The Board of Directors told him that they thought he had a drug problem and that he was going into homes to steal drugs. *Id.* He was evaluated and was determined to be a drug addict. *Id.* The Board discharged him for trespassing into private homes. *Id.*
the court said that being erroneously regarded as using drugs illegally is considered a disability only if the plaintiff is perceived to be sufficiently impaired to substantially limit a major life activity. The plaintiff failed to produce evidence of anyone perceiving him as being limited in a major life activity. The plaintiff's contention was that the company believed his alleged drug use was severe enough that it prevented him from performing his duties as company president. The court said that this was insufficient to render him substantially limited in his ability to work because it is only one job and not a range of jobs. The court said the plaintiff must also show that the employer regarded him as unable to perform in a broad range of jobs, not just the job he held.

The Supreme Court in Sutton cited with approval the EEOC's definition of the major life activity of working as requiring that the employee could not do a broad range of jobs, even though the Court was skeptical about working being considered a major life activity. What the Court failed to note was that the EEOC had indicated in its guidance that the evidence needed to prove substantial limitation in working should not be

330. Id. at 611.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 611-12 (holding that he was not discharged because of his perceived addiction, but because of his unexplained trespass into peoples' houses).
333. Id.
334. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2000), which provides that:
(3) With respect to the major life activity of working—
   (i) The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities.
   The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working;
   (ii) In addition to the factors listed in paragraph (j)(2) of this section, the following factors may be considered in determining whether an individual is substantially limited in the major life activity of “working”:
(A) The geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access;
(B) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment (class of jobs); and/or
(C) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types of other jobs not utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of that impairment (broad range of jobs in various classes).
335. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 473.
onerous. In addition, the guidance provides that one rejected from a job because of "myths, fears, and stereotypes" would be covered by this prong regardless of whether or not others shared this view. Clearly, the employer's belief of whether the employee was able to perform a wide range of jobs would be less relevant under the EEOC's guidance.

Shiplett v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. is an example of how "regarded as" should work. The plaintiff had been prescribed a highly addictive prescription drug for a sleep disorder. The plaintiff contended that the employer regarded him as disabled. The court said that the plaintiff had not specified what major life activities the defendant regarded the plaintiff as substantially limited in performing, so it assumed that the defendant regarded the plaintiff as substantially limited in performing his job as a train engineer. The court said that several circuits held the employer does not necessarily perceive the employee as being disabled simply because he cannot perform a particular job. The court decided that a broad range of jobs was involved in this case; however, if the defendant perceived the plaintiff as unable to perform the engineer job, then he would be unable to perform a wide range of safety sensitive jobs.

Some courts interpret "broad range of jobs" to even require the plaintiff to seek work outside his profession. For example, in Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd., the plaintiff pharmacist was fired after he went into treatment for drug addiction. The plaintiff argued that he was regarded as a drug addict. The only feasible major life activity in which he could argue he was substantially limited was working, and he could only show

339. Id. at *1.
340. Id. at *7.
341. Id.
342. Id. at *8 (citing Byrne v. Bd. of Educ., Sch. of W. Allis-W. Milwaukee, 979 F.2d 560, 567 (7th Cir. 1992)).
343. Shiplett, 1999 WL 435169, at *8 (holding that the plaintiff was a direct threat to safety and thus unqualified). See also Avery v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., No. 98-1739, 1999 WL 555299 (8th Cir. July 27, 1999) (stating that after Sutton, to prove that he is regarded as disabled, the plaintiff must show more than that the employer regarded him as an alcoholic and a security risk so that he could not do a range of security sensitive jobs).
344. 176 F.3d 847, 859 (5th Cir. 1999). See also Overstreet v. Calvert County Health Dep’t, 187 F.Supp.2d 567, 572-73 (D. Md. 2002) (finding that the defendant argued that being an addiction counselor is not a broad enough range of jobs to qualify the plaintiff as regarded as disabled. The court did not reach this issue because it held that the plaintiff was not constructively discharged).
that his employer believed that he could not be a pharmacist.\textsuperscript{345} The court said that a broad range of jobs was required, not just the inability to perform in his desired field.\textsuperscript{346}

Unless the courts are willing to interpret the term "substantially limited in a major life activity" more generously, that leaves only the last possibility for claiming protection, "having a record of a disability."\textsuperscript{347} Even here, the same problem arises; the plaintiff cannot prove that he has a record of being substantially limited in a major life activity.

3) Whether the plaintiff has a record of having a disability

The intent of the "having a record of a disability" prong was to protect one from discrimination who has a history of a disability or who has been misclassified as disabled.\textsuperscript{348} This should be an easier route for alcoholics, who usually have a record of a disability. However, because having a record of a disability is not defined in the Act, and the Court has not clarified its meaning under the ADA, the EEOC regulations and guidances, along with caselaw, must be referenced. The EEOC provides that "having a record of" can mean a history of disability or it can mean an actual documented record, such as medical, educational or employment records.\textsuperscript{349} Again, the plaintiff has to prove that he has a record of a substantially limiting impairment. Because the Court requires such stringent proof that the plaintiff is substantially limited in a major life activity, plaintiffs are having difficulty proving this prong as well.

In Bailey v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,\textsuperscript{350} for example, the court said, with regard to the recovering alcoholic plaintiff, that "having a record of a disability" is supposed to protect those who have recovered or are recovering from substantially limiting impairments from discrimination based on their medical history. Although the plaintiff had a record of an impairment, the court found that he could not show that he had a record of an impairment that substantially limited him in a major life activity, such as working.\textsuperscript{351}

\textsuperscript{345} Zenor, 176 F.3d at 860.
\textsuperscript{346} Id. at 860 (citing Deas v. River W., L.P., 152 F.3d 471, 481 (5th Cir. 1998) (discussing how plaintiff could not work specifically as an Addiction Technician because of her seizure disorder); Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 335 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that plaintiff's hemophilia prevented him from performing as a firefighter).
\textsuperscript{347} 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
\textsuperscript{349} Id. at 661-62.
\textsuperscript{350} 306 F.3d 1162 (1st Cir. 2002).
\textsuperscript{351} Id. at 1169.
In a case decided prior to *Sutton, Burch v. Coca Cola Co.*, the court said the fact that the alcoholic plaintiff had been hospitalized would be considered in whether he had a record of a disability, but that the hospital stay was of insufficient duration to qualify the plaintiff as having a record of a disability. 352 This decision is contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in *School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline*, in which the Court held that the plaintiff had a record of a disability because she had been hospitalized. 353 *Arline* was decided under the Rehabilitation Act and is precedent for the ADA. 354

Even if the plaintiff could show he was substantially limited in a major life activity, he still has the additional obstacle of whether he could perform the essential duties of the job.

4) Whether the plaintiff is unable to perform the essential functions of the job and the conflict with the major life activity of working

Title I, which applies to employment, poses additional problems for plaintiffs. Title I requires, in addition to being disabled, that one still be able to perform the essential duties of the job. 355 As discussed above, because of the stringent requirements the Court has imposed on proving a person is disabled, Title I effectively protects very few people. The courts require that the plaintiff be so impaired it is unlikely that he can perform the essential duties of the job. 356

As the court said in one case, it was "assuming without deciding" that working is a major life activity because of the conceptual difficulties of the analysis. 357 The problem, the court said, is that to prove he is disabled, the plaintiff must prove he is substantially limited in his ability to work; however, once the plaintiff shows that his ability to work is substantially limited, then he probably cannot prove that he is qualified for the job. 358 In other words, in order to prove he is qualified for the job, the plaintiff has to prove his alcoholism does not interfere with his job, which then contradicts his being substantially limited in the major life activity of working, the most likely major life activity the alcoholic plaintiff can claim to be substantially limited in performing.

352. 119 F.3d 305, 317 (5th Cir. 1997).
354. See Burgdorf, supra note 15, and accompanying text.
356. See Section IV.B.2.a.1).
358. 358 F.3d at 115.
Even if plaintiffs can prove that they are substantially limited in a major life activity other than working, courts often find that the plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of the job. Several courts have said that showing up to work as scheduled is an essential function of the job, for example. In one case, because the plaintiff was in jail for driving while intoxicated, he could not show up for work. He was terminated for excessive unauthorized absences, which is allowed by the ADA’s requirement that the employee measure up to the employer’s standards. Thus, an alcoholic employee has an even more difficult proof problem because he can be held to the same performance standards as other employees. If he is unable to perform his job because of his disability, he can be discharged for failing to meet the employer’s performance standards. Because of this provision, most courts effectively relieve the employer of its obligation to reasonably accommodate.

Alcoholic plaintiffs often engage in unacceptable behavior, which can serve as the impetus for getting them into treatment. Because employers are not required to reasonably accommodate such behavior, the alcoholic plaintiff can be fired without providing him the generally accepted reasonable accommodation of leave to receive treatment.

b. Discharge for reasons related to disability and holding plaintiff to same standards

1) Bad conduct

Although alcoholic plaintiffs’ unacceptable behavior is usually related to their illness, the courts disconnect the behavior from the illness and attribute the employers’ action to the behavior and not to the plaintiffs’

359. See, e.g., Altman v. N.Y. City Health and Hosp. Corp., 100 F.3d 1054, 1060 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the plaintiff was not qualified to serve as Chief of Medicine because of his inability to stay sober and his conduct that endangered patients and the hospital when he was drinking).

360. See, e.g., Smith v. Davis, 248 F.3d 249, 251 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that an employee who does not come to work on a regular basis is “not qualified” even if caused by his alcoholism, and the employer is not required to accommodate his excessive absenteeism); Leary v. Dalton, 58 F.3d 748 (1st Cir. 1995).

361. Leary v. Dalton, 58 F.3d 748, 753 (1st Cir. 1995).

362. Id. at 753.


365. See, e.g., Leary, 58 F.3d at 753.

366. See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS supra note 1, at 140-145.

alcoholism. Early ADA and Rehabilitation Act cases, such as Teahan v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., generally held that discharge for misconduct caused by the plaintiff’s alcoholism was based on a factor closely related to the plaintiff’s disability, so that firing him for the misconduct was the equivalent of firing him for his disability. The court said it is like a plaintiff whose limp causes him to make a thump when he walks, and the employer firing him for making the thumping noise.

Subsequent cases, such as Maddox v. University of Tennesse, took a different view. In the Maddox case, the court approved the firing of a football coach for driving while intoxicated, which the plaintiff alleged was causally connected to his alcoholism. The Sixth Circuit held that there is a distinction between discharging someone for misconduct and discharging someone for his disability. Otherwise the employer would have to accommodate the plaintiff’s behavior, considered unacceptable in other employees, because of the plaintiff’s disability.

By 2001, the courts were virtually unanimous in allowing employers to fire alcoholic employees for misconduct, even if related to the employee’s disability. These decisions ignore the holding in School Bd. of Education.

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368. See, e.g., Renaud v. Wyo. Dep’t of Family Servs., 203 F.3d 723, 729-30 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding that alcoholism is a disability under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, but firing for misconduct is not firing for disability).
369. 951 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1991)
370. Id. at 516.
371. 62 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 1995).
372. Id. at 846-47.
373. Id. at 847.
374. See, e.g., Pernice v. City of Chi., 237 F.3d 783, 785 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing the virtual unanimity of the circuits on the issue that employers are allowed to fire employees for misconduct, even if it is related to their disability.); Bekker v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., 229 F.3d 662, 670 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that defendant fired plaintiff not because it perceived her as an alcoholic but because she was under the influence of alcohol on the job, for which any employee would be fired); Adamczyk v. Chief of Police of Balt. County, No. 97-1240, 1998 WL 33694 (4th Cir. Jan. 30, 1998) (explaining that plaintiff could be fired for egregious conduct, even if related to alcoholism); Nielson v. Moroni Feed Co., 162 F.3d 604, 606 (10th Cir. 1998) (explaining why plaintiff company president was ousted for misconduct). The Board of Directors told him that they thought he had a drug problem and that he was going into homes to steal drugs. He was evaluated and was determined to be a drug addict. The Board discharged him for trespassing into private homes. Id.; Burch v. Coca Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 319 n.14 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing a number of other cases in which firing for misconduct is not firing for alcoholism); Walker v. Consol. Biscuit Co., No. 96-3747, 1997 WL 359054 (6th Cir. June 26, 1997) (explaining employee fired for being under the influence of alcohol at work, not because he was an alcoholic); Williams v. Widnall, 79 F.3d 1003, 1006-07 (10th Cir. 1996) (discussing employee fired for making threats against other employees while in treatment for alcoholism); Leary v. Dalton, 58 F.3d 748, 754 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding that alcoholism is a disability under the Rehabilitation Act, but that the plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of the job). One of the functions of the job was showing up to work as scheduled. Because the plaintiff was in jail
Nassau County v. Arline, in which the Supreme Court said that it is impermissible to distinguish between the effects of a disease and the disease itself. 375

Nevertheless, because the ADA requires alcoholics and drug addicts to meet the same performance standards as other employees, the effects of the disease can be taken into account when deciding to terminate employment if the employee is unable to measure up to the employer's standards. 376 In Nielson v. Moroni Feed Co., 377 the court said

One area, however, where the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act (footnote omitted) recognize a dichotomy between a disability and disability-caused misconduct is where the disability is related to alcoholism or illegal drug use. (citations omitted) . . . .

The reason this dichotomy exists in the context of alcoholism and illegal drug use is simple: both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act clearly contemplate removing from statutory protection unsatisfactory conduct caused by alcoholism and illegal drug use. Specifically, the ADA states that a covered entity may hold an employee who engages in the illegal use of drugs or who is an alcoholic to the same qualification standards for employment or job performance and behavior that such entity hold other employees, even if any unsatisfactory performance or behavior is related to the drug use or alcoholism of such employee . . . . 378

Thus, employers may fire the employee who is in possession of drugs, 379 under the influence at work, 380 excessively absent, 381 or driving under the

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377. 162 F.3d 604 (10th Cir. 1998)
378. Id. at 608-09 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4) (2000)).
379. See, e.g., Pernice v. City of Chi., 237 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2001).
380. See, e.g., Bekker v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., 229 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that a physician who was reported to have smelled of alcohol while at work and who refused treatment when offered was discharged for presenting a safety and business risk as well as being perceived as an alcoholic).
381. See, e.g., Fogle v. Ispat Inland, Inc., 32 F.App'x 155, 157 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding plaintiff fired for excessive absenteeism, not drug addiction); Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining plaintiff was convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicants and required to participate in a treatment program.)
influence. In addition, employers may fire employees for legal consequences suffered from drinking and for various acts of misconduct caused by drinking.

Her employer fired her for her absence during the treatment program. The court said that she could be held to the same performance standards as other employees. Id.

382. See, e.g., Despears v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635, 636-37 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding decision to drive is not due to alcoholism but bad conduct, for which the plaintiff was terminated). The court said that the plaintiff's alcoholism was not the sole cause of his drunk driving; he had to make a decision to drive while drunk. Id.

383. See, e.g., Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding plaintiff could be held to the same performance standards as other employees); Arbogast v. Alcoa Bldg. Products, 165 F.3d 31 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding plaintiff was not discriminated against because of his alcoholism, but rather his bad behavior and that he could not show that other similarly situated employees were treated differently); Ibarra v. Sunset Scavenger Co., No. C 01-2875 SI, 2003 WL 21244096, at *9-10 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2003) (finding that the ADA does not require accommodation and expressly authorizes employers to hold alcoholic employees to the same standards as other employees); LaBrucherie v. The Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. C 95-1533 SC, 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 12763, at *15-16 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 1995) (finding plaintiff fired for absence from work due to incarceration for DUI).

384. See, e.g., Martin v. Barnesville Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed., 209 F.3d 931 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that whether the employer perceived him as an alcoholic or not, it could refuse to hire him because of his prior bad conduct); Livingstone v. United States Postal Serv., No. 97-6178, 1998 WL 791828, at *6 (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 1998) (finding plaintiff was dismissed because of his intoxication, the fact that he arrived at work unable to perform his duties, and that he threatened the safety of others, were sufficient to support his discharge. Even if his misconduct was related to alcoholism, he could be discharged for the misconduct. But see Brennan v. N.Y. City Police Dep't., No. 97-7779, 1998 WL 51284 (2d Cir. Feb. 10, 1998) (holding that plaintiff policeman was a recovering alcoholic who had consumed alcohol and fallen asleep on a public transport and left his gun in a bag on the subway and later discharged; however, was not discharged due to him disability but due to carelessness).

The current consensus with regard to misconduct related to a disability is expressed in Despears v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 1995), in which the plaintiff was discharged for driving under the influence, as follows:

To impose liability under the Americans with Disabilities Act or the Rehabilitation Act in such circumstances would indirectly but unmistakably undermine the laws that regulate dangerous behavior. It would give alcoholics and other diseased or disabled persons a privilege to avoid some of the normal sanctions for criminal activity. It would say to an alcoholic: We know it is more difficult for you to avoid committing the crime of drunk driving than it is for healthy people, and therefore we will lighten the sanction by letting you keep your job in circumstances where anyone else who engaged in the same criminal behavior would lose it.

The refusal to excuse, or even alleviate the punishment of, the disabled person who commits a crime under the influence as it were of his disability yet not compelled by it and so not excused by it in the eyes of the criminal law is not "discrimination" against the disabled; it is a refusal to discriminate in their favor. It is true that the Americans with Disabilities
These holdings have had further effect. Courts used to say that other disabilities are not treated the same way as alcoholism, so that misconduct caused by other disabilities should not be cause for discipline. Nevertheless, the treatment accorded alcoholism in this regard has spilled over into other disabilities, and misconduct justifies discipline, even if caused by the plaintiff's disability other than alcoholism.

Another difference between alcoholism and other disabilities is that the employer may impose additional requirements on alcoholic employees who have sought leave to go to treatment. Many employers require employees to sign agreements that they will seek no further accommodation; that this is their last chance.

Act and the Rehabilitation Act require the employer to make a reasonable accommodation of an employee's disability, but we do not think it is a reasonably required accommodation to overlook infractions of law. . . .

Id. at 637 (citation omitted). The court said that the decision to drive is not due to alcoholism but bad conduct, for which the plaintiff was terminated and that the plaintiff's alcoholism was not the sole cause of his drunk driving; he had to make a decision to drive while drunk. Id.

385. Id. at 636.
386. See, e.g., Brohm v. JH Props., 149 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 1998) (analogizing the plaintiff anesthesiologist's sleeping during surgical procedures caused by sleep apnea to cases in which the plaintiff was fired for misconduct caused by his alcoholism); Teahan v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., 951 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that a termination for excessive absenteeism caused by the plaintiff's alcoholism was discrimination based solely on disability because it was based on a factor closely related to the plaintiff's disability); Maddox v. Univ. of Tenn., 62 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 1995) (approving the firing of a football coach for driving while intoxicated which the plaintiff alleged was causally connected to his alcoholism and holding there is a distinction between discharging someone for misconduct and discharging someone for his disability). Otherwise the employer would have to accommodate behavior considered unacceptable in other employees because of the plaintiff's disability. Id.

See also Kelly Cahill Timmons, Accommodating Misconduct under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 57 FLA. L. REV. 187 (2005) (discussing misconduct and disabilities other than alcoholism); Gasper v. Perry, No. 97-1542, 1998 WL 393708 (4th Cir. July 2, 1998) (holding in a case where the plaintiff had difficulty relating to people because of catastrophic injuries received in an accident that an employer may discharge an employee for misconduct, even if the misconduct is related to the plaintiff's disability); Matthews v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 128 F.3d 1194 (7th Cir. 1997) (explaining that an employer may prefer a non-disabled employee over a disabled employee who does not perform as well, even if his less able performance is due to his disability and holding that while plaintiff had been out of work because of a heart attack and rated low on quantity of work performed he was not fired because of his disability; he was fired as a consequence of his disability).

387. See infra note 389.
2) Violation of last chance agreement

*Nelson v. Williams Field Services Co.* is typical of the last chance agreement cases. The defendant encouraged employees who thought they had an alcohol or drug problem to come forward and seek help. The plaintiff was concerned about his alcohol consumption, and he was given time off for treatment if he would sign an agreement that he would refrain from consuming alcohol and drugs for the duration of his employment and submit to periodic testing. Three years after his return to work, the plaintiff was arrested on his own time while driving under the influence of alcohol. The district court found that the plaintiff had been terminated for violating the agreement not to consume alcohol or drugs for the duration of his employment, not because he was an alcoholic.

In fact, the plaintiff was discharged for violating an agreement that he was forced to enter into in exchange for leave to get help for his impairment, which has generally been recognized as a reasonable accommoda-

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389. Numerous courts in other circuits have similarly held that violation of return to work agreements or Last Chance Agreements constitute legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for terminating employees. *See*, e.g., Marari v. WCI Steel, Inc., 130 F.3d 1180, 1181-85 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding employer did not violate the ADA in discharging an alcoholic employee who failed to comply with his Last Chance Agreement, which conditioned his employment on counseling and periodic testing for substance abuse); Hinnerschitz v. Ortep of Pa., Inc., No. Civ. A. 97-7148, 1998 WL 962096, at *6 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 22, 1998), aff’d, 203 F.3d 817 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding defendant articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the plaintiff’s discharge where the plaintiff breached his return to work agreement); Nanopoulos v. Lukens Steel Co., No. Civ. A. 96-6483, 1997 WL 438463, at *4 (E.D.Pa. July 29, 1997), aff’d, 156 F.3d 1225 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding where the defendant has advanced valid, non-discriminatory reasons for firing the plaintiff, namely, his violation of his Last Chance Agreement, no rational jury could find discrimination); Golson-El v. Runyon, 812 F.Supp. 558, 561 (E.D.Pa.1993) (holding that the plaintiff was fired because she breached her Last Chance Agreement, not because she was an alcoholic); Brock v. Lucky Stores, No. C. 98-4758 SI, 2000 WL 288395, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar.14, 2000), aff’d, 23 Fed. App’x. 709, 2001 WL 1458014 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding the plaintiff’s failure to strictly comply with a return to work agreement was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating the plaintiff); Lottinger v. Shell Oil Co., 143 F.Supp.2d 743, 767-68 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (finding no discrimination where the plaintiff had received an opportunity to obtain treatment and subsequently violated a return to work agreement); McKey v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 956 F.Supp. 1313, 1319 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (holding the defendants’ termination of the plaintiff for failing to honor the terms and conditions of his return to work agreement was a legitimate reason for termination of his employment).
391. *Id.*
392. *Id.* at *2.
393. *Id.* at *3.
394. *Id.* at *2.
tion. The agreement made him liable to discharge for activities that occurred off the job for which other employees would not have been discharged. Thus, he was treated differently because of his disability, a classic example of discrimination. The plaintiff in *Longen v. Waterous Co.* made this argument when he was discharged for violating a last chance agreement. The court rejected his argument that he had been discriminated against because the last chance agreement was not imposed on other employees. He also argued that he had been discriminated against by being subject to termination for any use of mood-altering chemicals, even if not in the workplace, when the employer’s rule only proscribed use of drugs in the workplace. The court said that the plaintiff agreed to these further restrictions in the last chance agreement.

In another case, *Nauseda v. Tootsie Roll Industries, Inc.*, the plaintiff was required to take a breathalyzer test every day after he returned from treatment for alcoholism. When the plaintiff registered positive on the test, he was fired. In response to the contention that requiring him to take a breathalyzer test was discriminatory, the court said that the Seventh Circuit has indicated this is “a rather generous accommodation.” Rather than firing him, the company allowed him to return to work if he would take the test. The court indicated that it was reasonable for the company to want some assurance that the plaintiff was not under the influence because it would affect the safety of the workers who had to work with heavy equipment. As the court said, “[a]lcoholism is very difficult to overcome . . . Generally, one does not undergo treatment for alcoholism and become immediately cured, which is clear from [the plaintiff’s] own long history of treatment.” The difficulty in treating alcoholism is exactly why the

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397. 347 F.3d 685 (8th Cir. 2003).

398. *Id.* at 688-89.

399. *Id.* at 689.

400. *Id.* at 688-89.


402. *Id.* at *2.

403. *Id.* at *4.

404. *Id.*

405. *Id.* at *4. *See also* Mararri v. WCI Steel, Inc., 130 F.3d 1180 (6th Cir. 1997) (explaining the plaintiff was fired for violating the last chance agreement, not for his alcoholism and that the last chance agreement was an accommodation offered to the plaintiff in lieu of firing him previously); Miners v. Cargill Communications, Inc., 113 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding the company perceived plaintiff as an alcoholic, so she qualified as disabled under the ADA. In addition, while the company claimed that offering her treatment was a reasonable accommodation the court found there was insufficient proof that the plaintiff was an alcoholic and in need of accommodation).
plaintiff needs more than one chance to get into recovery. Requiring an alcoholic to sign a last chance agreement when he has only had one chance to get into recovery consigns many alcoholics to job-loss because relapse is characteristic of the disease. A reasonable accommodation should include some tolerance for relapse. Moreover, employees should not be discriminated against because they obtained a reasonable accommodation to go to treatment and should not be subject to discharge for activities that would not result in the discharge of other non-disabled employees.

c. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable accommodation

The issue of reasonable accommodation is complicated by several factors. If the alcoholic is considered disabled because he is regarded as such or has a record of being disabled, he may not be entitled to a reasonable accommodation. Several courts have held that if the plaintiff is not in fact disabled, but is being discriminated against because of his record of a disability or because the employer regards him as disabled, the plaintiff does not need an accommodation. The clear language of the Act does not distinguish among the three prongs of the disability definition in requiring reasonable accommodation; thus, reasonable accommodation should be required for all three prongs, not just in the case of the actual disability prong. An alcoholic has an impairment but is generally unable to prove that it is substantially limiting. Thus, if he is perceived by his employer as so substantially limited that he cannot do the job, he should be entitled to a reasonable accommodation to fulfill the purposes of the ADA and to enable him to be a productive worker.

406. See supra discussion accompanying notes 396-99.
407. See Lawrence D. Rosenthal, Reasonable Accommodations for Individuals Regarded As Having Disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act? Why “No” Should Not Be the Answer” 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 895, 896-898. See also Friedland supra note 208, at 186. See, e.g., Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 1999). “The prevailing view in the federal appellate courts is that a ‘regarded as’ plaintiff is not entitled to a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.” FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 2, at 195 (supp. 2005).
408. See sources cited supra note 407.
409. See Rosenthal, supra note 407, at 899 (citing other reasons why reasonable accommodation should apply to all three prongs of disability definition, including “the remedial purposes behind the ADA, furtherance of some of the ADA’s most important goals, the idea that employers should not benefit by creating and following stereotypes the ADA was meant to eliminate, the Supreme Court’s decision in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, [citation omitted] and the legislative history behind the ‘regarded as’ prong of the ADA.”).
410. See Section IV.B.2.a.1).
411. See generally Rosenthal, supra note 407, at 962-63 (noting that if the employee has no impairment, then he does not need a reasonable accommodation. If, however, he has
If he is entitled to a reasonable accommodation, there are two factors that must be considered with regard to alcoholics. One factor is that a reasonable accommodation must be limited so that it does not enable an alcoholic to continue drinking.\textsuperscript{412} However, an alcoholic should be sufficiently accommodated to enable him to get into recovery and stay in recovery by attending counseling and Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.\textsuperscript{413} He should also be given a second chance if he relapses and not be summarily discharged for one slip.\textsuperscript{414}

Before the Court’s narrowing of the definition of disability, beginning in 1999, the lower courts uniformly held that alcoholism was a disability;\textsuperscript{415} however, even then, alcoholics were rarely successful in getting a reasonable accommodation beyond time off to go to treatment.\textsuperscript{416} The reason for this was the provision of the ADA that allowed employers to impose the same job requirements on alcoholics and drug addicts as required of other employees, even if unsatisfactory performance is related to the drug use or alcoholism of such employee.\textsuperscript{417}

In addition, the plaintiff may be allowed only one treatment. In\textsuperscript{418} Evans v. Federal Express Corp., for example, the court said, in applying a Massachusetts statute, that the plaintiff had already been reasonably accommodated by being given a leave to go to treatment for cocaine addiction, so that her second request for leave for alcohol treatment was not a reasonable accommodation. The plaintiff said that she would become an impairment and needs a reasonable accommodation to perform the job, the ADA’s plain language and remedial purposes require that he should have it).

\textsuperscript{412} LaBrucherie v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 95-16882, 1997 WL 398689, at *1 (9th Cir. July 14, 1997) (citing Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.3d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1990)).

\textsuperscript{413} See supra Section IV.B.2.b.2.

\textsuperscript{414} See supra notes 256-57.

\textsuperscript{415} See, e.g., Office of the Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office of Senate Fair Employment Practices, 95 F.3d 1102, 1105, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating that “it is well-established that alcoholism meets the definition of a disability.” In questioning whether the defendant was required to offer the plaintiff a “fresh start” the court concluded that offering the plaintiff leave to go to treatment and light duty afterwards was a sufficient accommodation).

\textsuperscript{416} See, e.g., Leary v. Dalton, 58 F.3d 748, 753 (1st Cir. 1995) (“Assuming [employee’s] incarceration was a ‘manifestation’ of his alcoholism, (citation omitted), we reject the argument that [employee] should have been allowed to draw upon his accrued annual leave as a ‘reasonable accommodation’ for his disability.”).

\textsuperscript{417} 133 F.3d 137, 140 (1st Cir. 1998). See also Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.2d 558, 561-62 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that continued accommodation for an alcoholic would just enable him to drink and that the plaintiff’s at least three leaves for treatment before discharge was a reasonable accommodation).
qualified under the statute if allowed the second leave to seek help. The court said that generally the employer cannot refuse the accommodation and then fire the plaintiff because of inadequate performance.419 One consideration in determining whether an accommodation is reasonable is the likelihood of success.420 In this case, the court said that the company could consider a second treatment not likely to succeed because the first one did not succeed. Also the court said that treatments for addiction are "notoriously chancy."421 Even though the plaintiff was sober at the time of the opinion, the company could rely on what it knew at the time or what it could reasonably foresee.422 The court said that even if the company sometimes gave multiple leaves, it was not required to and that the EEOC does not require multiple leaves for treatment for addiction.423 The court also said that even "in a more sympathetic setting—a treatment for cluster migraines," the Ninth Circuit did not require multiple leaves.424

The refusal of courts to give alcoholics a second chance ignores the fact that relapse is a symptom of the illness and frequently occurs. By refusing to give the alcoholic a second chance, which is often what he needs to get into recovery,425 the courts are balancing the two concerns: they do not want to enable the alcoholic to continue drinking, but they want to provide reasonable accommodation by allowing recovery. By giving multiple chances an employer would be enabling the alcoholic,426 while failing to give a second chance ignores the reality of the situation.427 However, most alcoholic employees are no longer entitled to any accommodation under the ADA, even to go to treatment, because effectively they are no longer covered by the ADA.428

419. See Evans v. Federal Express, 133 F.3d at 140.
420. Id.
421. Id. (citing Whitlock v. Donovan, 598 F. Supp. 126, 134 (D.D.C. 1984)).
422. Id.
423. Id. at 140-41 (citing Schmidt v Safeway, Inc., 864 F.Supp. 991 (D. Or. 1994)).
424. Id. at 141 (citing Kimbro v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 889 F.2d 869, 879 n.10 (9th Cir. 1989)).
425. See generally ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 1, at 140-45.
426. See, e.g., Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that continued accommodation for an alcoholic would just enable him to drink).
427. However, alcoholics are not without some recourse. If the employer is covered by the Family and Medical Leave Act, the alcoholic can get unpaid leave to go to treatment. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2000). See, e.g., Sloop v. ABTCO, Inc., No. 98-2440, 1999 WL 280281 (4th Cir. May 6, 1999) (FMLA requires a leave of absence for treatment of substance abuse, but not if the leave is occasioned by the plaintiff's continuing to drink rather than go to treatment).
428. See Section IV.B.2.a.1)-3).
V. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED SOLUTION

Under the Supreme Court’s recent decisions, is an alcoholic, active or recovering, ever disabled? To be considered disabled, the impairment must significantly limit him in a major life activity. Because this is an individualized inquiry, each active alcoholic must prove the major life activities in which he is limited. Many active alcoholics have difficulty sleeping, working, driving, performing manual tasks, or taking care of themselves. They may have an assortment of physical illnesses. However, as noted above, most active alcoholics are functional and able to work, so they may not be able to prove that they are “sufficiently limited” in any “major life activity,” under the Court’s restrictive interpretation of those terms. The irony of the Court’s decisions is that only a relatively non-functional, active alcoholic could possibly prove that he is presently disabled and entitled to reasonable accommodation. If he does get into recovery, he almost certainly loses the protection of the Act.

After the Sutton case, courts must measure a disability in its corrected state. Thus, the question then becomes: is a recovering alcoholic ever disabled and entitled to reasonable accommodation? The impairment has to be presently impairing a major life activity, so the unmitigated state of the impairment is not relevant in determining whether the employee is presently impaired. In its mitigated state, the only life activity that the impairment significantly limits in every case is drinking alcohol. Because the courts have restrictively interpreted major life activity to be an activity that is of central importance to most people’s lives drinking would likely not be a major life activity. The people to whom drinking is of central importance are alcoholics, so it is unlikely that a recovering alcoholic is significantly limited in a major life activity.

430. See Section IV.B.2.a.1).
431. See generally Starr supra note 61, at 2327-30 (discussing the costs associated with alcoholism).
432. Id.
433. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
434. See supra Section IV.B.2.a.1.
435. See supra discussion accompanying notes 128-33
436. As discussed previously, he might be determined to have a record of a disability or be regarded as disabled, but he probably would not be entitled to reasonable accommodation under either of these provisions. See supra Section IV.B.2.c.
437. Because this is an individualized inquiry, some alcoholics could be limited in major life activities because of physical consequences of the drinking, such as heart disease, but this would be an impairment in and of itself.
438. See supra text accompanying notes 184-89.
If a recovering alcoholic relapses, he can be fired for one or both of two reasons. First, if he engages in bad behavior connected to his relapse, he can be fired because he can be held to the same standards as other employees.439 Second, in exchange for the reasonable accommodation of going to treatment, the alcoholic may have been forced to sign a last chance agreement in which he agrees to more stringent oversight than other employees.440 Thus, whether he violates a work rule or not, he can be discharged merely for relapsing.

Can the employer fire an employee simply because he is an alcoholic, if he has an impairment that does not significantly limit a major life activity? Under the first prong of the disability definition, the employee is not presently disabled.441 He cannot claim this protection of the Act, so the answer is yes. This can hardly be what Congress intended.

Can such an alcoholic prove that he has a record of a disability? Even here, the courts have not been generous. If he has been hospitalized for only a short time for his illness, some courts hold that he does not have a sufficient record of a disability.442 In addition, he must prove that he has a record of being substantially limited in a major life activity, which is also unlikely, except in the case of very poorly functioning alcoholics.443

If his employer fires him because the employer does not think an alcoholic can perform the job, can the employee show that he has been regarded as disabled? Even if the employer believes that the alcoholic employee cannot do the job because of his alcoholism, the employee will still have to show that he is regarded as unable to perform in a range of jobs.444 As another author has suggested, there is not a statutory directive to view “regarded as” from the employer’s perspective alone.445 “The important role of stigma . . . suggests that an individual should also be protected under the ‘regarded as’ prong when she experiences discrimination on the basis of an (actual, past, or perceived) impairment that is ‘regarded’ by society in general as substantially limiting.”446

Even if the employee proves that he is regarded as disabled or has a record of a disability, he may not be entitled to a reasonable accommodation.447 So, if the employee needs an accommodation to attend AA and/or

439. See supra Section IV.B.2.b.1).
440. See supra Section IV.B.2.b.2).
441. See supra Section IV.B.2.a.1).
442. See supra text accompanying notes 352-54.
443. See supra text accompanying notes 138-43.
444. See supra text accompanying notes 138-43.
445. See Bagenstos, Subordination, supra note 28, at 447.
446. Bagenstos, Subordination, supra note 28, at 448 (emphasis in original).
447. See supra Section IV.B.2.c.)
therapy to stay sober, he is out of luck. Thus, he may be unable to maintain
his sobriety and will inevitably become worse.

Using alcoholism as an example, it can be seen that the Supreme
Court's decisions have effectively eliminated from the application of the
ADA at least one disability that Congress expressly intended to protect. 448
Obviously there are other conditions that the courts have decided are not
legally disabling, although thought before to be so in every case, such as
cancer. 449

The Court's decisions limit the protected class to people who are tradi-
tionally disabled, such as people who are blind, deaf or unable to walk,
because they are totally limited in a major life activity.450 People with less
obvious impairments, such as alcoholism, diabetes, back injuries, and
mental illness generally may not be limited in a major life activity under the
Court's narrow interpretation of that term. Nevertheless, these impairments
cause these individuals to be substantially limited in life activities that may
not be recognized because the courts do not think that such activities are
central to a normal person's daily life. 451

The unintended result of the Court's decisions in the case of alcohol-
ism is to provide protection only to some functional, but still very sick,
active alcoholics who should be encouraged to enter recovery. Once they
are in recovery, they lose protection of the ADA and become subject to
discipline or discharge, if they require the smallest accommodation to
remain sober. 452 If they are unable to maintain their sobriety, they can be
discharged for not measuring up to the employment requirements or for
violating a last chance agreement. 453 Surely this is not the result that
Congress intended or that society would consider desirable. In its zeal to
limit the coverage the ADA, the Supreme Court is limiting the employment
protection of the Act to people who cannot, or in the case of some active
alcoholics, should not, be working. 454

Why have the courts interpreted the ADA so strictly that plaintiffs
suing for employment discrimination under the ADA have to be so disabled

448. See supra note 9 for legislative history.
449. See cases cited supra note 312 (noting cases involving other impairments that
courts have determined are not disabilities); see also Eichhorn, Dancing, supra note 125, at
203-15 (discussing cases applying "substantially limited" to hold that persons who are blind
in one eye, missing fingers, and had an arm amputated are not disabled).
450. See Kaiser, supra note 5, at 736.
451. See Edmonds, supra note 189, at 340-48, 360-63 (discussing other life activities
that should be added to the list, such as driving, digesting food, eliminating waste products,
or exercising).
452. See supra Section IV.B.2.a.1).
453. See supra Section IV.B.2.b.1)-2).
454. See Kaiser, supra note 5, at 736.
that they probably cannot work anyway? One can only speculate. One obvious possibility is that the Court is generally hostile to employment discrimination cases.

With regard to the ADA, there are some additional considerations. There are two problems with regard to the conception of the statute. One problem involves the structure of the Act, and the other involves the origin of this statute. With regard to the structure of the Act, the ADA uses the same definition of disability — that a person must be substantially limited in his ability to perform a major life activity — for all categories of coverage. Logically, protecting the rights of people who are seeking employment or trying to maintain employment involves different considerations from protecting rights of people denied access to public accommodations. It can be argued that people who are denied access to public accommodations are more likely to be more impaired than people who are able to work. The Supreme Court has not been entirely consistent in this area and has indicated that it is reluctant to designate “working” as a major life activity, even though the Court has said that “reproduction” is. This

455. The courts have been very restrictive in their interpretation of the ADA in other areas relating to alcoholism as well. See, e.g., EEOC v. Exxon Corp., 203 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 2000) (discussing the response to the Exxon Valdes accident in which an alcoholic employee caused a serious accident and the company implemented a policy that removes employees who have undergone treatment for substance abuse from certain safety-sensitive and little-supervised positions as a business necessity).


For a more optimistic view of the Supreme Court’s attitude toward Title VII, see Harold S. Lewis, Walking the Walk of Plain Text: The Supreme Court’s Markedly More Solicitous Treatment of Title VII Following the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 49 St. Louis U. L.J. 1081 (2005), in which the author opines that the Supreme Court is interpreting Title VII more broadly after the 1991 Civil Rights Act after years of unfavorable interpretations. However, some authors have opined that the Court is treating the ADA even less favorably than other anti-discrimination acts. See, e.g., Bagenstos, Supreme Court, supra note 3, at 944-45. Compare Colker, Windfall, supra note 5, at 100 (concluding that defendants are winning more than 90% of the time in ADA employment discrimination cases) with Waterstone, supra note 13, at 1826-32 (claiming that plaintiffs are doing substantially better in non-employment cases and concluding that courts are more troubled by opening up employment opportunities to disabled people than they are by opening public accommodations to disabled people). Plaintiffs have been more successful in the Supreme Court in non-employment cases. See id. at 1838-42 (“[I]n nearly every Title II and III case before it, the Supreme Court has expanded rather than narrowed the ADA.”).


458. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999). The Supreme Court has noted this reluctance, despite the fact the working was found to be a major life activity in Arline and cited as such in the HEW regulations. Congress clearly intended Arline’s (School
somewhat schizoid treatment is reflected in the two cases discussed earlier that were decided under the ADA’s titles that govern areas other than employment. In both of these cases, the Court was very generous in its interpretation of the Act. This may be some evidence of the Court’s hostility to employment discrimination cases. To be more gracious, the problem may be that the ADA contains a conceptual problem, which requires disability to be viewed more, rather than less, stringently for the purposes of employment than disability for other purposes. The goal of Title I was to enable disabled people to work, not to put them in the dilemma of proving that they are sufficiently impaired to be disabled but still able to perform the essential duties of the job; in other words, that they are almost, but not quite, too sick to work. However, the Act as written and interpreted allows that outcome.

The other problem is with regard to the origin of the ADA. The ADA’s predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act, applied only to the federal government itself or to entities that consented to enter into a relationship with the federal government, federal grantees and federal contractors, all of whom were benefitting from the relationship. One can only speculate that courts are limiting the ability of plaintiffs to proceed with a case out of fear of allowing juries to hear these sympathetic cases or to require the employer to prove undue hardship, which, according to the statute, could be onerous. This reluctance may be due to the fact that, as opposed to the

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461. See supra Section III B.1.a. for a discussion of Bragdon and Section III.B.3 for a discussion of Martin.
462. See Id.
463. See Kaiser, supra note 5, at 753-54. Another reason for the treatment the Court has accorded Title I of the ADA has been posited, and that is that the Court believes the disability discrimination may be defended as rational, while other forms of discrimination may not be. See Bagenstos, Supreme Court, supra note 3. Cf. Anderson, supra note 27, at 119-20 ("Disability discrimination laws in effect work as a subsidy paid by employers through 'reasonable accommodation,' a subsidy likely to be borne disparately within the labor market.").
464. See Olsky, supra note 34, at 1841 (stating that Congress was concerned about the high unemployment rate among the disabled, which according to one survey was 39%).
465. See Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference; Can Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79 N. C. L. Rev. 307 (2001) in which the author explores the re-distributive nature of the ADA. "The 'unfunded mandate' quality of the obligation was magnified by the undefined scope of the ensuing responsibility to accommodate." Id. at 317-18. "[U]ntil Congress confronts the disjunction of fitting a statute with such wealth-redistributive aspects into a context of 'but for,' Title VII-like discrimination . . . [t]he Court's narrowing of the definition of 'disabled' may prove the easiest and most effective way for the Court to limit
Rehabilitation Act, the defendant is not getting anything in exchange for making a reasonable accommodation that could be substantially burdensome. 465

In addition, as discussed above, some provisions of the Rehabilitation Act required federal contractors and the federal government to take affirmative action to employ the handicapped, as disabled people were then labeled. 466 There was a concern that the employer would have to employ people who could not perform the job, so the definition of one who is currently handicapped was intended to be stricter than for one who is discriminated against because he has a record of a disability or because he is regarded as disabled. 467 When the ADA was drafted, it simply used the Rehabilitation Act definitions, even though affirmative action was not required by any provision of the ADA. 468 Nevertheless, the courts did not interpret the Rehabilitation Act as strictly as the courts have been interpreting the ADA, despite Congress’ express prohibition that the ADA should not be interpreted less generously than the Rehabilitation Act. 469 Judicial activism is, and has been, cutting in more than one direction lately. 470 As one author concluded, after an empirical study on ADA litigation:

The most sobering hypothesis that emerges from this data is that the enactment of the ADA may have greatly harmed plaintiffs’ prospects under a related disability statute—the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. On the eve of the effective date of ADA Title I, Rehabilitation Act plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases were faring twice as successfully as would ADA plaintiffs over the next decade. 471

The solution is for the courts to recognize their obligation to follow the express intent of Congress and interpret the ADA as generously as they did the Rehabilitation Act. How can this be accomplished at this point in time

the seemingly unfathomable potential sweep of ADA claims.” Id. at 358. See also Long, supra note 71, at 622-23. Another author suggests a possible impetus for limiting the protected class is the large number of disability claims filed. Stephen F. Befort, The Story of Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.: Narrowing the Reach of the Americans with Disabilities Act, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES 329, 332-33 (Joel Friedman ed., 2006).

465. See Colker, Windfall, supra note 5, at 161. See also Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 464 (discussing the re-distributive nature of the ADA).

466. However, Section 504 does not require federal grantors to take affirmative action, and the ADA was based on this provision of the Rehabilitation Act. See Burgdorf, supra note 15, at 418-19, 476.

467. See Friedland supra note 208, at 184-86; Burgdorf supra note 15, at 432-33.

468. See Burgdorf, supra note 15, at 418-19, 476.


470. See Rubenfeld, supra note 456.

471. Colker, Winning, supra note 5, at 278.
with the Supreme Court having boxed itself into a corner, recognizing so few people in the protected class for employment purposes? Without a legislative solution,\textsuperscript{472} which seems unlikely, the solution is to interpret the “regarded as” and “having a record of” provisions as Congress intended.\textsuperscript{473} In both Acts, the employer assumes that the person cannot do the job because either he has a record of a disability or because the employer regards him as being disabled. If courts follow the intent of Congress, these provisions should be interpreted more generously to prevent persons from being discriminated against because of perceived disabilities.\textsuperscript{474} These are people who can work, but who are being discriminated against because the employer thinks they cannot perform the job.\textsuperscript{475} Under the Sutton case, the Court adopted the EEOC’s definition of “working” as a major life activity, which requires that the plaintiff be unable to perform a range of jobs.\textsuperscript{476} In the context of perceived disabilities, this definition works better than it would under the actual disability prong because there is no conflict with the employee being qualified to do the job, as there may be if the employee is claiming to be actually disabled. If the employer believes that the employee cannot do his job and deals with him accordingly, then the employee should be considered substantially limited in the major life activity of working.\textsuperscript{477} As the court in Shiplett v. National Railroad

\textsuperscript{472} See Long, supra note 71, at 623-47 (reviewing the proposed legislative solutions). See also Mark A. Rothstein, Serge A. Martinez & W. Paul McKinney, Using Established Medical Criteria to Define Disability: A Proposal to Amend the Americans with Disabilities Act, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 282-96 (2002) (arguing for amending the ADA to allow the EEOC to publish medical standards for determining who is disabled); Anderson, supra note 27, at 129-49 (arguing for the removal of the phrase “substantially limits” from the definition of disability); Eichhorn, Major, supra note 196, at 1473 (1999):

The current definition, which relies on notions of “substantial limits” on “major life activities,” has proved not only unworkable, but often harmful to the Act’s purposes. It should be replaced with a definition based simply upon mental or physical impairment. Under such a definition, if a defendant bases a decision upon a plaintiff’s actual mental or physical impairment—or a plaintiff’s record of such an impairment, or a perceived impairment [footnote omitted]—and has no legitimate reason to do so, then the defendant is liable for disability discrimination.

\textsuperscript{473} See Bagenshtos, Subordination, supra note 28, at 448 (“Congress included the ‘regarded as’ provision in the Rehabilitation Act (and now the ADA) precisely to protect people disadvantaged because of ‘society’s accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease.’”) (citing School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987)).

\textsuperscript{474} See Mayerson, supra note 48, at 592.

\textsuperscript{475} Id.


\textsuperscript{477} See Bagenshtos, Subordination, supra note 28, at 507-08 (“If ‘working’ is properly treated as a major life activity because the inability to work is likely to be stigmatizing and to lead to systematic disadvantage, then the test for substantial limitation should reflect that function. An individual can experience stigma without being entirely
Passenger Corp. said, if the employer believed that the employee could not be a train engineer, then he would be perceived as unable to do a number of safety sensitive jobs.\footnote{No. 97-2056, 1999 WL 435169, at *8 (6th Cir. June 17, 1999).} In other words, if the employer believes the employee cannot do the job, then the employer would also believe that the employee could not do other similar jobs.\footnote{See Burgdorf \textit{supra} note 15, at 467 (stating that in Cook v. Rhode Island, 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993), the court found that the jury could infer that the plaintiff was perceived as being unable to perform a wide range of jobs if refused one job).} That should be enough to satisfy the Court’s requirement that the employee be perceived as unable to perform a range of jobs.\footnote{This is supported by the EEOC regulations in this regard. The number and types of job requirements are “not intended to be an onerous evidentiary showing.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (2006).}

The question then becomes: should people who are not actually disabled, but who are only regarded as or who have a record of a disability be entitled to reasonable accommodation?\footnote{Courts have decided both ways. See Timothy J. McFarlin, Comment, \textit{If They Ask for a Stool . . . Recognizing Reasonable Accommodation for Employees “Regarded As” Disabled}, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 927 (2005).} The answer should be a qualified yes. While it may sound counterintuitive that a person who is not actually disabled would need a reasonable accommodation, there is no such limitation in the statute.\footnote{See \textit{supra} note 408-09 for additional discussion of this issue.} Reasonable accommodation applies to all three prongs of the disability definition.\footnote{42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000). Cf. Friedland, \textit{supra} note 208, at 186 (noting the “incongruity between the ADA’s definition of disability and its accommodation requirement”).} Once the person qualifies for the protected class, the employer must reasonably accommodate any known physical or mental limitations.\footnote{Friedland, \textit{supra} note 208, at 186.} With the courts’ restrictive interpretation of who is disabled, reasonable accommodation becomes especially important. This is particularly true in the case of people who are only able to work because they are using mitigating measures or require mitigating measures that may necessitate a reasonable accommodation, such as an alcoholic who may require some time off to attend treatment, AA and/or counseling or a diabetic who needs breaks to check his glucose levels.\footnote{See Margaret C. McGrath, \textit{Insulin-Dependent Diabetes and Access to Treatment in the Workplace: the Failure of the Americans With Disabilities Act to Provide Protection}, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 957 (2004), for problems posed by recent decisions for diabetics who are not limited in a major life activity if they take their insulin, but who often need reasonable accommodation to be able to work.}
If reasonable accommodations were required for people who are only perceived as disabled or who have a record of a disability, then the accommodations would, in most cases, not have to be as burdensome as accommodations for those who are actually disabled. This solution would relieve the courts of their fear that the employer would be severely burdened by reasonable accommodations.

VI. CONCLUSION

There is another obvious consideration. Everything should not have to be justified in terms of economic efficiency. The anti-discrimination acts did take into account the morality of discrimination in forbidding it. Foreclosing disabled people from employment, even if it is justified in terms of economic efficiency, cannot be justified in terms of morality. Furthermore, there is "a price—a cost— for securing more important remedial and social objectives." The courts have restricted the class of persons protected by the ADA to an unconscionably small number. To rehabilitate the ADA, the courts must protect those employees who can now be discriminated against with impunity because employers incorrectly believe that their employees' impairments prevent them from doing the job. Until a legislative solution is feasible, the courts must accord the ADA its rightful place as a protector of impaired people who are not in fact too sick to work, but who can now legally be treated as if they were.

486. Kaminshine, supra note 44, at 231-32.
487. Id. For example, customer preference is not a defense in discrimination cases, despite profitability. Id. at 232. "[D]iscrimination, at least in the short term, is not always economically irrational. According to economists, an employer might find forbidden criteria attractive, even if only crudely predictive of productivity needs, because they are relatively convenient and cheap to administer." Id. at 239. BFOQ under both the ADEA and Title VII require the employer to suffer some economic detriment rather than use a facially discriminatory policy. Id. at 243-45. Similarly, the ADEA forbids mandatory retirement at any age for most jobs. See Johnson, supra note 203, at n.305.