On behalf of the consequence argument: time, modality, and the nature of free action
Abstract
The consequence argument for the incompatibility of free action and
determinism has long been under attack, but two important objections have only
recently emerged: Warfield’s modal fallacy objection and Campbell’s no past
objection. In this paper, I explain the significance of these objections and defend the
consequence argument against them. First, I present a novel formulation of the
argument that withstands their force. Next, I argue for the one controversial claim
on which this formulation relies: the trans-temporality thesis. This thesis implies
that an agent acts freely only if there is one time at which she is able to perform an
action and a distinct time at which she actually performs it. I then point out that
determinism, too, is a thesis about trans-temporal relations. I conclude that it is
precisely because my formulation of the consequence argument emphasizes transtemporality
that it prevails against the modal fallacy and no past objections.