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        On behalf of the consequence argument: time, modality, and the nature of free action

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        Finch On Behalf of the Consequence Argument.pdf (1.684Mb)
        Date
        2011-09-13
        Author
        Finch, Alicia
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        Abstract
        The consequence argument for the incompatibility of free action and determinism has long been under attack, but two important objections have only recently emerged: Warfield’s modal fallacy objection and Campbell’s no past objection. In this paper, I explain the significance of these objections and defend the consequence argument against them. First, I present a novel formulation of the argument that withstands their force. Next, I argue for the one controversial claim on which this formulation relies: the trans-temporality thesis. This thesis implies that an agent acts freely only if there is one time at which she is able to perform an action and a distinct time at which she actually performs it. I then point out that determinism, too, is a thesis about trans-temporal relations. I conclude that it is precisely because my formulation of the consequence argument emphasizes transtemporality that it prevails against the modal fallacy and no past objections.
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        http://commons.lib.niu.edu/handle/10843/13731
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