ABSTRACT

THE ORGANIZATION OF INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE TO EXtractive INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT IN THE CORDILLERA OF THE NORTHERN PHILIPPINES

Robert Bulanda, MA
Anthropology
Northern Illinois University, 2015
Susan Russell, Director

Over the past half-century, the Philippines has experienced great social changes as social movements have arisen in response to the national government's aggressive implementation of neoliberal development policies. The recent history of the Philippines features an illustrious culture of mass-based organization, as local populations protest national development strategies that promote rapid economic growth and integration into world markets at the expense of local social and environmental concerns. Specifically, an anti-large scale mining social movement in the Philippines has developed in reaction to the liberalization of the national mining industry with the Mining Act of 1995, which opened the country's rich mineral resources to 100 percent ownership by foreign corporations. Through the development of a protest movement against such neoliberal policies, local communities and their regional, national and international representative organizations have coalesced around the promotion of indigenous identity, stressing the environmental and economic rights guaranteed to indigenous peoples by the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997. In promoting such rights, these agents strive to continue to develop local mining industries and profit from local lands and resources, which
indigenous communities have practiced and exploited since time immemorial. Ultimately, the anti-large scale mining movement struggles to maintain an identity as a social movement protesting the globalization of natural resource exploitation, while promoting the rights of indigenous natural resource exploitation. The research focuses on Baguio City in Benguet Province of the Cordillera Administrative Region of the Northern Philippines and investigates the challenges of organizing social movements to bring local, indigenous concerns into the national and international development and environmentalist discourses.
NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY  
DE KALB, ILLINOIS

May 2015

THE ORGANIZATION OF INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE TO NEOLIBERAL EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT IN THE CORDILLERA OF THE NORTHERN PHILIPPINES

BY

ROBERT BULANDA  
©2015 Robert Bulanda

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF ANTHROPOLOGY

Thesis Director:  
Susan D. Russell
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful for the inspiration, support and guidance of many people throughout the process of writing this thesis. I would especially like to thank my thesis Dr. Susan Russell, and my thesis committee members, Dr. Andrea Molnar and Dr. Mark Schuller. I would also like to thank my Tagalog teacher, Mrs. Rhodalyne Gallo-Crail at Northern Illinois University, as well as the many teachers and tutors at the Christian Language Study Center in Quezon City, Philippines. I would like to thank the Center for Southeast Asian Studies for its material support.

Finally, I would like to thank my friends and family for their love and support throughout my academic experience.
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. ETHNOGRAPHIC AND HISTORICAL SETTING</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. SMALL-SCALE GOLD MINING</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. CAPITALIST EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY POLICY</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. MINING PROTEST</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

This research investigates the development of the complex and often contradictory organized social activism, or organized grassroots political action, as a response of indigenous peoples and communities to the imposition of neoliberal development. Specifically, it investigates social movements organized to protest the proliferation of large-scale mining policies and activities in the Philippines, particularly Benguet Province, following the passage of Republic Act 7942, or the Mining Act of 1995, which greatly liberalized the national mining industry. In contradiction to this neoliberal, international business-oriented legislation and mining development policy, the Philippine national government passed the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) in 1997, one of the most socially progressive and indigenous rights-oriented pieces of legislation and policy statements regarding indigenous peoples in the Southeast Asia region. Complicating mining policy, IPRA guarantees the rights of indigenous peoples to the use of their ancestral lands, which includes the exploitation of natural resources. In response to this complex policy environment and contradictory laws, indigenous peoples, communities and organizations have developed a variety of social movements to promote their own interests. Ultimately, local communities and their regional, national and international representative organizations attempt to protest the implementation of the Mining Act of 1995 and foreign ownership of large-scale mines within their territories while simultaneously asserting their rights as indigenous peoples under the implementation of IPRA. They adapt indigenous mining culture to exploit modern mining practices and techniques to profit and gain livelihood from their lands.
and natural resources while vocally denouncing such exploitation by external actors. In particular, this thesis addresses the following questions:

1. How has mining historically affected the social and physical environments of indigenous communities?

2. How do indigenous people perceive the effects of corporate, large-scale mining?

3. To what extent today are indigenous peoples engaged in mining activities, and how have these activities adapted to the introduction of modern mining policies and activities?

4. Have changes in national mining policies and activities, both locally and globally based, prompted organized social action among indigenous communities?

This thesis focuses on the emergence of grassroots activism and social movements and the subsequent proliferation of peoples’ organizations (POs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), that provide political legitimacy, opportunity and social cohesion to activist movements throughout the Philippines in response to the implementation of neoliberal national development policies. Neoliberal development policies advocate rapid economic growth through free and open global trade, with limited government regulations. POs are locally organized and managed grassroots organizations with little formal organization or staffing, funding or political requirements. NGOs, on the other hand, are professionally staffed state-certified organizations (Asian Development Bank 1999: 2). In the Philippines, NGOs are highly politicized and bureaucratized because they must complete a state-certification process. Status as an NGO allows an organization access and eligibility to more funding opportunities and
political influence than non-registered or certified POs. However, throughout the Philippines, local and indigenous populations often distrust and are reluctant to work with NGOs, due to their highly political nature and government sanctioning. Fears of their co-optation to state and bureaucratic interests and corruption remain prevalent, even as many NGOs claim the promotion of local and indigenous interests and rights as their mission.

Despite such mistrust of certain organizations, the recent history of the Philippines features an illustrious culture of mass-based organization as local populations protest national development strategies that promote rapid economic growth and integration into world markets at the expense of social and environmental concerns. Mining policy provides an ideal example of the growth of activism as a response to such a development strategy, as an anti-mining social movement has developed out of the liberalization of the national mining industry with the Mining Act of 1995.

My field work over the summer of 2013 focused on the organization of the mining awareness campaigns in Baguio City and the surrounding countryside in Benguet Province, Philippines. Benguet features some of the richest mineral deposits in the Philippines, and Baguio serves as the headquarters for many mining corporations, as well as many anti-large-scale mining activists and organizations. Additionally, indigenous communities and peoples of the surrounding countryside, including many immigrants from throughout the Philippines, continue to depend to a large extent on small-scale mining for their livelihoods. Such mining practices themselves continue to develop and become more technologically advanced and intensive. These small-scale mining operations are now increasingly more environmentally and socially destructive than “traditional” practices. Conflicts of interest arise between the economic and
social development of the Philippines by the national government and international corporations with indigenous groups and organizations dedicated to the protection and development of indigenous and local environments and livelihoods by indigenous groups and organizations. These conflicts are especially apparent throughout mining and mineral-rich areas of the Philippines, especially in developing areas such as the Cordillera in the northern Philippines and Mindanao in the southern Philippines.

Over the summer of 2013, I conducted interviews in Baguio City with representatives and leaders of two indigenous rights organizations, the Cordillera Peoples’ Alliance (CPA) and Philippine Task Force for Indigenous Peoples Rights (TFIP). I also interviewed a group of small-scale miners in the indigenous mining community of Pula in a nearby area of Benguet Province and observed the effects of both small-scale and large-scale mining on the environment of the mountainous countryside. Ultimately, however this is a primarily library-based research thesis.

This thesis investigates how local populations organize to confront the problems of neoliberal development policies and attempt to influence the future of development and its effects on their environments and livelihoods. Specifically, I am interested in investigating the strategies of organizing social movements to bring local, indigenous concerns into the national and international development and environmentalist discourses. This investigation was analyzed within the framework of social movements theories because the organizations representing and promoting this movement actively frame themselves as the representatives of a locally based and regionally united social movement. Social movements have emerged as a widespread response to neoliberal development of the mining industry in the Benguet region, and this emergence was
analyzed within the context of anthropological theories of social movements. This research contributes to the literature on the effects of neoliberal development on local and indigenous communities within developing countries by providing a case study of such a movement within the particular context of neoliberal development of the mining industry. Ultimately, the anti-large-scale mining movement struggles to maintain an identity as a social movement protesting the globalization of natural resource exploitation, while promoting indigenous natural resource exploitation.

This thesis is organized into six chapters. This chapter provides an overview of the thesis project and the organization of the chapters. Chapter Two reviews the literature on the ethnography of Benguet Province within the Cordillera region of the northern Philippines. Chapter Three reviews the literature on local traditional and small-scale mining in Benguet Province and the Cordillera region. Chapter Four reviews the literature on capitalistic and neoliberal development policies in the Philippines, especially in the context of extractive industries, particularly large-scale mining. Chapter Five reviews the literature on protests to intensive mining in the Philippines. Building on the previous chapters, it focuses on protest as a local response to environmental and economic and livelihood changes resulting from rapidly developing technological changes and a capitalistic neoliberal development policy framework in the intensive small-scale and large-scale mining industries of the Philippines. Chapter Six provides a summary of the previous chapters and analyzes local mining protest movements within the framework of social movements theories.
CHAPTER 2
ETHNOGRAPHIC AND HISTORICAL SETTING

The mountainous Cordillera region of northern Luzon provides the setting for a diverse array of indigenous peoples, collectively known as the *Igorots*, from an indigenous term meaning “people of the mountains” (Tauli-Corpuz 2001:282). In the area of southern Benguet Province, surrounding the Philippine gold-mining capital of Baguio City, the major indigenous peoples’ groups include the Southern Kankana’ey and the Ibaloi. These groups have traditionally engaged in both subsistence farming of wet, or irrigated, rice fields and dry, or rain-fed, vegetable fields; the maintenance of livestock; and small-scale long-distance trade of gold and other mineral resources extracted from the resource-rich terrain, using small-scale traditional mining techniques and practices. According to the Cordillera Schools Group (2003:156), southern Benguet’s “natural resources consist mainly of forests and agricultural lands. The vast forests conceal mineral resources that include gold and copper.” The Ibaloi and Southern Kankana’ey face challenges in maintaining their traditional and cultural ways of life as agriculture, mining and trade have become increasingly industrialized and commercialized.

The Cordillera region features a unique history within the Philippine archipelago, as it largely resisted external or colonial control or influence until the American colonial period, following the Spanish-American-Cuban-Filipino War in 1898. The Cordillera peoples thus avoided the Hispanization of their lowland neighbors throughout the Spanish colonial period, and the Islamization of the far southern islands of the Philippines prior to the Spanish colonial
period. The peoples of the Cordillera, including the Ibaloi and the Southern Kankana’ey, maintained such independence largely due to their homeland’s rugged terrain, consisting of foreboding mountain ranges ranging in elevation from 3,000 to 9,000 feet above sea level (Russell 1987:141). Indeed, the southern Benguet territory of the Ibaloi and Southern Kankana’ey is characterized by “mountain peaks and ridges, steep slopes, deep ravines, and waterways” (Cordillera Schools Group 2003:28, 156; see also Wiber 1993:6). Cultural features, developments and adaptations also greatly enabled their ability to maintain their independence, as their social religious, agricultural, resource extraction and commercial structures enabled their economic self-sufficiency while their traditions of warfare and headhunting enabled their resistance to foreign encroachment. However, as the Cordillera became increasingly consolidated under centralized control during the American colonial regime of the early twentieth century and the Philippine national government following World War II in 1945, the Igorots have struggled to maintain their cultural identity and control of their cultural lands and resources. At the same time, they have been simultaneously incorporated into the national political and economic system and set apart and identified as ethnic minorities. The Ibaloi and Southern Kankana’ey face particular threats to their traditional survival, as their location near Baguio City and their gold-rich lands offer the possibilities of large-scale international economic opportunities and entice national development projects. This chapter reviews the historical resistance and eventual incorporation of the Ibaloi and Southern Kankana’ey to foreign influence, with special attention to their traditional social structure, ritual and religious structure, agricultural adaptations, warfare, gold and mineral extraction techniques and practices, and trade practices.
A History of Resistance

The Spanish colonial empire first officially established its control of the present-day Philippine archipelago in 1521, with the arrival of Ferdinand Magellan’s expedition (Neher 2000:46). Spain extended its colonial rule over much of the Philippines, including the northernmost and largest island of Luzon, throughout the middle of the 16th century to the end of the 19th century. However, despite the sustained history of aggressive Spanish campaigns of military subjugation and Christian Catholic conversion, “the Igorot peoples of Northern Luzon fought for their liberty against foreign aggressions all during the 350 years that their lowland brethren were being ruled over by Spanish invaders” (Scott 1971:1). The rugged, mountainous terrain of the Cordillera provides an ideal setting for such resistance. Indeed, many lowland Philippine peoples also found refuge from Spanish rule throughout the Cordillera as they fled and established new communities in resistance to mounting colonial pressures (Keesing 1962:6). However, the Igorots’ prolonged struggle for independence ultimately reflects their own agency, as “Spanish records make it clear that they fought for their independence with every means at their disposal for three centuries, and that this resistance to invasion was deliberate, self-conscious, and continuous” (Scott 1971:1). They employed methods of traditional warfare and defensive strategies to keep the Spanish from entering their communities (Scott 1971:7-8). Thus, the early history of the Igorots demonstrates a culture of resistance in the face of powerful foreign aggression and interests.

Spanish interest in the Cordillera stemmed from the region’s rich natural resources, particularly its mineral resources, including gold. Throughout the early 17th century, the Spanish attempted to gain control of the Igorot gold mines throughout the Cordillera (Cawed 1972:1).
Scott (1975) reviews early Spanish discovery of the gold mining region and expeditions to establish a gold-mining presence. Indeed, throughout the colonial period, the Spanish conducted much warfare for control over gold mines and even justified such warfare on religious grounds, claiming that God ordained Christians, rather than “savages,” control over valuable natural resources, especially gold (McKay 2006:295). Furthermore, the Spanish sought tax revenue from gold trade and sales (Scott 1966:313). Following early unsuccessful attempts to subjugate the Igorots in 1662, the Spanish “suffered a sense of shame to see all those mountains inhabited by the Igorots, ‘owners of the gold mines and enemies of the Christians’” (Scott 1971:1). The “Igorot gold monopoly” thwarted colonial and economic aspirations (Scott 1971:11). Spanish desire for gold and Christian converts prompted multiple attempts to establish dominion over the Cordillera, but Igorot resistance proved formidable. These military and conversion campaigns proved economically expensive and unproductive, and the Spanish government ceased any further expeditions into the Cordillera by the 17th century (Scott 1971:12). Indeed, “no Spanish force ever maintained a garrison permanently on the Cordillera before the Remington repeating rifle replaced the old muskets” (Scott 1971:7). By this time, the Spanish empire’s military and religious power was on the decline, and even with such a technological advantage, they never successfully established a strong presence in the Cordillera.

Such expeditions, however, led to increased Spanish presence in the region and social displacement, especially as unsuccessful Spanish expeditions to the mountains established an increased military presence in the foothills and lowlands surrounding the mountains (McKay 2006:295). The mountain-dwelling Igorots further exacerbated the economic and military problems of the surrounding lowlanders, as they conducted raids on lowland towns, and
clandestinely traded gold and other resources with lowland communities, leading to Spanish reprisals (Scott 1966:313). Despite the overall success of the Igorot resistance to Spanish expeditions and colonization of their territory, some Igorot communities welcomed the Spanish and engaged in trade with some Spanish merchants (Scott 1971:5-6). Furthermore, despite many common traditions, the mountain-dwelling Igorots maintained distinct and often antagonistic tribal and community identities, continuing inter-tribal and inter-community warfare and headhunting until the American colonial period in the 20th century (Cawed 1972:5). Ironically, even as the resistance to Spanish rule provided a common aspiration among Igorot tribes and communities, Spanish interference with trade routes brought increased warfare within the Cordillera (Scott 1971:5-6). Furthermore, the quality of life throughout the Cordillera decreased throughout the Spanish colonial period, as villages and living spaces became increasingly smaller, more crowded and defensively oriented (Scott 1971:6-7). Despite these hardships, the Igorots developed a strong sense of unified identity and agency throughout the Cordillera. As Scott (1971:8) asserts, they “were satisfied with their form of government, and they were satisfied with their kind of religion.” Thus, the Igorots of the Cordillera maintained their independence and openly defied Spanish dominion of their territory throughout much of the Spanish colonial period, despite the subjugation of their neighbors and the active Spanish efforts to control the whole region and its valuable natural resources.

However, the Igorot resistance began to weaken during the Spanish colonial period at the end of the 19th century as the Spanish military presence became more aggressive with increasing threats to Spanish economic interests. Throughout the early 19th century, the Spanish established taxes on the tobacco trade throughout the Philippines and attempted to enforce a monopoly on all
tobacco trade. Trade with lowlanders supplied the Igorot economy as they traded mountain and forest resources for food and livestock supplies (Scott 1966:324; Scott 1971:11). As the Igorots ignored Spanish taxes, the Spanish increased their military expeditions to the Cordillera to enforce their tobacco monopoly and prevent the loss of tobacco tax revenue from “untaxed trade” (Scott 1971:11). Colonel Guillermo Galvey established a renewed military campaign to end Igorot independence and untaxed trade throughout the early 19th century (Scott 1971:12).

While the Igorots continued to grow and trade tobacco and other resources, the Spanish established permanent settlements and eventually succeeded in incorporating the Igorots into their colonial administration through a violent campaign of subjugation. The strategic location of the homeland of the Ibaloi and Southern Kankana’ey in the southern region of the Cordillera led to an especially aggressive campaign against them, as “Galvey’s decimation of Benguet…did make its miserable survivors the first tribe of Igorots to be officially listed as Spanish subjects” (Scott 1971:12). The Cordillera Schools Group (2003:49) further notes the “early subjugation” of the Ibaloi, in particular, and the establishment of a foreign-influenced regional government and commercial center within their homeland at present-day Baguio City. This early subjugation among the Ibaloi is reflected in the fact that “administrators have rated the Ibaloi as unusually submissive, passive, and shy as compared with the Cordillera peoples generally” (Keesing 1962:49). Furthermore, the Ibaloi were the first Igorots to come into contact with the Spanish in 1571 (Wiber 1993:4). While other Igorot communities continued to resist colonial rule and foreign influence throughout the 19th century, Spanish troops were “permanently quartered” in all the major regions of the Cordillera by the 1890s (Scott 1971:12). Indeed, throughout the 1890s, the Spanish began to campaign for military and economic power throughout the
Cordillera with reinvigorated intensity, establishing new military bases and attempting to document and control all trade (Cawed 1972:2). Thus, the Igorots were newly incorporated into the international political and economic system by the time of the American colonial period, following the Spanish-American War in 1898.

The American colonial period brought many changes throughout the Cordillera, as the American administration successfully pursued policies of education and conversion and more completely incorporated the Igorots into Philippine society. While some Igorots assisted the Philippine nationalists in their struggle to create an independent Philippine nation, and the nationalists used the strategic highlands of the Cordillera throughout their unsuccessful struggle against American rule, the Igorots in general offered little resistance to American rule, especially compared to their resistance to Spanish rule (Cawed 1972:4; Finin 2005:231). The American administration focused on spreading Protestantism and education throughout the Philippines, especially in the Cordillera, which had largely resisted Hispanic Catholicism and education systems (Cawed 1972:4; Cordillera Schools Group 2003:174-175). This American influence has led to much cultural change and adaptation among the Igorots, especially among the Ibaloi and Southern Kankana’ey of Benguet Province, who experienced “early subjugation” compared to other Igorot groups and “long exposure to alien cultures and…proximity to Baguio City, the center of commerce and trade in the region” (Cordillera Schools Group 2003:49). Among the Ibaloi, Western-influenced local government and education “institutions led to the collapse of the baknang’s [or traditional elites’] role in the social, political and economic systems” (Cordillera Schools Group 2003:50). A new class of educated elite emerged and adopted a more Western-influenced lifestyle, “as education became the new source of power and wealth” (Cordillera...
Similarly, among the Southern Kankana’ey, educational background became a new symbol of power, wealth and status (Cordillera Schools Group 2003:174). Younger people began to achieve more power and status as they achieved greater success in the American-based educational system than their elders. However, the traditional system has adapted as “the village elders have not fully lost their traditional functions. They have become an advisory or consultative body to the formal government” (Cordillera Schools Group 2003:174).

Such political change led to great economic changes, as the “process of political incorporation is viewed as inexorably tied to the process of economic integration” (Wiber 1993:2). Economically, the social changes introduced by the Americans led to the changes in land ownership as a Western land tenure system replaced traditional laws (Cordillera Schools Group 2003:50). Furthermore, the economic redistribution system of communal feasting diminished as American policies introduced competitive capitalist markets throughout the Cordillera. Ultimately, “capitalism and free enterprise are the lasting legacies of the American economic policies. Large-scale mining, vegetable-gardening and timber industries flourished as a result of these” (Cordillera Schools Group 2003: 50). Thus, despite centuries of autonomy and strong resistance to foreign influence, the Igorots of the Cordillera, especially the Ibaloi and Southern Kankana’ey of Benguet Province, have increasingly been incorporated into and adapted to global religious, political and economic systems throughout the 20th century.

This history of resistance to external colonization has led to the continued discrimination of Igorot communities and culture within mainstream Philippine society. Azurin (1991:1) asserts that highland peoples are stereotypically perceived as “savage” and associated with headhunting...
practices. Such discriminations and attitudes of cultural hostility stem from the Spanish colonial period. The Spanish encouraged a dichotomy of Christian and non-Christian and lowland and highland peoples in their pursuit of Christianizing and subjugating the entire population (Scott 1971:3; McKay 2006:296). Tauli-Corpuz (2001:282) asserts that the Spanish label of Igorots as “heathens, savages, and infidels” has led to discriminatory attitudes and behaviors which have persisted among the Hispanized dominant Philippine culture throughout recent times.

The American colonial administration extended this division between lowland and highland peoples by applying “tribal” identities and creating reservation-like conditions in the highlands of the Cordillera, based on the tribal identities, definitions and experiences of the Native Americans (McKay 2006:296). According to McKay (2006:296), tribes are “distinguished as legitimate indigenous groups who could demonstrate their attachment to a particular place and could provide identifiable community leaders.” McKay (2006:296) further asserts that “the contours of the Igorot tribal slot owe more to Spanish religiosity and American notions of Indians than to any differences between Igorots and lowlanders themselves.” Such societal divisions and discriminations continue to influence relations between Cordillera populations and mainstream Philippine society, despite historical, linguistic and cultural evidence of similar orgins of highland and lowland peoples (Scott 1971:2-3; Azurin 1991:32). Furthermore, within the Cordillera, Igorot tribes feature little cultural variation apart from linguistic differences, despite differences in their respective histories (Russell 1989:250). However, discriminatory attitudes toward highland populations led to their social and economic marginalization. Today, Baguio City, the economic capital of the Cordillera and the only urban center within the Cordillera, is politically and commercially dominated by lowland Philippine
settlers and wealthy foreigners, particularly from India and China (Russell 1989:250-251; Finin 2005:8). Thus, historical developments of resistance and discrimination continue to influence social identity and agency among the Igorots within Philippine society.

Social Structure

Despite many similarities among Ibaloi and Southern Kankana’ey Igorots of southern Benguet and fellow Igorots and lowland neighbors, they are unique in their degree of social stratification. Keesing (1962:51) asserts that the elites among the peoples of southern Benguet Province are comprised of “wealthy and powerful families who have emerged as aristocracies to a degree matched nowhere else among the mountain communities.” Wiber (1993:4) further asserts that the Ibaloi, in particular, are “anomalous” for their “highly stratified society in a region known for fragmented and egalitarian social organization.” Indeed, Lewis (1992:233) argues that the “social and economic class structure of Southern Cordillera remained atypical of most small-scale societies, in that it had a somewhat stratified system, anticipating incorporation into global society.” Such social stratification may result from their early contact and subjugation to the Spanish, as they are the most “Hispanized uplands people, acculturated to Western ways” (Wiber 1993:5). Despite this high degree of social stratification, there are traditionally only two distinguishable social classes among the Ibaloi and Southern Kankana’ey, the poor (abitug among the Ibaloi and abiteng among the Southern Kankana’ey) and the wealthy (bakanang in both cultural contexts) (Cordillera Schools Group 2003:30). This class distinction has traditionally been highly marked, however, as the baknang or “wealthy exercise authority in almost all aspects of the social, political and economic life of the [the Igorots of southern Benguet]. They serve as hosts to canyao feasts; they sit in the village council to decide on
important matters affecting the village; and from their ranks come the village headman or chief” (30).

Indeed, a “plutocracy” already distinguished the social classes of the southern Benguet Igorots prior to the arrival of capitalist influence (Lewis 1992:234). According to Tauli-Corpuz (2001:283), the traditional political system is dominated by wealthy “elders” who “make decisions and arbitrate.” Furthermore, the poor or “commoners” or abitug/abiteng “owe a chronic debt to their wealthier relatives and neighbors” (Lewis 1992:45). While there was some degree of social mobility and intermarriage between classes, elite families maintained their control of power by practicing intermarriage among themselves (Cawed 1972:42; Lewis 1992:46). Kinship and inheritance are traced bilaterally (Cawed 1972:40; Wiber 1993:137). Towards the end of the Spanish colonial period, and especially with the introduction of the American colonial period and universal education, a new middle class emerged (Wiber 1993:41). Indeed, the “old indices of wealth” such as large herds of animals lost social prestige and education and monetary wealth became socially important and prestigious (Wiber 1993:43). Furthermore, traditional communal ownership of land has been increasingly replaced by private ownership of land (Cawed 1972:42; Cordillera Schools Group 2003:50). Thus, the Ibaloi and Southern Kankana’ey of Benguet have traditionally featured a relatively stratified social and political system which has adapted to Western and capitalist influence.

The settlement patterns of the Ibaloi and Southern Kankana’ey further facilitated their incorporation into global political and economic systems. According to Finin (2005:11), settlement patterns among the Igorots “have traditionally been organized in self-regulating villages that vary in size.” McKay (2006:296) asserts that, “in fact, the ‘tribal’ formulation
[which incorporated the Igorots into the American colonial administration of the Philippines]
suited the nucleated village structures of the wet rice cultivating Kankanaey and Ibaloi groups
much better than it did the more flexible, non-nucleated villages of shifting cultivators in Ifugao,
Kalinga, and Apayao.” Thus, the Ibaloi and Southern Kankana’ey feature a settlement pattern
which facilitated their incorporation into the American colonial administration and the
succeeding Philippine national administration.

Finally, common within Igorot culture, the Southern Kankana’ey and the Ibaloi have
traditionally expressed and enforced social and economic status through ritual feasting. Russell
(2007) asserts the development of a prestige economy among the Ibaloi and Southern
Kankana’ey. They redistributed wealth through ritual feasts of merit. Such feasts have adapted
to changing economic and cultural norms and values, as they remain important political tools and
displays of power despite the incorporation of the Ibaloi and Southern Kankana’ey into the
modern Philippine and global economic and political systems (Russell 1989, 2007). Thus,
traditional feasts, though largely replaced within the economic system with monetary wealth,
continue to adapt and be influential within Ibaloi and Southern Kankana’ey society.

Ritual and Religion

Ritual and religious practices permeate all aspects of Igorot life. As Scott (1966:152)
asserts, “Igorot pagan worship penetrates into every aspect of Igorot life, and actual prayers, rites
and religious songs accompany every phase or step of life he considers significant,” and religious
practice “sanctifies the material world, forms the basis of the composition of society, and is the
sanctifier of moral conduct.” According to Tauli-Corpuz (2001:281), the Igorot religious system
is not a defined and independent system within Igorot culture but rather a “whole set of values
deemed good… such as respect for the ancestors, nature, and elders and honesty, community, solidarity, and collectivity.” The Igorot religious system is animistic, or marked by “the belief that every living thing has a soul” and “not only ancestors, plants, and animals (that is, living things) are endowed with spiritual powers; places, symbols, sounds, and moments also have special powers attributed to them” (Tauli-Corpuz 2001:286). Within this belief system, “deities have particular roles to play” and the Ibaloi revere “Balitok (God of Gold),” reflecting the importance of gold in their traditional life-ways (Tauli-Corpuz 2001:285). Significantly, “traditional Igorot religion is characterized by ancestor worship and nature worship” (Tauli-Corpuz 2001:284), and their ritual and religious life is defined by the “need to sustain good relationships between human beings, between humans and the rest of creation, and between humans and the spirits and deities” (Tauli-Corpuz 2001:285).

Natural resources thus play a significant role in Igorot religious beliefs and ritual practices. Indeed, “land is synonymous with life,” and prayers and rituals are conducted “to thank and praise the spirits for an abundant harvest, for striking gold in the mines, and for other such instances of good fortune. These are offered to acknowledge the proprietary rights of the spirits to the land, resources, and material blessings bestowed upon a family or clan” (Tauli-Corpuz 2001:285). Igorot religion features ancestor worship, a remote pantheon of gods, and a number of spirits or *anitos*. Ancestor worship is especially important because of a social organization based on bilateral ancestor-based descent groups (Wiber 1993:49). Carino (1958:205-207) describes how the dead become ancestors as they are transported to Mount Pulog, the highest peak on Luzon, in elaborate rituals. Thus, natural resources and ancestors are sanctified, as they are given spiritual qualities, through Igorot religious beliefs and ritual systems.
The social and economic structure of Igorot cultures influence their ritual and religious structures because of the importance of redistributive ritual feasts. Prestige feasts within the Igorot ritual repertoire are generically called *canyao*. According to Cawed (1972:29), “The *canyao* is a socio-religious ceremony in which a chicken, a pig or carabao [water buffalo] is killed as a sacrifice and feasted on.” Such ceremonial feasts occur to celebrate and commemorate important events, such as marriage or a death in the community, as well as to mark certain set times, including “several times during the planting and harvesting” seasons (Cawed 1972:29). Indeed for the Ibaloi, “harvest season begins” when the *mambunong*, or ritual priest, performs a “ritual by butchering a pig to anticipate a bountiful harvest” (Cordillera Schools Group 2003:41).

In addition to *canyao*, *mangmang* or smaller ritual feasts are celebrated “on lesser occasions,” such as “any called-for occasion to appease the anger of an ancestor or to counteract any evil or harm inflicted by a bad *anito*” (Cawed 1972:31,32). Scott (1966:152) states that during ritual and religious feasting “sanctification of the material is focused most intently on food, not only upon its production but also its distribution.” Social and economic status is demonstrated and reinforced at ritual feasts, as elites sponsor feasts and provide the most sacrificial goods and food. Indeed, Keesing (1962:64) asserts that an elite, or member of the *baknang* class, distinguishes himself by the “more bones of animals killed in his feast.” In southern Benguet, *canyao* is further distinguished by competitive feasts, called *peshit* among the Ibaloi and *pedit* among the Southern Kankana’ey (Russell 1989:249). Emphasis is placed on the “ largesse” or “expense” of such “prestige feasts” (Russell 1989:255). These feasts serve as political forums, in which sponsors express their political potency and aspirations (Wiber
According to Lewis (1992:59), the wealthy gain social prestige and legitimation of their wealth and elite status by sponsoring feasts and providing many sacrificial goods, while commoners must borrow and become indebted in order to fulfill their ritual and sacrificial obligations to the spirits of nature and the spirits of their ancestors. Thus, the stratified social order and economic inequality of the Igorots, particularly the Ibaloi and Southern Kankana’ey of Benguet, are legitimated and reinforced through the ritual and religious system.

Traditional religious and ritual beliefs and practices continue to permeate and dominate Igorot culture, even as it adapts to global religious, economic and political systems. According to Russell (1989:252-253), most Igorots, particularly around Baguio City in southern Benguet, consider themselves Christian, although they continue to emphasize the importance of “ritual sponsorship” or sacrificial feasting as an exchange between the living and the spirits of their ancestors in their ritual lives. Indeed, Wiber (1993:49) asserts that the Igorots of southern Benguet practice a “syncretized Christianity,” while Tauli-Corpuz (2001:283) defines most Igorots as “nominal Christians.” Within their culture, “ancestral and nature spirits are still revered, respected, and feared. Igorots practice a unique kind of Christianity, mixed with traditional religion” (Tauli-Corpuz 2001:283). Recent immigration from the southern Philippines has also led to the increased presence of Islam throughout the Cordillera.

Furthermore, even as the Igorots adapt more modern and “ecologically maladaptive” agricultural and economic systems, they continue to practice their traditional ritual system based on ancestor and nature spirit placation. Thus, the traditional ritual and religious system of the Igorots continues to influence their social identity, even as they adapt to globalized political and economic systems which contradict with some of their traditional beliefs.
Agriculture

The Igorots have traditionally engaged in both subsistence farming of wet rice fields and dry vegetable fields, the maintenance of livestock, and small-scale long-distance trade. According to Keesing (1962:1), “Some are ‘dry’ or natural-rainfall gardeners scattered out in small hamlets. Others are ‘wet’ cultivators, growing crops in irrigated terraces sculpted in mountain pockets and up the sheer hillsides.” Scott (1966:1) describes the Ibaloi and Southern Kankana’ey as having the “shifting agriculture of the swidden-farming root-eating peoples of Benguet” prior to arrival of the Spanish. However, “by the end of the Spanish regime” cultural “diffusion had carried irrigated rice throughout Benguet, probably from Ifugao as well as from Bontoc, although not to such an extent that it has even today replaced root crops (camote and taro) as the universal staple” (Scott 1966:4). As they have increasingly joined globalized world markets, especially beginning with their first contacts with the Spanish, they have “added large livestock herds, coffee plantations, and intensified agricultural production” to their agricultural repertoire (Keesing 1962:49-51).

The Ibaloi and Southern Kankana’ey, within the fertile and water-rich mountains and forests and temperate climate of southern Benguet, plant and harvest two crops of rice per year (Cawed 1972:9; Cordillera Schools Group 2003:40). Other important agricultural products include root vegetables, especially camote (sweet potato), the “supplementary food of the Igorot” (Cawed 1972:9). Other root crops include gabi, cassava, ginger and potatoes. Vegetables include cabbage, celery, wong bok, tomatoes and pechay. Important fruits include avocados, bananas, pineapples, oranges, mangoes, and papayas. Coffee and mushrooms are also farmed (Cordillera Schools Group 2003:42). Livestock includes pigs, cows, carabao, goats and
chickens. Most Ibaloi own and manage some livestock (Cordillera Schools Group 2003:43). Agricultural land was traditionally divided into three distinct agricultural plot types: dry fields (mostly for camote), flooded rice terraces, and door-yard gardens for vegetables and fruits. Additionally, uncultivated lands were used as hunting grounds and buffalo pastures. Such patterns have decreased as more land has been cultivated for large-scale commercial agriculture, especially following World War II (Lewis 1992:22-23). Hunting, fishing and wine making provide additional supplementary food sources (Cordillera Schools Group 2003:45). Thus, agriculture throughout southern Benguet is highly varied and adaptable.

While both the Ibaloi and Southern Kankana’ey farm and exploit these multiple food sources, their agricultural strategies differ as they have adapted to different geographical features within their respective homelands of southern Benguet within the southern Cordillera. The homeland of the Ibaloi, in the far southern area of the region clustered around Baguio City features “forests, mountain peaks and ridges, steep slopes, deep ravines, and waterways[:] … rivers, springs and under surface water resources account for the abundance of water throughout the year” (Cordillera Schools Group 2003:28). While featuring a similar climate and geography, the homeland of Southern Kankana’ey is “wholly dominated by mountain ranges…steep slopes to nearly level slopes with deep ravines and small patches of gentle slopes that are found along the riverbanks, narrow valleys and on top of ridges” (Cordillera Schools Group 2003:156). Thus, the homeland of the Ibaloi features more water sources while the homeland of the Southern Kankana’ey is more rugged. Such geographical differences have influenced agricultural adaptations and practices, as “river settlements,” characteristic of the Ibaloi, have developed a “rice-growing stress” while “mountain settlements,” characteristic of the Southern
Kankana’ey, have developed a “root crop-growing stress” (Keesing 1962:51). Following World War II and the development of large agribusiness and commercial farming throughout the Benguet and the Cordillera, these agricultural stresses and niches have led to cultural competition and tensions between Ibaloi and Southern Kankana’ey. The Ibaloi continue to dominate wet rice production, which carries much social prestige throughout the region, but the Southern Kankana’ey have come to dominate the root crops and vegetables, which carry more economic and political value within the context of large-scale agribusiness (Russell 1989:251,260). Thus, the Ibaloi maintain their traditional dominance of cultural prestige in the region, but they are challenged by the political and economic prestige of the Southern Kankana’ey, especially as Benguet supplies much of the temperate vegetables throughout the Philippines and is known as the “Salad Bowl of the Philippines” (Cordillera Schools Group 2003:28). Thus, agricultural developments, especially the increasing growth of globalized large-scale agribusiness, are leading to cultural tensions and transformations.

**Trade and Commerce**

While recent historical trends have accelerated the globalization of Igorot culture and their place within global economic and political systems, the Igorots have been involved in globalization since time immemorial because their trade and commerce networks connected them with Japanese and Chinese networks through their lowland and coastal neighbors and relatives. Indeed, “reference to trade with Japanese and Chinese merchants [in early Spanish records] is particularly significant as indicating that mining in this Cordillera zone had been developed prior to Spanish times” (Keesing 1962:97). In these trade networks, gold and other minerals, featured prominently in linking the Igorots, especially the Ibaloi and Southern
Kankana’ey in the gold-rich mountains of Benguet, to regional and international trading networks.

Prior to the arrival of the Spanish, the Igorots had established and maintained extensive trade and commerce networks with lowland and coastal Philippine groups. These networks continued to be maintained throughout the Spanish colonial period, as the Igorots resists Spanish control over their productive resources and commercial activities. Indeed, ethnohistorical records suggest that the search for gold and the establishment of gold mines and gold mining communities may have been the catalyst for pre-historical lowland migration and settlement throughout the Cordillera. Canilao (2011) reviews oral ethnohistorical accounts which suggest that the Igorots populated Benguet as they found and mined gold supplies for trade with lowlanders and other maritime Southeast Asian and Chinese traders. Gold production remained important even after the establishment of wetland agriculture. Keesing (1962:7) documents “locations of gold where rivers enter the plains, which could have brought about occupation of the mountains to work this resource.” Even as geographical separation led to diverging cultural developments among lowlanders and highlanders, “the process of cultural bifurcation on account of both external and internal pressures did not erase the links and commonalities among the highland, midland, and lowland settlements” (Azurin 1991:31). Furthermore, “ancestral and trading links of highland Sagada and coastal Candon remain fresh in the memories of the old residents of both communities,” while trading pathways, especially along the Cordillera’s extensive river systems, linked the highlands and lowlands communities geographically and culturally (Azurin 1991:27,41). Thus, the highland and lowland Philippine
cultural communities shared common cultural and commercial interests prior to the arrival of the Spanish and the subsequent colonial distinction between the two regions.

Igorots traded gold to the lowlands and coast. According to Scott (1971:2), lowland, and coastal “Ilocanos and the Pangasinanes and [highland] Igorots were business partners in the gold industry” and the “Igorots mined the gold but… the Ilocanos refined it and distributed it to other places.” Furthermore, Cawed (1972:2) asserts that “trade existed between the Igorots… and their lowland neighbors in the Ilocos, and many Ilocanos migrated to the place [the Cordillera].” Igorots would traditionally “bring their gold from the mountains of Benguet” to the Ilocos coast (Keesing 1962:87). Indeed, “old trade trails connected the Benguet heights of the Ibaloi with the Pangasinan plains to the south, with the Southern Ilocos coast to the west, and with ‘Ituy,’ the upper Magat river flats, to the east” (Keesing 1962:324). Gold proved valuable because it was “wanted by pre-Spanish traders from neighboring Asian areas” (Keesing 1962:7). Indeed, the “Chinese had been trading for centuries at suitable landing points along the coast, here as elsewhere in the Philippines. Japanese traders competed with them… Inward trade included cloth, ceramic ware, semiprecious beads, and worked and unworked metals, while among goods taken out were gold, deerskins, carabao horn, beeswax, and fibers. In general, relations appear to have been those of friendly convenience” (Keesing 1962:13). Such trade and commerce were especially significant to the Ibaloi and Southern Kankana’ey because they were “never wholly self-sufficient,” so they depended on trade as long-distance merchants, with a mercantile orientation (Lewis 1992:82). Indeed, “elite dominance was underwritten by control of long-distance trade” (Lewis 1992:234). Furthermore, the gold trade connected them to the global economy, especially prior to World War II (Lewis 1992:235). Thus, the Igorots, particularly the
Ibaloi and Southern Kankana’ey of Benguet, depended on long-distance trade networks, which enabled their cultural survival.

Such trading networks were maintained through a system of traditional warfare and peace pacts with highland neighbors. In general, Igorot communities mistrusted and feared their neighboring communities, though “to ensure the availability of trade routes to the lowlands, some interior villages maintained bilateral ‘peace pacts’ with a limited number of other highland villages” (Finin 2005:11). According to Cawed (1972:23), the Igorots “were known as fierce headhunters,” while Keesing (1962:7) asserts that “warfare and headhunting” shaped “intergroup relations” among the Igorots prior to their incorporation into the Spanish and American colonial systems. Furthermore, they rarely maintained trade relations with neighboring highland communities, as the “structure of pre-twentieth-century marketing networks tended to extend down toward coastal areas on the west and east rather than further into the interior. Highlanders traded products like honey, deerskins, and… gold for coastal goods such as salt and imported Chinese porcelains” (Finin 2005:11). Despite inter-group conflicts, Igorot communities remained dependent on each other for the maintenance of long-distance trade networks.

Following World War II, the incorporation of the Philippine nation into an increasingly globalized economic and political environment led to the acceleration of large-scale, international agribusiness and mining throughout the Cordillera, particularly the homeland of the Ibaloi in southern Benguet surrounding the regional commercial capital of Baguio City. Such developments have affected Igorot trading practices, as Igorot communities engaged in commercial farming and mining activities and brought their market produce to the centralized location of Baguio City (Russell 1987:141; Lewis 1992:82). Indeed, “the city of Baguio… has
become the major marketing center for the Ibaloi, largely obviating the long treks to the lowland communities” (Keesing 1962:51). Commercial vegetable production has greatly expanded since World War II, as “upland farmers in Benguet produce the bulk of the commercial vegetables… consumed by urban populations in Manila” (Russell 1987:141). Such emphasis on commercial production is changing cultural relations and economics as “commercial production is input-intensive, requiring large amounts of capital for fertilizer and chemicals each season” (Russell 1987:141). Thus, Igorot trade continues to adapt to ever-increasing national and global economic and political systems.

Ultimately, the Igorot history and culture continue to influence their current economic and social status within broader Philippine and global society. Their resistance to incorporation within dominant colonial and national cultures has led to their being set apart from and classified as different from mainstream Philippine society and culture. This classification has both negative and positive effects, as it has led to minority status and prejudiced and discriminatory attitudes and actions against Igorots while allowing them to maintain much of their cultural identity, especially economic activities of traditional small-scale mining. As their minority status becomes more politicized with increasing emphasis on indigenous identity and indigenous rights and their economic livelihood is increasingly threatened by increasing neoliberal development paradigms throughout the Philippines and the world, the Igorot history and culture serves as the basis for resistance to encroachment of large-scale mining operations within the Cordillera.
CHAPTER 3
SMALL-SCALE GOLD MINING

Traditional small-scale gold mining has provided a sustainable economic and commercial livelihood to the Igorots of the Cordillera since time immemorial and has been a major source of income and trade for the indigenous peoples of the region. Their traditional small-scale gold mining techniques continue to be practiced and provide a means of cultural identity and survival to indigenous cultural communities of the region. However, small-scale gold mining in general throughout the Philippines, especially in “gold rush” areas such as southern Benguet Province, has evolved over time to become more chemically and technologically intensive. In addition to international and large-scale mining corporations developing mining sites, migrant miners have joined the gold rush and developed their own communities and mining techniques, especially since the beginning of the 20th century. These developments have led to newer and more modern small-scale mining techniques and technologies, even among indigenous communities, which are more technologically and chemically intensive and more environmentally and socially disruptive. These new small-scale mining practices and methods threaten the continuation of traditional mining practices and methods, idealized as a sustainable form of resource extraction and economic livelihood. Such developments are often ignored as increasingly technologically and chemically intensive practices and methods, or “modern small-scale mining” and “traditional small-scale mining,” are lumped together as general small-scale mining. Such incorporation of these differing practices and methods under the same label leads to misunderstandings and difficulties in the regulation of small-scale mining. Furthermore, indigenous communities’ legal
rights to their lands and properties have developed and evolved within this context of evolving interest in the Philippines’ mineral resources and the recently evolving methods, practices and techniques for extracting these resources, especially with the passage of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) in 1997. This chapter reviews the small-scale mining techniques and methods that are practiced throughout Benguet Province, the homeland of the Ibaloi and Southern Kankana’ey, focusing on the development and differences between traditional and modern small-scale mining.

**Traditional Small-Scale Mining in the Cordillera**

The southern Cordillera region of southern Benguet is a “rich country” (Cawed 1972:9) for mineral resources, and “most of the areas occupied by the Ibaloys [Ibaloi] are rich in mineral resources such as copper, gold, pyrite, and limestone” (Cordillera Schools Group 2003: 28). Indeed, the “Southern Cordillera was and continues to be the principal source of gold in Luzon” (Caballero 1996:15). Due to this natural wealth, “the Ibaloys [Ibaloi] in the gold-rich areas of Benguet are engaged in small-scale mining” (Cordillera Schools Group 2003:43). Furthermore, the Southern Kankana’ey also heavily practice small-scale mining, as “the Kankana’ey of Benguet, particularly those in Mankayan, are expert miners” (Cordillera Schools Group 2003:166). Additionally, “besides gold, copper is also mined, smelted and brought to the blacksmiths to be manufactured into domestic articles” (Cordillera Schools Group 2003:167). Indeed, “gold mining and processing is a practice of great antiquity in the Philippines and its presence and role in a community’s livelihood is well-established,” and “the tradition of gold mining permeates their technological, sociological and ideological systems” (Caballero 1996:1-
Thus, traditional small-scale mining plays a central role in the traditional economic livelihood and cultural identity of the Ibaloi and Southern Kankana’ey of Benguet.

Furthermore, such mining industry provides economic opportunity and agency for both men and women, as traditional mining and processing methods are divided along gender lines. Men typically engage in mining-intensive activities, such as exploring and prospecting mineral-rich areas for potential mining sites, excavating the mines and extracting mineral ore, whereas women typically engage in processing-intensive activities, as the “separation of gold from the ore” (Cordillera Schools Group 2003:43; see also Cordillera Schools Group 2003:163 and AFRIM 2012:15). Indeed, “women play an important role in traditional small-scale mining” as they “have been trained in the special skill of gold processing” (AFRIM 2012:26). The Alternative Forum for Research in Mindanao (2012:26) lists “the roles of women in gold processing” in the Filipino language:

- **Pag-u-usal** – This is the process of skillfully selecting gold ores.
- **Pagba-bagon** – From the term “bagon” or an improvised wagon or cart used in transporting muck ores (waste) from inside the tunnel to outside. Women assist in this process.
- **Pagpa-pala ng waste** – This is the manual shoveling of muck ores outside the tunnel.
- **Man-gaid** – The manual pulverizing of ores prior to feeding of ore in the ball mill.
- **Mag-alinteg** – The grinding of mineral ore using a pair of stones.
- **Mandayas** – The skillful separation of gold dust from the gold tails.

Thus, traditional mining practices provide the opportunity for economic development, skills development and cultural and social agency to women within the Ibaloi and Southern Kankana’ey cultural traditions. The relative equality between men and women such a system provides is increasingly threatened by the growth of male-dominated modern mining practices.
The tools employed in traditional small-scale mining and processing methods include “primitive mining tools” and “simple mining tools” (Cordillera Schools Group 2003:163). According to Israel and Asirot (2002:1), “Small-scale gold mining is an activity that relies heavily on manual labor and uses simple implements and methods.” These tools have traditionally consisted of “wooden wedges, short wooden shovel, stone or hard-wood hammer, and a fire-tempered wood or steel [shovel] lengthened with a wooden handle and various baskets of woven split bamboo” (Cordillera Schools Group 2003:163). Tools for processing gold ore have traditionally consisted of “a large flat stone to crush the ore into fine particles. The gold is separated from the ore using a wooden gold separator (sabak) that is immersed in a trough (dayasan) to wash out the ore and leave the gold particles that are then cooked in an earthen dish over a coal fire. A wooden blower is used to insure a steady heat to melt the pulverized gold into ‘cakes’” (Cordillera Schools Group 2003:163). Recently, steel and iron tools have increasingly replaced wooden and stone tools, even as traditional mining and processing methods continue to be practiced (Caballero 1996). Indeed, according to the Alternative Forum for Research in Mindanao (2012:11), “traditional mining” includes not only “old practices of mining using indigenous materials as used by the IP [indigenous persons] ancestors. The current mining practices of the communities have improved and evolved to meet the demands of the present time.” Thus, the lines between traditional and modern mining practices become blurred as indigenous communities with traditional mining cultures adopt new technologies and methods.

These traditional small-scale mining methods practiced by the Ibaloi and Southern Kankana’ey include lode mining, placer mining and placer-lode mining (Cordillera Schools Group 2003:43). In lode mining, miners prospect, excavate, and extract lode, or “mineralized
vein or veins, usually in hard rock. Lode mining involves the digging of tunnels following the lode. The extraction of gold is generally a family activity” (Caballero 1996:164). Tunnels in lode mining are “approximately 1.5 m. high and 1 m. wide,” and they are supported by wooden timbers and ventilated through the excavation of shafts (Caballero 1996:164,165). Lode mining involves the whole community as social and cultural regulations are enforced. Religious rituals are important in the opening of new tunnels, as “new tunnels are located and opened through a combination of ritual, prospecting and/or visual means” (Caballero 1996:164). Additionally, lode mining is not practiced during certain rituals, especially death and funeral rituals (Caballero 1996:164). Conflict between miners who claim the same lode is “brought to the panglakayan [council of elders] who will determine the party at fault and impose on them the necessary penalties” (165). Thus, religious and social institutions function to regulate lode mining practices.

Placer mining involves the extraction of gold ore from a placer deposit, or “loose sedimentary deposit (gravel, sand, silt) containing valuable minerals” (Caballero 1996:165). Placer mining involves less prospecting, excavating and ore extraction than lode mining, as ore is closer to the surface and in the context of looser surrounding rock and soil. Furthermore, “placer gold is recovered by sluicing,” or water processing, and it involves less community cooperation and regulation, as “the work force in placer mining consists of family units divided into pairs; however, mining is sometimes done alone. Occasionally, there can be three but rarely four persons working together” (Caballero 1996:165).

While there are important differences between these two traditional small-scale mining methods, they are often practiced in conjunction or combination with each other at placer-lode
mining sites on mountain sides (Cordillera Schools Group 2003:43). Furthermore, the gold extracted from both methods is treated and handled in the same way after it has been mined. The Ibaloi and Southern Kankana’ey consider gold to be property of their gods and ancestors, and they treat and handle it with the utmost respect. Indeed, they mine and process “the gold with the utmost seriousness for it is taboo to laugh and joke while mining and processing the metal. To do so incurs the displeasure of the gods who in owning the gold can hide it from the villagers or cause the gold grains to fly away” (Caballero 1996:1). Furthermore, “there are other taboos among the lode miners, which if violated they believe will reduce the yield of the gold being mined” (Caballero 1996: 165). Such beliefs influence community relations and property claims, as “traditional small-scale miners believe that ultimately their god (Kabunian) and anitos (spirits, ancestors) own the resources and a council of elders (panglackayan) manage these resources for the community” (Caballero 1996:59). Furthermore, “the traditional small-scale miners share the resource among themselves. For example, cultural practices of sharing among kin, the participative role of women in mining and corporate rights to property even to those not resident in the area, allows for the avoidance of competition and the broadening of the resource base” (Caballero 1996:159). Additionally, “a unique traditional way of ore sharing is still practiced in Benguet. The monetary profit from a single mining operation is equally shared by the mine workers. Another sharing tradition that is still practiced in Benguet is the “sagaok.” This is a mode of sharing by tunnel owners and miners whenever a high-grade ore is found. All the members of the community get a share of the mine. Elders, women and children are prioritized. Other miners and mine workers may work inside the mine for a given amount of time to get their share” (AFRIM 2012:16). Wiber (1993:89-90) further asserts that gold and other mineral
resources are considered “communal resources.” Thus, all sectors of society benefit from the economic distribution of gold. Ultimately, the methods, practices and beliefs of traditional small-scale mining function to provide a culturally sustainable economic livelihood system to the Igorots of the Cordillera, especially the Ibaloi and Southern Kankana’ey of the mineral-rich southern Benguet region.

**Modern (“Gold Rush”) Small-Scale Gold Mining**

Modern mining techniques spread prolifically throughout the Cordillera region with the introduction of American influence in the Philippines. The American regime penetrated the Cordillera to a further extent than previous foreign interests had managed to accomplish in their pursuit of the “yet untapped natural wealth” of the mountains (Azurin 1991:1). Indeed, the “bounty of the Igorot goldmines … brought some American prospectors to the Cordillera who then married into the Igorot clans owning the mines… more than a decade before Commodore George Dewey ever dreamed of ordering his fleet to steam toward Manila Bay in 1898,” foreshadowing the American colonial period (Azurin 1991:4). The southern Benguet homeland of the Ibaloi served as the major destination of early American prospectors, as the history of “Spanish interest and the reported production of traditional small-scale miners” brought “many of the American prospectors … to the vicinity of Benguet Province. In the Benguet district, the Americans adopted a set of rules to govern their location and holding of mining claims and established an office of the mining recorder” (Caballero 1996:34).

This American interest in the gold of Benguet Province focused on the development of a large-scale mining industry. According to Caballero (1996:35), “The period from 1898 to 1918 established gold as the major mining industry in the Philippines and Benguet Province as the
major mining area. The areas prospected, developed and brought into production were to be the major gold mining areas for both the commercial mines and the traditional small-scale miners in the years to come.” Furthermore, “by 1916 Benguet Province through BCMC [Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, an American-originated large-scale mining corporation] was the primary gold-producing area,” and by “1921, Mountain Province [encompassing present-day Benguet Province] did become the leading gold producer in the Philippines” (Caballero 1996:34, 36). Vidal (2005:39) further asserts that the American colonial period “gave rise to the establishment of major Philippine mining companies, the most famous of which are Lepanto Consolidated and Benguet Consolidated Mines Ltd,” both of which operate within Benguet Province. Subsequently, the American colonial period established the southern Benguet region as the premier gold-producing region within the newly industrialized gold mining commerce of the Philippines.

While focused on the development of the large-scale mining industry, these American-led developments led to a regional “gold rush” which has greatly affected the populations of the Benguet homeland of the Ibaloi and Southern Kankana’ey and the development of small-scale mining throughout the region (Israel and Asirot 2002:2). According to Finin (2005:278), “Beginning in the 1930s, the gold rush that brought hundreds of American miners to the Cordillera also required a large number of laborers. Over time thousands of highlanders hailing from hundreds of villages were placed together in mining communities.” Many lowlanders also migrated to the region and established their own communities as cultural, linguistic and historical differences and mining policies led to settlement practices “segregating highlanders and lowlanders.” Such migration patterns have led to “worsening social instability in small-scale
mining areas,” as “many small-scale miners are migrants in the areas where they mine” (Israel and Asirot 2002:50). In addition to the social problems caused by an influx of migrant populations, throughout the 1930s, until the outbreak of World War II in 1941, American policies led to ever-greater gold extraction, as “during this gold boom period, the government control of the mining industry was extended. This included government intervention in terms of mine leases, mine safety, mineral reservations and additional taxes on mining operations” (Caballero 1996:39). This expanded state control of the mining industry increased the political and social danger of small-scale mining as “most small-scale gold mining in the Philippines was operated without license and, therefore, illegal” (Israel and Asirot 2002:11; see also Wiber 1993:89). Throughout the 1980s, the Philippines experienced a further “gold boom” (Vidal 2005:39-40), as “following the international trend, the production of gold in the Philippines has also been increasing over time” (Israel and Asirot 2002:3). This gold boom further increased with the passage of a more liberal national mining law and policy in 1995 (Vidal 2005:40).

Thus, the history of gold mining policy since the establishment of the American period has led to great social and economic changes throughout the Cordillera and Benguet Province, including ownership of mines and domestic and foreign immigration into the region.

Furthermore, the increased economic opportunity and settlement of large and diverse numbers of migrants to gold rush areas, such as southern Benguet Province, have led to the introduction and development of new small-scale mining techniques and practices, which threaten the continued sustainability of traditional small-scale mining. Small-scale mining plays an important role in the Philippine economy “as an employment haven in the rural upland areas,” which “contributes significantly to gold production and rural employment in the Philippines”
Indeed, Israel and Asirot (2002:11) assert that “underground small-scale gold mining contributed around 25 percent of the total gold production,” and “This contribution was certainly large coming from a non-mechanized and generally artisanal form of mining activity.” The Alternative Forum for Research in Mindanao (2012:11) distinguishes between two types of small-scale mining: “traditional” and “modern-corporate.” Within the framework of “traditional” mining, mines are usually owned by families, are smaller “pocket” mines, do not operate during the rainy season, and involve no mechanical processing, but only manual ore crushing and sluicing. “Modern” small-scale mining sometimes involves larger mines and employs mechanized processing plants, such as ball milling and carbon-in-pulp plants as well as chemicals, including mercury and cyanide, in the processing process (AFRIM 2012:11). Indeed, “modern practices of gold extraction processing and refining utilize chemicals like mercury, cyanide, nitric acid and zinc” while “the process of refining gold through smelting using blue torch flame produces fumes” (AFRIM 2012:29). According to Israel and Asirot (2002:14), “Mercury gets into the picture in small-scale mining because it is the main agent used to separate the gold from the mined ore employing the amalgamation method of processing. Amalgamation is popular in small-scale mining areas since it is simple to apply and requires relatively low investment.” These modern extraction and processing practices cause much environmental degradation. The use of chemicals in gold processing “results in the production of mine tailings” (Israel and Asirot 2002:14). The Alternative Forum for Research in Mindanao reports that “in Benguet, the processing plants … are situated near the river, creeks and along roads. The use of cyanide, nitric acid and zinc are common in leaching plants. There are tailing ponds but they are not constructed to meet some standard of safety. They are not cemented and
are in direct contact with the soil. Heavy metal contamination to surface and soil was also observed.” Additionally, Israel and Asirot (2002:47-49) list the environmental hazards of chemical processing in small-scale mining as “cyanide pollution,” “deforestation,” “soil erosion,” “biodiversity loss,” “siltation and sedimentation of downstream water bodies.” Furthermore, “At present, dynamite blasting and cutting of trees are done without permission,” and “landslides and floods are also common” (AFRIM 2012:28-29, 31). Caballero (1996:175) asserts that the “main issue of concern is the use of mercury in the extraction of gold from ore.” The presence of mercury produces health risks for mine workers as well as local wildlife and communities (AFRIM 2012:29-30). Furthermore, “small-scale gold mining has been the target of strong opposition in recent years mainly because of its various adverse environmental and social side effects. Foremost of these is mercury pollution” (Israel and Asirot 2002:1). Thus, modern small-scale mining differs from traditional small-scale mining most significantly in its use of chemicals that cause environmental degradation.

However, despite these important distinctions between these two methods of small-scale mining practiced throughout the Philippines, the governmental policies apply the same regulations to both methods. Caballero (1996:174) asserts that “little attention was given to the traditional small-scale mining communities in Benguet Province prior to the 1980s. However, this changed during the middle and late 1980s which saw a proliferation of gold-rush areas in the Philippines. The national government included the miners of Benguet Province as part of the gold-rush phenomenon and distinctions were not made between these two groups. They were all called small-scale miners and they were all assumed to practice placer and lode mining in the same manner, including the extraction of gold from the ore with the use of mercury.”
Furthermore, Republic Act No. 7076, “also known as the People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991… ignored the existence of small-scale miners as all of the statute’s provisions were premised on the misconception that all such miners are of the type exemplified by gold-rush miners” (Caballero 1996:177). Such a lack of distinction exacerbates local government units’ (LGUs) ability to regulate modern small-scale mining operations, as local communities resist the implementation of universal regulatory policies. Small-scale mines are required to register with LGUs, “but because of the historical nature of the industry in the communities, it has been difficult for LGUs to strictly implement this requirement. Currently, the small mining operators are just voluntarily registering with the LGU” (AFRIM 2012:23). The lack of registrations leads to loss of revenue for LGUs and the local communities they represent because it prevents the enforcement of taxation (AFRIM 2012:23). Furthermore, it creates dependency of small-scale mining, both traditional and modern, on large-scale mining operations, as “many small-scale mining areas… are situated within the mining claims of large-scale companies” (Israel and Asirot 2002:49) and are allowed to operate only because “the large-scale mining firm tolerates the operation of the small-scale miners” (Israel and Asirot 2002:23). Ultimately, the Alternative Forum for Research in Mindanao (2012:31) asserts that “in Benguet, SSM [small-scale mining] operation is historically part of their way of life. SSM defines their cultural identity. The traditional practices of SSM are threatened by competition for resource and profit. The introduction of new technologies, entry of migrant financiers and workers and the increasing demand for the resource and profit, along with the adverse impacts posed and continues to pose challenges to self-governance of IP communities.” Indeed, the development of the mining industry in the Philippines, throughout the American colonial period through the present
republican period, has led to threatened sustainability of traditional small-scale mining and
economic livelihood in Benguet, not only due to the introduction of large-scale mining
operations but also due to the influx of migrants and the introduction of modern small-scale
mining techniques.

Ultimately, small-scale mining remains a complex and controversial topic. It includes
both traditional mining, idealized as an egalitarian and socially and ecologically sustainable
economic livelihood system for the peoples of the Cordillera, and modern small-scale mining,
vilified as socially and ecologically destructive and unsustainable. As communities within the
Cordillera assert their rights as indigenous peoples, they attempt to clearly distinguish between
these two small-scale mining practices and distance themselves from modern mining practices,
both small-scale and large-scale. The maintenance and continuation of traditional small-scale
mining practices serves as the foundation for indigenous identity throughout the Cordillera, and
the basis for indigenous resistance to large-scale mining operations.
CHAPTER 4
CAPITALIST EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY POLICY

The challenges facing the continued survival of traditional mining communities in the Cordillera stem from the aggressive pursuit of capitalist development of property and extractive industries throughout the Philippines. Such pursuit accelerated within the Cordillera beginning with the consolidation of the region under the American colonial regime, around the turn of the 20th century. Mangahas (1987) provides historical context for the process of the transformation of indigenous property systems in the Philippines. When the United States colonized the Philippines in 1901, it distributed much of the previous colonialist Spain’s lands to influential, landlord Filipinos. In doing so, it created a homestead system that created more social distance between Philippine landlords and the landless. Much land of the Philippines that had previously been public was now private. This new system led to a breakdown in landlord-tenant relationships in the Philippines because as the landlords gained more lands, they did not share their new wealth with their tenants. At this time, large-scale and foreign-owned and controlled mining corporations developed throughout the region, particularly in Benguet Province. The aggressive pursuit of capitalist development further intensified in the 1980s, with the waning of the Cold War, as the Philippines, like much of the developing world, adopted a neoliberal development paradigm. Neoliberal development policies advocate rapid economic growth through free and open global trade, with limited government regulations. Such policies, often advocated by international development agencies such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, focus on economic development at the expense of local social and
environmental concerns. The passage of Republic Act 7942, or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, illustrates such neoliberal development policy within the context of extractive industries, as it expands the areas open to large-scale mining operations and provides for 100% ownership of mining corporations and operations by foreigners and foreign interests. This chapter reviews the development of capitalist large-scale mining, beginning with the foundation of the American-established Benguet Corporation at the beginning of the 20th century, and a neoliberal development paradigm of extractive industries in the Philippines, focusing on the implementation of the Mining Act of 1995.

Development of Large-Scale Extractive Industries in the Cordillera

Large-scale gold mining was established as a major industry in the Cordillera with the beginning of the American colonial period, which “gave rise to the establishment of major Philippine mining companies, the most famous of which are Lepanto Consolidated and Benguet Consolidated Mines Ltd.” (Vidal 2005:39). According to Caballero (1996:35), “The period from 1898 to 1918 established gold as the major mining industry in the Philippines and Benguet Province as the major mining area. The areas prospected, developed and brought into production were to be the major gold mining areas for both the commercial mines and the traditional small-scale miners in the years to come.” Furthermore, Broad and Cavanagh (1993:31) assert that “over this last century, a few giant mining firms – many with significant foreign ownership – received government concessions and began large-scale operations with much of the output destined for export.” Thus, the capitalist large-scale mining industry has developed throughout the Philippines with the onset of the American colonial period.
The present-day Benguet Corporation led this development and has long maintained its role as one of the major large-scale mining corporations in the Cordillera region, throughout a “long, stormy but relatively stable development” (Ramos 1989:107). Indeed, “the company spearheaded the Philippines’ ascendance to become the world’s ninth largest gold producer, and it turned gold and copper concentrates into two of the country’s leading exports” (Broad and Cavanagh 1993:29). It was formed and registered in 1903 as the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company (BCMC) by three American investors and businessmen (Broad and Cavanagh 1993:29). Caballero (1996:34) asserts that “by 1916 Benguet Province through BCMC [Benguet Consolidated Mining Company] was the primary gold-producing area.” The company’s operations continued to thrive and experienced a boom throughout the 1930s, until its infrastructure was destroyed with the onset of the World War II Pacific conflict in the Philippines in 1941. Following the war and the liberation of the Philippines, it quickly rebuilt, and “after $15 million of rehabilitation work, BCMC was the first mining company to reopen in 1947” (Ramos 1989:108). In 1956 the company changed its name to Benguet Consolidated, Inc., and in 1980 it again changed its name to Benguet Corporation. By 1974, foreign domination of the corporation expired with the “expiration of parity rights,” and it “underwent Filipinization,” which “signaled a 60 per cent Filipino ownership” (Ramos 1989:108). This shift to Philippine control failed to include or benefit local communities, as the company “was sold to one of the wealthiest Philippine families, and [is] now owned in approximately equal thirds by wealthy Filipinos, the Philippine government, and U.S. investors” (Broad and Cavanagh 1993:29). Furthermore, Vitug (1998) provides a case study of such unequal development through a critique of the extractive industry of logging, asserting that national political leaders have granted
resource extraction privileges to relatives, patrons and associates while corruption and
deforestation have led to the environmental degradation of many indigenous lands. Thus,
nationalization of the Philippines’ resources has failed to promote equitable development
throughout the country.

Despite the presence of such externally controlled large-scale mining operations in the
proximity of traditional mining communities, “the two communities of miners… coexisted
relatively peacefully until the large-scale companies began to encroach on the areas of the
indigenous miners and the adverse ecological impact of large-scale mining spread” (Broad and
Cavanagh 1993:31). This encroachment accelerated with a Philippine gold boom from
approximately 1982 to 1988 (Vidal 2005:39-40). Indeed, the “people of Itogon [located in the
Benguet countryside surrounding Baguio City] trace their troubles back to the early 1980s when
Benguet Corporation…began bulldozing open-pit mines in this area without consulting the
Itogon community” (Broad and Cavanagh 1993:27).

Ricardo A. Godoy (1990) argues that troubles arise as local communities and large-scale
corporations hold divergent perceptions of property rights and fairness, and their relations and
understandings of each other prove dynamic and unstable despite the presence of legal contracts.
Peasants base their claims on traditional ideas of labor and reciprocity, while proprietors base
their claims on legal processes, such as taxes, fees, concessions and ownership deeds. Thus, the
privatization of land and gold mines throughout the Philippines led to a decline in traditional
land and mine ownership. While the gold boom tapered off by the late 1980s, and the large-scale
open-pit mines are no longer operational, large-scale mining corporations, including Benguet
Corporation as well as Lepanto Mining Inc. and Philex Mining, continue to operate mines
throughout Benguet Province (Vidal 2005:39-40). Furthermore, the “approval of the Mining Act of 1995” catalyzed resurgence in large-scale mining throughout the region (Vidal 2005:40). Thus, government policies have promoted the development of large-scale mining without benefitting local communities.

The Philippine Mining Act of 1995

The Republic Act (RA) 7942, or Mining Act of 1995, was passed in 1995 “under the government of former President Fidel V. Ramos, whose Philippines 2000 Medium Term Philippine Development Plan focused on privatization, liberalization and deregulation of the Philippine economy as a strategy to propel the country to NIC (Newly Industrializing Country) status” (Lansang 2011:128). Indeed, the Philippines experienced a great political and economic transition from the late 1980s throughout the early 1990s. Following the regime change of the People Power movement of 1987 and the collapse of “the twenty year authoritarian rule of Ferdinand Marcos, a deep economic crisis resulted in the economy contracting by over 15 per cent” (Balisacan et al. 2008:295). In “the wake of deep economic crises, the collapse of long-standing centralized authoritarian regimes, and the advent of fragile democracies,” the Philippines adopted a policy of decentralization in 1992 (Hill 2008:43). Such policy reforms “were accompanied by a major liberalization program,” as “decentralization programmes are frequently initiated as part of a regime change, involving both political democratization and economic liberalization” (Balisacan et al. 2008:293, 294). Thus, the passage of the Mining Act of 1995 occurred within the context of both political and economic turmoil, instability and transition.
Furthermore, these crises opened the country to international influence, as political and economic “changes relate to neoliberalism and globalization” (Nevins and Peluso 2008:1). Neoliberal policies advocate the “specific goal of facilitating economic growth through increased investment and growth in export production,” and they became the dominant paradigm for international development throughout the 1970s and 1980s as “markets became triumphalist and neoliberal firms…were normalized” (Nevins and Peluso 2008:8, 9). As developing countries, such as the Philippines, enter the globalized and international economy, they face pressures from global interests, such as multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations and international financial institutions, to adopt such market-oriented neoliberal policies (Nevins and Peluso 2008:20). Indeed, the Citizens Assessment of Structural Adjustment Philippines Thematic Group Workshop (CASA) (2008:8, 9) asserts that multinational financial institutions exert “tremendous influence… in ‘developing’ countries,” particularly during periods of transition or crisis. The passage of the Mining Act of 1995 occurred within such an environment of international pressure. Sawyer and Gomez (2012:252) assert the pressure of “transnational governmentality” to regulate resource extraction. “Institutional capture” leads to multinational corporations and international financial institutions gaining greater influence over national and local governments and compromises the state’s role as a neutral arbiter (Sawyer and Gomez 2012:253). Indeed, throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s transition to democracy in the Philippines, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) prepared a series of “recommendations for immediate action” and “intermediate recommendations” for the Philippine economy, and the Mining Act of 1995 is “believed to be a direct consequence of ADB study” (CASA 2008:7, 8). Additionally, a simultaneous Extractive Industries Review (EIR) was “unduly dominated and
therefore controlled by the World Bank” (Tauli-Corpuz 2003:9). According to Colchester (2003:12), these international funding agency reviews led to the development of policies which directly affect indigenous communities without any input from these communities themselves. Furthermore, within the context of “globalization and finding a niche in the global market place, the Medium Term Development Plan of the Arroyo government identified metallic minerals as a strategic commodity and mineral commodity production as a priority economic activity” (Lansang 2011:136). Thus, the Mining Act of 1995 was passed as a globalized, neoliberal framework which prioritized international markets over local interests.

The Mining Act of 1995 led to the internationalization and liberalization of the mining industry in the Philippines because it established two distinct forms of agreements between the national government and transnational companies to develop large-scale mining operations. These agreements are Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA) and Financial Technical Assistance Agreements (FTAA). MPSAs reflect national development interests as companies applying for them must be at least 60% Filipino-owned (Holden and Jacobson 2012:46-47). On the other hand, FTAAAs reflect more neoliberal and globalized interests. According to Lansang (2011:134-135; see also Pavlova and Hincks 2013:66):

An FTAA is an agreement between the Philippine government and a transnational mining corporation, where the latter puts up the capital and technology and in return is allowed to lease an area of 100,000 hectares to mine for 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. Other features of the FTAA include: 100% foreign ownership of the corporation operating in the Philippines, as opposed to the 60% Filipino-40% foreign equity stated in the Philippine Constitution; five years tax holiday for the mining corporation which can be extended for another five years and tax free importation of equipment and machinery; investment incentives such as repatriation of investments, remittance of earnings, remittance of foreign loans and obligations from contracts; freedom from expropriation, freedom from requisition of investment and confidentiality; and auxiliary mining rights such as timber rights, water rights, easement rights, right to possess explosives, entry into
private lands and concession areas. In exchange, the government’s share in the FTAA consists of the taxes that the government is requiring a corporation to pay, regardless if it finds deposits or not. In the event that it does, the collection of the government’s share (60%) shall commence after the contractor has fully recovered its pre-operating expenses, exploration, and development expenditures.

In early 2004, the Supreme Court of the Philippines ruled FTAAAs unconstitutional because they allowed of 100% foreign-owned corporations to operate throughout the Philippines. By late 2004, it reversed this decision due to pressure from the national government and international corporations (Lansang 2011:147; Holden and Jacobson 2012:47). This liberalization of the mining industry led to a significant expansion of the large-scale mining industry throughout the Philippines, as the period from 1994 to 1996 featured a 400% increase of foreign mining companies represented in Philippines (Holden and Jacobson 2012:46). The majority of mining concessions were FTAAAAs, as “by 2002, there were 43 FTAAAAs in place covering 2.2 million hectares (approximately 8 percent of the land area of the Philippines) in contrast to the 270,716 hectares (approximately 0.9 percent of the land area of the Philippines) that were covered by the MPSAs” (Holden and Jacobson 2012:47). Rovillos et al. (2003:229) assert that transnational corporations have acted within the “framework of growth-driven, profit-motivated, export-oriented industrialization as encoded in the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.” Thus, the neoliberal Mining Act of 1995 facilitated the expansion of the large-scale mining industry throughout the Philippines, as it allowed multinational corporations to greatly expand their operations. This expansion has been highly profitable for the multinational corporations, as well the Philippine national government, due to the increasing tax revenues it has generated. However, it has failed to include the local communities of mining areas, which do not
economically benefit from multinational large-scale mining operations but experience their environmental and social consequences.

**Local Environmental and Social Effects**

Vidal (2005:30-31) summarizes the effects of large-scale mining on the physical environment, the biological environment and the human or social environment. According to her, effects on the physical environment include: increased dust levels in the air in the area of mining operations sites; increased noise levels; modification of landforms and topography; removal of soils and soil erosion; chemical spills; industrial and domestic waste; conversion of idle lands into industrial lands; sedimentation along creeks, rivers and coastal areas; chemical spills along creeks, rivers and seas; increased surface water runoff and use of surface water for washings and ablutions. Effects on the biological environment include: loss of natural vegetation in the mining areas, loss of wildlife habitat and food, and smothering of aquatic wildlife from sedimentation. Effects on the human or social environment include: in-migration of direct and indirect workers at mining operations; increased need for basic services for healthcare, education and other basic services; employment opportunities at mining operations, but displacement of traditional livelihoods; payment of taxes to local governmental units (LGUs); spread of diseases and sanitation-related problems, including dust-induced respiratory diseases and heavy metal ingestion; and the introduction of new cultural norms and values. Additionally, Holden and Jacobson (2012) argue that the environmental impacts, such as soil depletion, exacerbate the effects of natural hazards within the fragile tropical ecosystem of the Philippine archipelago, located in the volatile Pacific Ring of Fire. Environmental dangers such as flooding and landslides caused by tropical storms and typhoons become potentially more severe as soils lose
their integrity and ability to retain water. While the Mining Act of 1995 provides “direct employment, excise tax, royalties paid to Indigenous peoples, and [mandated] social programs” (Pavlova and Hincks 2013:64), “the government’s measures and funding programs with mining contractors to address the negative effects of large-scale mining do not fully mitigate the negative impacts or provide adequate compensation for the adverse economic and social costs, thus making the whole situation unsustainable.” Furthermore, “if this practice continues and the policy is not altered, the government and the mining industry will aggravate the state of the country’s environmental degradation and increase poverty” (Lansang 2011:136).

Ultimately, the development of the large-scale mining industry throughout the Philippines, beginning with the American colonial regime and accelerating through recent neoliberal development paradigms, has negatively affected local physical and social environments, as local communities have largely been excluded from its benefits even as they are confronted with the effects of large-scale mining operations.
CHAPTER 5
MINING PROTEST

The pursuit of environmentally and socially destructive large-scale mining and other large-scale and national development projects throughout the Cordillera has led to the growth of a robust and diverse protest movement against such “development aggression” throughout the region and the country (Carino 2004; Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement 2010; Holden and Jacobson 2012). Cited in Holden and Jacobson (2012:221), Nadeau (2005) defines development aggression as “the process of displacing people from their land and homes to make way for development schemes that are being imposed from above without consent or public debate.” Furthermore, it relates to neoliberalism as a paradigm of “inappropriate development…a globalizing economic and political process coming from outside that severely damages a community’s culture, social organization and environment” (Holden and Jacobson 2012:222). The movement against such development within the mining industry in the Philippines has simultaneously influenced and been influenced by a proliferation of civil society organizations (CSOs), including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and people’s organizations (POs). Indeed, the Philippines features the “third largest NGO community in the world” and the “largest and most politically significant NGO community” in Southeast Asia (Hirsch and Warren 1998:xii, 51). Furthermore, Hirsch and Warren (1998:xii) assert that these NGOs “fill a political vacuum,” especially within the context of the Philippines’ rapid and aggressive decentralizing and liberalizing economic and political policies, which have “included the transfer to LGUs [local government units] of a wide range of functions and services”
over the past several decades, since the reinstatement of democratic rule in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Within the Cordillera and other mining regions throughout the country, many of these organizations have grown out of local protests to national mining policy and its local implementation, while they have simultaneously supported these protests and advocated for sustainable development and indigenous political and economic rights in the region and throughout the country. The Catholic Church, a “formidable political force in the Philippines” (Pavlova and Hincks 2013:65), has also influenced the civil society movement against mining policy, as its leaders and organizations have vocally condemned the neoliberal policy and offered their support to poor and indigenous communities protesting it. The passage of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) in 1997 inextricably linked mining policy to indigenous rights, as it requires indigenous communities and leaders to grant free and prior informed consent (FPIC) to mining corporations for any development projects within ancestral lands (Republic of the Philippines 1997). Thus, the organization of the protest movement against large-scale mining throughout the Cordillera and other mining regions throughout the Philippines has developed in relation to the CSO community and the protection and assertion of indigenous rights. Such protest has involved awareness and education campaigns to galvanize communities against mining in their lands and advocate for sustainable development; petitions; barricades; editorials exposing bribery, problems with FPIC implementation, LGU representation, and violence against environmentalists and community organizers; legal challenges and alternatives to mining laws; and even violence against mining projects and their supporters.
Local Activism to Broader Scale Networks

With its culture of independence and resistance to external influence and control, the Cordillera also features an illustrious history of protest and resistance movements against international, neoliberal development in the region. Such organized protest has thrived since the Chico River struggle of the early 1970s, when the Marcos regime planned to develop a series of hydroelectric dams along the Chico River, flowing through the Cordillera. This plan represents an ideal early example of a large-scale neoliberal development project with liberal international investment and national governmental support, as a “German contract firm conducted a World Bank-financed pre-feasibility study in 1973, and came up with a proposal to build four dams on the Chico river, named simply Chico I, II, III and IV,” and “following the study, the National Power Corporation (NPC), was charged with continuing survey work” (Hilhorst 2003:34). A protest movement, drawing heavily on Igorot cultural features and identity but also reaching beyond traditional boundaries to incorporate the increasingly globalized society, grew in response to this project. For example, a group of local Kalinga villages agreed upon a peace pact in 1975 to unite against the project. While a tradition of Igorot culture, this peace pact reflected broader society, as it first “consisted of a great number of parties, not just two villages, and included outsiders who extended their solidarity to the struggle. Second, the content of the pact clearly aimed to unite villages against the government” (Hilhorst 2003:36).

Methods of protest included physically obstructing survey work and petitioning the president (Hilhorst 2003:38). Physically blocking roads and construction continues to be a common form of protest by Filipino activists against large-scale development projects, such as mining. In 1990 small-scale pocket-miners blockaded the “lone road up the lucrative Keystone
Vein. The blockade, coordinated with similar actions by pocket-miners in two other nearby veins of Benguet’s open-pit expansion, succeeded in closing the Grand Antamok Project site for three full months” (Broad and Cavanagh 1993:28). According to recent news reports, “Barricades against mining were once again being erected in parts of the Philippines. Those barricades are growing, with indigenous peoples blockading against Royalco in Nueva Vizcaya, despite a court order calling for it to disband, and tribal halting [sic] Carrascal Nickel Corporation (CNC) in Kalinga, in the Cordillera” (MAC 2014). Additionally, Broad and Cavanagh (2014) report that “in the community of Didipio [in Benguet], we spent time with farmers who had formed an organization to oppose OceanaGold as it moved in. With great emotion, they described the barricades they set up in 2008 and 2009 after the company demolished the homes of those who refused to sell out.”

Within the context of the Chico River dams project, while villagers tried to stop the NPC from constructing buildings, the government responded with increasing military intervention (Hilhorst 2003:38). Such high militarization continues throughout the Cordillera today, as one Igorot community member has recently complained: “There are so many that if you smoke a cigarette… and throw away your butt, it is likely to land on the shoulders of a [government] military” personnel (Broad and Cavanagh 1993:109). Furthermore, Rovillos et al. (2003:213) assert that the government acts as a “virtual security guard” of mining corporations through military protection. Indeed, the Asian representation of Mines and Communities (MAC 2006) has complained that the “impact of militarization that accompanies extractive industry development is disproportionately borne by indigenous peoples in our region as in the rest of the world,” while civil society organizations throughout Asia “share a common and grave concern
with the environmental and human rights abuses taking place throughout our region that can be linked to transnational business activity, particularly in the extractive industries sector.” Indeed, “the Philippines is the deadliest Asian country for environment and land defenders, a report from a London-based group [Global Witness] said,” and “the report said of the 67 activists killed, 41 were opposing mining or extractive operations” (Inquirer.net 2014). Furthermore, “civil society groups in the Cordillera are condemning the murder of anti-mining activists, claiming they were killed by the army before being buried in shallow graves. Despite this intimidation anti-mining sentiments continue to be strongly expressed by indigenous groups across the Cordillera” (MAC 2014).

Increased militarization throughout the Cordillera has further led to an increased presence of the rebel New Peoples’ Army (NPA) throughout the region (Hilhorst 2003:41). The NPA represents the armed faction of the Philippine Communist Party and hopes to establish a communist regime throughout the Philippines, leading to greater social and economic equality. Holden and Jacobson (2012:206, 208) assert that the government’s strategy of militarizing the Cordillera in response to NPA presence is a “self-defeating strategy,” as the heavy military presence leads to further NPA recruitment. Furthermore, a UN Rapporteur has recently cited “serious human rights violations” in regards to militarization in mining areas of the Philippines (Holden and Jacobson 2012:212-213). Indeed, in April of 2014, “Communist rebels… attacked a big mining firm in Maco, Compostela Valley, burning vehicles and equipment, police and local officials said” (Lim 2014).

According to Hilhorst (2003:44), during “the period from 1980 to 1986, the protest movement grew significantly all over the Cordillera.” This movement appealed to Igorot
culture, as “land, as a central element in the ancestral worship of people in the Chico valley, became a focal point of the struggle” (Hilhorst 2003:35). Indeed, the slogan “land is life” emerged as the dominant paradigm of the movement (Hilhorst 2003:41; Hilhorst 2004:83). Broad and Cavanagh (1993:59) assert that the poor and undeveloped populations of a country, often indigenous communities, act as the “first environmentalists” because they are so dependent on their local environments for land and livelihood. Furthermore, individuals within poor, especially indigenous, communities have an incentive to exploit the environment (on a small scale), but together are likely to actively work to protect it (Broad and Cavanagh 1993:71).

Indeed, “citizens’ movements in the Philippines have a long and illustrious history of campaigns and projects that advance the sustainable-development agenda at the local level” (Broad and Cavanagh 1993:147). Significantly however, the movement further reflected the broader political environment of nationalization and bureaucratization, as throughout “the 1980s, a number of NGOs emerged in the Cordillera as offspring of the political movement,” including the incorporation of the Consortium of NGOs in 1986 (Hilhorst 2003:52, 55).

In 1984, the Cordillera People’s Alliance (CPA) emerged as a bridge connecting local organized activism and formal organizational society, as “an umbrella that encompasses 100 local people’s organizations (POs) and support groups in the region. The institutional set-up is such that the NGOs of the Consortium provide services to assist the People’s Organizations affiliated with the CPA to organize, educate, and have projects” (Hilhorst 2003:18). According to Hilhorst (2003:44), the “CPA was dedicated to greater Cordillera unity and self-determination. One of its activities was to co-ordinate the growing international support networks that the regional struggles had attracted. Lobby work by international advocates led the World Bank to
suspend its financial support for the Chico River dams, which all but meant the end of the project.”

The Chico River struggle continues to influence Cordillera organization and activism, as Cordillera Day continues to commemorate the assassination of Dacliing Dulag, an Igorot leader of opposition to the dams, and the CPA continues to lead the struggle for indigenous rights and livelihood in the face of government development intervention (Hilhorst 2003:18). Indeed, as an organizational leader, the CPA continues to employ a wide range of protest strategies which “establish new institutions that marry traditional and modern forms of conflict handling” (Hilhorst 2004:87). Since its inception in opposition to the Chico River dams, the main focus of the CPA has shifted to “express opposition to the development of open-pit mines that ‘will destroy the livelihood, environment and water sources of the Cordillera’” (Hilhorst 2003:21). Thus, opposition to early neoliberal development projects which threatened the land and environment of the Cordillera continues to inspire protest movements and organizations throughout the region.

The protest movement against liberalized large-scale mining throughout the Philippines developed from local concerns and protests, which expanded into the broader societal consciousness and organizational structure due to unified opposition to a high-profile, large-scale, neoliberal development project. Such opposition also originated as large-scale development projects began to damage local environments and economic livelihoods. Broad and Cavanagh (1993:31) assert that “the two communities of miners, large-scale and small-scale, coexisted relatively peacefully until the large-scale companies began to encroach on the areas of indigenous miners and adverse ecological impact of large-scale mining spread. Today Itogon [an
Igorot community near Baguio] is experiencing crisis and confrontation: a growing movement is challenging the right of the few to mine in a fashion so detrimental to the many.” According to Lansang (2011:129), the “advocacy campaign for the repeal of the Mining Act of 1995 started with petitions of residents living in areas where the first applications for large-scale mining were approved by the government. The affected residents aimed to stop the explorations of the mining corporations.” Broad and Cavanagh (1993:116) assert that such a pattern of local peasant concern for environments and livelihoods leading to mass-based protest movements is common throughout the Philippines and around the world, as peasants understand the “correlation between ecological destruction and human suffering better than the rest of us. These people are the ones who suffer the consequences… As a result, the organizations they and people not unlike them have created… focus on resolving both the human suffering and the ecological degradation by transferring control of natural resources from the few to the many.”

Local groups continue to form the backbone of the anti-large-scale mining campaign throughout the Philippines, but there is also a need for an actively engaged and organized civil society to protect and uphold the laws (Broad and Cavanagh 1993:63, 71). This campaign reached the broader national social consciousness “as a result of the Marcopper mining disaster that happened in Marinduque on 24 March 1996,” during which a tailings spill from a large-scale dam caused extensive environmental damage (Lansang 2011:129). Significantly, the “disaster focused attention on the issue of and consequences of the liberalization policy in the mining industry, especially because Marcopper was 40% owned by Placer Dome, a Canadian partner” (Lansang 2011:129). According to Vidal (2005:40), this spill entered the national public consciousness as a “big scandal and was a source of grave embarrassment to the government and
mining industry players.” Indeed, “after the disaster, the [anti-large-scale mining] campaign gained momentum all over the country” (Lansang 2011:129). Combining local and informal organizational structures and broader scale and formal organizational structures “to reverse the liberalization of mining policy, NGOs, in tandem with their partner POs, started regional advocacy campaigns against large-scale mining throughout the Philippines” (Lansang 2011:129). Furthermore, their campaign took up the issue of mining after the Marcopper tragedy and raised it to the national and multi-sectoral level” (Lansang 2011:138). Such campaigns achieved early success as the Department of the Environment and Natural Resources of the Philippines revoked Marcopper’s Environmental Compliance Certificate (Vidal 2005:41-42). However, the anti-large-scale mining movement has continued to work to “consolidate and bring the advocacy campaigns from the regional to the national level” (Lansang 2011:129).

This focus on broad-scale consolidation led to formation of Kalikasan People’s Network for the Environment (PNE) and Defend Patrimony! Alliance, an “advocacy coalition represent[ing] NGOs, POs, and sectoral representatives from organizations of peasants, fisherfolk, workers, women, indigenous peoples, urban poor, and concerned individuals in the Philippines calling for the repeal of the Mining Act of 1995 and nationalization of the mining policy” (Lansang 2011:130). Furthermore, “in 2005, the Alyansa Tigil Mina (ATM) [Alliance Against Mining] coalition was formed, made up of NGOs, POs, church groups and academic institutions” (Lansang 2011:130). According to Lansang (2011:130), the “ATM functions both as an advocacy group and a people’s movement, working in solidarity with other groups, to protect communities and natural resources that are threatened by large-scale mining operations in the Philippines.” Preda Foundation (2012) describes the ATM as an “alliance of mining-affected
communities and their support groups of NGOs/POs and other civil society organizations who are opposing the aggressive promotion of large-scale mining in the Philippines. The alliance is currently pushing for a moratorium on mining, revocation of Executive Order 270-A, repeal of the Mining Act of 1995 and passage of AMMB [Alternative Minerals Management Bill].” Such groups continue to form, as “SALAKNIB or Save the Earth Movement was finally adopted as the official name of the anti-mining movement with members composed of multi-sectoral groups” (Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement 2010:17). Furthermore, “together with other NGO partners, the branch also assisted in the formation of the Alliance of Novo Vizcayanos Against Development Aggressions (ANVADA), composed of multi-sectoral groups and individuals from government, NGOs, POs in mining communities, and the local business sector to serve as the provincial advocacy group against all forms of development aggression” (Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement 2010:17). Thus, the campaign against liberalized large-scale mining throughout the Philippines began at the local level and has expanded into a broad-based coalition of peoples and organizations, ranging from local to national.

Additionally, the large-scale mining protest movement expanded into the global consciousness when “MCDC [Mining Communities Development Center, Inc] took the issue further at the international level when its executive director, engineer Catalino L. Corpuz Jr., participated in the Mining and Indigenous People’s Consultation in London on 6-16 May 1996” (Lansang 2011:139). According to Lansang (2011:139), Corpuz has been “regarded as one of the country’s most militant advocates of indigenous people’s rights,” and “he presented to the conference a paper entitled, ‘The Liberalization of the Mining Industry: A Continuing Policy of National Oppression of Indigenous Peoples in the Philippines.’” In this paper, he “even went as
far as saying that a call to review and amend the Mining Act of 1995 is not enough, and that no
less than civil war might be needed to stop large-scale mining” (Lansang 2011:140). At the
conference, the “Philippine delegation…gained the unanimous support of the participants. The
body supported the resolution rejecting the Philippine Mining Act of 1995” (Lansang 2011:140).
Furthermore, at the international level, the large-scale mining protest movement in the
Philippines received varied and widespread support, as it was perceived as a “multi-sectoral
concern which was also a sovereignty issue due to liberalization of the industry” (Lansang
2011:140). As such, it “attracted the attention of NGOs which had exemplified a variety of
approaches in terms of organization and strategy. Environmental NGOs, human rights NGOs
(specifically for indigenous peoples’ rights) and development NGOs were all involved in the
advocacy campaign for the repeal of the Mining Act of 1995” (Lansang 2011:140). Indeed, the
importance of local, regional, national, and international links continue to grow in significance,
as “growing realization that transnational connections are the only way to fight international
impediments to sustainable development, from the debt crisis and the power of transnational
banks, to environmentally destructive foreign-funded aid projects, to uncontrolled flows of
foreign investment” (152). Thus, the organization of the anti-mining protest movement in the
Philippines has proven to be widespread and varied as it has expanded into networks along
broader and broader scopes.

Locally, the strategies of consolidating the anti-mining movement and creating broad-
based coalitions affected the protest movement within the Cordillera when “the people’s
resistance was consolidated at the regional level during the Cordillera People’s Regional Mining
Conference, 22-23 April 1996, sponsored by the Cordillera People’s Alliance (CPA)” (Lansang
Furthermore, in 1996 “three Catholic dioceses of Bayombong, Urdaneta and Baguio-Benguet held a convention to discuss how to address through their various apostolates the implications of the Mining Act of 1995 and to devise strategies to build networks for a strong national lobby” (Lansang 2011:138). Thus, the organization of the resistance and protest movement to neoliberal large-scale mining policy in the Philippines has focused on consolidation into coalitions and networks of peoples and organizations at local, national and international levels.

The Catholic Church

Significantly, the Catholic Church, as an influential institution throughout local communities in the Philippines, as well as the national and international communities, has offered its vocal opposition to large-scale, environmentally destructive development. The Church has supported the anti-large-scale mining protest movement since the beginning of any organized movement. Indeed, Catholic Bishop Francisco Claver, of Bontok Igorot origin, wrote an open letter to President Marcos in 1975 protesting the Chico dam project. He stated that “when a Bontok has to turn to a people not his own for help, this only means he has tried his supreme best to solve his problem himself, and he realizes his powerlessness in the face of overwhelming odds,” and “deep down in their guts they know damming the Chico is a decree of death for them as a people” (Hilhorst 2003:35). The Roman Catholic Social Action Commission has also supported the CPA and its anti-large-scale mining initiatives (Rovillos et al. 2003:225). More recently, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) has published pastoral letters condemning large-scale mining in 1998, 2006 and 2008, while the Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation Commission of the Association of Major Religious Superiors of the
Philippines (JPICC AMRSP) expressed opposition to large-scale mining as a moral development paradigm in 2009 (Holden and Jacobson 2012:172). Additionally, the Catholic Church’s Basic Ecclesial Community (BEC) movement has worked to organize small groups of people in accordance with official Church commitment to environmentalism, including opposition to mining (Holden and Jacobson 2012:240, 242). Furthermore, the “Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) has adopted a firm anti-mining stance” (Pavlova and Hincks 2013:68). It has criticized President Aquino’s Executive Order (EO) 79, issued to reform mining policy by “describing it as a palliative that does not address fundamental problems with the existing mining law and calling for a moratorium on the implementation of the EO” (Pavlova and Hincks 2013:68). In issuing such a criticism, the CBCP supports ATM, which has stated that EO 79 is “inadequate, unresponsive and misleading” to mining concerns and accuses President Aquino of “aggressively promoting mining for the benefit of the industry” rather than addressing the substantial flaws in the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (Preda Foundation 2012). Furthermore, 72 bishops signed a statement calling for the passage of the Alternative Minerals Management Bill (AMMB), now tentatively titled the Philippine Minerals Resources Act of 2012 (Preda Foundation 2012).

Additionally, Environmental Science for Social Change, a Jesuit-run NGO, reports “deep and fairly widespread suspicion about the mining industry in the Philippines today” and opposes 100% foreign-owned companies “engaging in mining, as this implies ownership of patrimony” (UCA News 1999). It promotes “advocacy [as a] mechanism to ensure that local cases become part of the national-level dialogue,” asserting that in order “to tackle the complex mining issue, intensive and meaningful dialogue is needed among government agencies, mining companies,
NGOs and Church groups representing civil society, and the indigenous peoples most affected by mining operations” (UCA News 1999). In addition to national church organizations, local church groups have also supported the anti-large-scale mining movement, as “in the province of Nueva Vizcaya, Bishop Ramon Villena urged residents to wear black as a sign of their objection to all forms of mining activities,” while “in Palawan, Church leaders started this week to gather 10 million signatures against mining operations in the province. Bishop Pedro Arigo of Puerto Princesa dedicated the signature drive to anti-mining crusader and broadcaster Dr. Gerardo ‘Gerry’ Ortega who was [recently] killed” (UCA News 2014). Within the highly religious Philippines, such active and vocal support from the Catholic Church is significant as it is a powerful and widespread international organization.

**Protests Against President Aquino**

In 2014, the environmental group Kalikasan published an editorial criticizing the collusion between large-scale mining corporations and the Philippine government, particularly the Aquino administration, and the resulting degradation of the Philippine environment, especially in Benguet. It asserts that “Philex Mining Corporation, which caused a 20.6-million metric ton mine spill disaster in early August 2012, the biggest in Philippine history, will soon be resuming its operations after paying a measly P188.6 million in environmental fines to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) just last June 6. It should be noted that this was already the 4th mine spill incident that involved Philex,” and “these mine spills are a direct result and clear proof of the anti-people and anti-environment mining policy of the Aquino government. At the same time, the collaborationist treatment of the Aquino government to the cases of Citinickel and Philex shows how it sacrifices environmental safety and people’s welfare for the interest and
benefits of big business polluters. Clearly, there is no hope for environmental justice under Aquino” (PIPLinks “Citinickel and Philex” 2014). Furthermore, in 2011 protestors tore down an effigy that depicts President Benigno Aquino III as a “‘promoter and implementor’ of liberalization and large-scale mining in the country,” while “Filipino environmental activists” marked the 16th year of the Mining Act of 1995 with “protest action including a march to the presidential palace in Manila” (UCA News 2014). Thus, much recent high-profile protest against large-scale mining in the Philippines has focused on President Aquino as a promoter of international neoliberal development.

Problems with FPIC Implementation

The Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997 has proven to be a landmark law, as the first national legislation specifically listing, guaranteeing and protecting the rights of indigenous peoples in Asia. Significantly to the mining industry and to mining communities, it mandates free and prior informed consent (FPIC) of indigenous leaders for corporations to conduct explorations for mines or any type of mining or environmentally disruptive activity within ancestral lands. The Republic of the Philippines (1997:3) defines FPIC as “the consensus of all members of the ICCs/IPs [Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples] to be determined in accordance with their respective customary laws and practices, free from any external manipulation, interference and coercion, and obtained after fully disclosing the intent and scope of the activity, in a language and process understandable to the community.” According to Magno and Gatmaytan (2013:1), “FPIC in this context requires that indigenous communities be provided with adequate and accessible information, and that consensus is determined in accordance with indigenous peoples’ customary laws and practices and free from
any external manipulation or coercion,” and “the IPRA requires FPIC prior to the extraction of resources from indigenous ancestral domains and lands.” Additionally, “the IPRA’s definitions of ancestral domains and lands are quite comprehensive. Ancestral domains are collectively owned and may include lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein (including minerals). Ancestral lands, which have a narrower definition than ancestral domains, may be under individual or traditional group ownership” (Magno and Gatmaytan 2013:7).

Such laws prove important, as previously, indigenous communities were often displaced from their lands “simply because they were unable to produce the legal claims to their domain” (Braganza 1996:314). However, implementation of this law within mining communities has proven difficult and faced criticism from the anti-large-scale mining movement. A major problem proves to be determining legitimate representatives for communities. While Carino (2004:80, 82) concedes that the “definition of informed consent provides for community-wide consent and understanding,” actual FPIC proceedings often take the form of “bad faith negotiations,” in which some community members, who may or may not directly benefit from the FPIC, claim to represent the entire community. Additionally, according to Hilhorst (2004:87), indigenous peoples are reluctant to cooperate with the state because the history of their relations has been characterized by “broken promises.” Furthermore, Carling (2004:186) asserts that the passage of IPRA has failed to suppress the “oppressive and deceptive laws, decrees and policies, which violate the rights of indigenous peoples and have facilitated the plunder of their natural resources” (186). Tauli-Corpuz (2006:15, 20) asserts that the lack of a standardized procedure for FPIC implementation leads to misunderstandings and irregularities, and without a “normalized” FPIC procedure, indigenous communities face difficulties “resisting

Concerns raised against the NCIP [National Commission on Indigenous Peoples] with regard to FPIC include:

- Half-heartedly implementing or even subverting the process for acquiring FPIC;
- Recognizing false tribal leaders (dubbed tribal ‘dealers’ by indigenous peoples) to further the claims of the mining companies;
- Riding roughshod over indigenous communities’ customary laws and governance systems;
- Implementing a defective Ancestral Domain Sustainable Development and Protection Plan for a long, cumbersome and often expensive process for securing certificates of ancestral domain title and land title.

An example of a heavily disputed FPIC decision occurred in 2013 when “indigenous elders in [Itogon in Benguet] voted to allow South African mining giant Gold Fields Ltd. to proceed with and assume majority control over one of the biggest gold and copper mining ventures in the country” as “the NCIP said 238 elders voted in favor of the project while 51 others rejected it. However, following this decision, a picket mounted by members of anti-mining group Save Mankayan Movement (SMM) in front of the municipal hall had turned violent. The protestors, however, were pacified later by police and Army soldiers” (Cimatu
2013). Indeed, “two previous FPIC consultations were also disputed by SSM,” while “earlier, 31 elders from Barangay Bulalacao sent a petition urging fellow elders not to approve the project. Those from Barangay Upper Tabao also filed a petition in the NCIP questioning the FPIC process, saying it was biased” (Cimatu 2013). Ultimately, “the SMM, through another petition, asked the NCIP to void the FPIC and the votes cast on Saturday” (Cimatu 2013). Furthermore, in 2007, in a petition, “hundreds of residents of Bobok-Bisal [in Benguet] expressed their strong opposition to a memorandum of agreement (MoA) entered into between the municipal government of Bokod and Magellan Metals Inc. for the conduct of a mine exploration in their village. They said that no consultation was done by the company with the people of the affected communities before the agreement was signed, thereby compromising their rights over their ancestral lands” (See 2007). Additionally, “leaders of the Blaan tribe of Bong Mal, Bong Banwe’, lobbied the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) for a resolution on non-FPIC (Free, Prior and Informed Consent) coverage on the Tampakan mining project on Thursday, January 23, 2014,” stating “our community does not want the NCIP to conduct FPIC for mining in our land because this will only cause more problems and troubles” (PIPLinks “Blaan Leaders” 2014). Thus, despite the progressive legislation of the IPRA, the anti-large-scale mining protest movement continues to challenge and criticize its implementation.

**Sustainable Development**

As the anti-large-scale mining protest movement unifies in its opposition to the current model of neoliberal mining development, it simultaneously promotes and supports sustainable development as an alternative paradigm in contrast to development aggression. According to
Holden and Jacobson (2012:185), the World Commission on Development and Environment defines sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs.” Braganza (1996:315) further defines sustainable development as “proper ‘people-oriented’ management of the environment, particularly the forests… seen as an expression of the democratic principles of the government in responding to the sustainable development agenda.” Additionally, the “four principles of sustainable development” are economic sustainability, equity, participation, and improvement of the lives of the poor (Broad and Cavanagh 1993:144). Furthermore, Broad and Cavanagh (1993:138) assert that “democratizing control of resources is key to sustainable development.” Thus, sustainable development involves both environmental and social elements, as it must be ecologically sound and socially inclusive.

While such a development ideology enjoys much popularity, especially among civil society organizations and leaders, it remains an ambiguous strategy, difficult for a multi-sectoral movement like the anti-large-scale mining protest movement to reach a consensus on, especially across class and geographic lines in an increasingly globalizing world (Bryant and Parnwell 1996:1, 11). Within the context of the anti-large-scale mining protest movement in the Philippines, civil society and political leaders have consolidated their sustainable development agenda within a campaign to repeal the Mining Act of 1995 and implement an Alternative Mining Bill (AMB) or “The Philippines Mineral Resource Act of 2009” (Lansang 2011:147, 151). The movement to repeal the Mining of 1995 achieved early success when the Philippine Supreme Court declared the law unconstitutional in January of 2004. However, the court reversed its decision, under government and corporate pressure by December of 2004, when it
ruled that “the Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving strokes” and “it should not be used to strangulate economic growth or to serve narrow, parochial interests. Rather, it should be construed to grant the President and Congress sufficient discretion and reasonable leeway to enable them to attract foreign investments and expertise as well as to secure for the people and their posterity” (Lansang 2011:147-148).

In addition to challenging the constitutionality and legality of the Mining Act of 1995, the anti-large-scale mining protest movement has also proposed a legislative alternative, the AMB, which “is a proposed policy to scrap the Mining Act of 1995 and introduce a new mining policy, which is anchored on land and natural resources management and is hinged on a human rights-based approach” (Lansang 2011:151). Significantly, this bill “will support national development based on the principles of sustainable development and will address the main flaw of the Mining Act of 1995 which is its inconsistency in relation with sustainable development” (Lansang 2011:151). While this bill has received much support, it still faces much opposition, especially at the national level, as the President’s office has expressed opposition, and it has failed to pass Congress (Lansang 2011:151). Thus, while the anti-large-scale mining protest movement in the Philippines achieved short-term political success, this success has proven fleeting and ultimately ineffectual.

Despite these political setbacks, “the broad outlines of the sustainable-development movement are beginning to be clear” (Broad and Cavanagh 1993:133). While this movement is a “nascent movement,” “large, mass-based people’s organizations” comprise its backbone and function as “the strand with the longest history” (Broad and Cavanagh 1993:133). Indeed, “the Philippines ought to consider [them] a national treasure” (133). In addition, “often intertwined
with these mass people’s organizations is a second strand: thousands of NGOs… that seek to promote and work for the interests and demands of the people’s organizations” (Broad and Cavanagh 1993:134). Issue-based coalitions comprise a third strand, and the “fourth and final strand is the relatively new phenomenon of environmental organizations… that are building up their ranks not only from the POs and NGOs but also from previously unorganized concerned citizens of the middle and even upper classes” (Broad and Cavanagh 1993:135). As a broad-based movement, “diversity and dynamism of the assembled groups are noteworthy in themselves” (Broad and Cavanagh 1993:133). Indeed, “some, particularly Western funding agencies, are known to despair at the constant flux in Philippine civil society attested by this gathering: continuous creation of new organizations and realignments of the old” (Broad and Cavanagh 1993:133). Thus, while the anti-large-scale mining protest movement in the Philippines proves highly organized and united for sustainable development and against development aggression, it remains widely diverse and dispersed along organizational lines.

Ultimately, the social movement protesting large-scale mining in the Philippines, and the Cordillera in particular, is influenced by an emphasis on identifying with traditional cultures and highlighting traditional values and practices, such as dependence on the land and communal property-holding. At the same time, it attempts to merge all levels and sectors of society, from local to global and traditional to cosmopolitan, in bringing the protest struggle to national and global arenas of debate, discussion and decision making. Organizations and networks of organizations provide the bridge in broadcasting the voice of the traditional and local populations at the grassroots of the protest movement to more powerful levels of society.
CONCLUSION AND ANALYSIS

As the anti-large-scale mining protest movement has grown throughout the Philippines, it has evolved from a series of local protests and organizations into a large and widespread social movement. Within this expanding process, it has effectively gained popularity and influence over ever-increasing numbers of people and interest groups throughout the Philippines and around the world. However, it has also faced problems of organization and accountability to local interests and concerns, as it has become increasingly formalized and bureaucratized with the subsequent growth of officially recognized and externally funded organizations at local, regional and national levels, such as the Cordillera Peoples Alliance, the Philippine Task Force for Indigenous Peoples and the International Working Group on Indigenous Affairs, based in Denmark. While the organizational structures of these organizations promote and facilitate communication and networking between and among diverse local organizations and movements and interest and political groups, they risk leading to the excessive influence of external or foreign organizations and interest groups on local interests and concerns and over-reliance on external funding and support resource bases. Furthermore, increasingly large and convoluted organizations and networks lead to disagreement, conflict and fission within social movements.

Thus, while the growth of an anti-large scale mining social movement has led to widespread awareness, activism and advocacy for affected mining communities, it has led to problems of accountability to local interests and concerns. Further, problems of defining
indigenousness and legitimate claimants of local responsibility and leadership increasingly exacerbate such problems of accountability. Indigenous identity functions as a political and socioeconomic label. As certain obligations and rights become attached to this label, its use becomes contested. This is especially true throughout Southeast Asia as the growth of indigenous rights rhetoric has led to the reformulation of the concept of indigeneity from a negative and backward identity into a positive and empowering identity with special rights and privileges. NGOs claiming indigenous roots and representation of indigenous rights have simultaneously formed within the political sphere (Baird 2011:155, 156, 171). However, this label continues to obligate populations to claim “traditional” sets of behaviors and standards of living despite their exposure to and participation in an increasingly globalized world (Frake 2014:201). Furthermore, throughout the Philippines, appeals to traditional, indigenous culture and leadership lead to local abuses of power and external manipulation of local identity politics, as local leadership often lacks clear definition, allowing for individuals to claim “traditional” leadership roles and speak for entire groups and populations whether such leadership proves legitimate or not (Frake 2014:200). Based on the invented concepts of indigenous identity and the struggle for its associated rights, particularly ancestral domain, the anti-large-scale mining movement throughout the Philippines ultimately continues to struggle to form a solid foundational identity.

Ultimately, as protest movements grow and expand into widespread and broad-based social movements within and among different levels of social, cultural and geographical dimensions, they simultaneously risk becoming increasingly fragmented and factionalized. Despite the growth of official multisectoral and multilevel civil society organizations providing
apparent unification, they often lack agreement and cohesion among leadership and between leadership and constituencies. Indeed, they often lack a clear and accurate understanding of the real composition of their constituency, as they claim to represent groups of people, rather than individuals who support them. Furthermore, such organizations comprise networks of people and organizations which prove fleeting and transitory. Within the anti-mining protest movement, such disagreements and misrepresentations of constituencies and transitory networks prove problematic at regional, national and international levels. Local protest actions and movements that resist official formalization and bureaucratization and unite along organic and grassroots campaigns, in contrast remain salient, relevant and accountable to the issues and concerns of affected communities.

As political entities, formal civil society organizations, particularly NGOs, must operate within complex and multifaceted political contexts. According to Eccleston and Potter (1996:49), confronting environmental problems, which remains the focus of many anti-mining NGOs in the Philippines, leads to a variety of further political controversies and confrontations, including “steering and choosing through time” when policies or courses of action create or otherwise affect environmental problems; “conflicting interests and values” from which certain interests benefit more than others; and “enduring structures of power” when the interests and values of the politically influential and elite prevail and frame the processes of steering and choosing at different levels of political engagement. Furthermore, such organizations must navigate a complex political environment with many actors and interested parties at multiple levels of political influence and engagement, including the local political context, domestic national ideology, domestic business interests, international politics, the international economy,
and international organizations (Eccleston and Potter 1996:49-50). These complex and multifaceted political contexts, environments and actors lead to many problems for NGOs, as they claim to represent local and grassroots constituencies. Indeed, Eccleston and Potter (1996:65) assert that “in general, NGOs face severe problems in confronting the dominant values of national elites who give priority to short-term benefits of forest exploitation [and other environmentally intensive development, including large-scale mining] over environmental costs.” They further argue that “NGO campaigns should incorporate not just the national but the local and global context as well” because “all three spatial dimensions of the political context should be considered in relating NGO advocacy work to their influence in resolving environmental problems” (Eccleston and Potter 1996:65, 66). Within the context of the anti-large-scale mining protest movement in the Philippines, such problems of political engagement, representation and accountability among different levels of geospatial dimensions prove especially problematic for NGO and political leaders, as they often come from the national elite and are influenced by national and international business and environmental concerns, even as they claim to represent local and marginalized constituencies.

Broad and Cavanagh (1993:138) assert that the diverse and widespread communities, groups of citizens, politicians, NGOs and other civil society organizations opposed to neoliberal development policies, which form the social movement against mining and other large-scale development projects are only united in their condemnation of the development model as rooted in inequities and fostering greater inequities. Their collective identity as a movement remains dependent upon their beliefs that “democratizing control of resources is key to sustainable development” because under the present model “development is not trickling down to the people,
but it is trickling out” of the communities and country to foreign banks and other national and international interest groups (Broad and Cavanagh 1993:138, 139). However, while it unites behind the idealized and ambiguous model of sustainable development, the environmental social movement in the Philippines remains too scattered and widespread to effectively present a clear and realistic agenda for equitable and sustainable environmental and development policies. As a part of this broader social movement, the anti-large-scale mining protest movement faces similar problems of vague unity and the failure of the formulation and presentation of an overall agenda and alternative for present mining policies across cultural, social and political levels. At local levels, however, communities often unite in opposition to specific mining projects, which galvanize their opposition to all large-scale mining.

Indeed, Edelman (2001) argues that the study of social movements as unified and coherent social actors and entities proves unjustifiable, especially since “the long 1960s” (285), when social movements arose all around the world, not only in poor, third-world countries but also in wealthy, first-world countries. With this proliferation of social movements, a shift in the focus of social movements, as both social phenomena and as a subject of social studies, occurred as they became more widespread and diverse, both geographically and socially. The shift in the study of social movements, particularly anthropological study, needs to focus on the elements that comprise such movements rather than the movements as a whole, as these different elements often have different and even contradictory goals and methods for achieving these goals. Indeed, “ethnographic research on social movements, moreover, tended to resist ‘grand theoretical’ generalizations because close-up views of collective action often looked messy, with activist groups and coalitions forming, dividing, reassembling and with significant sectors of their target
constituencies remaining on the sidelines” (Edelman 2001:286). Furthermore, “real social movements are often notoriously ephemeral and factionalized, manifest major discrepancies among leaders and between leaders and supporters, and – probably most importantly – rarely attract more than a minority of the constituencies they claim to represent” (Edelman 2001:310-311). However, a continuing problem with the conduct of ethnography remains a tendency to ignore historical roots and to identify too closely with a movement and see it as a cohesive, worthwhile movement (Edelman 2001:310). Thus, while the study of social movements depends on identifying and separating their individual and often contradictory elements and actors, they must further be placed within their social and global context, as it is not enough to study the movement, “but rather the broader social field within which it operates” (Edelman 2001:311).

Edelman (2001:288) identifies two theoretical frameworks for such simultaneous detailed and wide-angled study of social movements: the “identity-oriented” or New Social Movements (NSMs) paradigm and the “resource mobilization” paradigm. According to Nash (“Introduction” 2005:10), the NSMs paradigm “incorporated cultural issues as central to the motivating logic of society.” Social movements often rely on indigenous peoples and their cultures as “testimonial peoples” to form the basis of such an identity (Nash “Deterritorialization” 2005:178). Salman and Assies (2007:222-223) state that “social movements…reflect the conflict inherent in a mode of production,” as within the context of the post-industrial global society, conflicts of cultural ideas arise as local peoples and communities struggle to maintain autonomy and self-management in the face of rising technocracy imposed by processes of globalization. Such struggles for self-management lead to the “fragmented, network-like form of new social movements” (Salman and Assies 2007:223). Within the framework of resource mobilization,
social movements are studied as a form of collective “action” rather than “behavior” (Salman and Assies 2007:226). Both of these frameworks apply to the anti-large-scale mining protest movement in the Philippines, as this movement promotes indigenous identity and indigenous rights as a source of a unified identity for the movement. It also seeks to mobilize resources in support of this crucial unified identity. This unified identity draws on indigenous identities and customary actions, especially in the Cordillera, with its long tradition of Igorot autonomy, independence and resistance to dominant colonial, national and globalized cultures.

Edelman (2005:29) further critiques the expansion of social movements as they bureaucratize into formal “networks,” as these networks have recently proliferated with the similar proliferation of NGOs, especially in association with solving the problems of third-world or developing countries, such as the Philippines. Despite their widespread appeal and inclusion of many people and interest groups, networks often fail to achieve significant results or social change because they often prove transitory and difficult to maintain. Indeed, they often “decompose” and “recompose” as new groups splinter off with new agendas or organizational structures, as “networks beget networks” (Edelman 2005:35). Within a network, a “crisis” often occurs as organizational divisions increase over time and the qualities of diversity and inclusiveness, which help networks grow and proliferate in the first place, shift from being strengths to becoming weaknesses as polarization increases among different peoples and interest groups. This crisis leads to a “rupture” within the network and an eventual “formal transition” as new networks replace the old network.

According to Edelman (2005:39), as the original network declines, spin-offs take on increasing importance. Formal networks further suffer from factional in-fighting, macrocephal
organizational structure, battles over funding, and dependence on foreign donors (Edelman 2005:36). Further problems of accountability, democratization and representation occur within networks, especially with the recent proliferation of mass media and communications technologies that have led to “dot-causes,” or social media campaigns of participation with little to no oversight or accountability, and “shell” networks, which exist formally, or on paper, and often have great representation but do not engage in real-world actions (Edelman 2005:41). Such transitory and unaccountable characteristics lead to confusion and lack of focused action and agendas. They ultimately lead to the failure of movements to achieve meaningful and effective results for movements that are characterized by formal network organizational structure. A further hindrance to network organization, especially in regards to the environmentally intensive mining issue, stems from the disagreements and lack of cohesion between local interests and broader interests, such as regional and national, or even international, networks (Malayang et al. 2005:8). Local communities often firmly oppose large-scale mining activities, while regional or national networks, further removed from the direct effects of these activities, remain more apprehensive about total opposition, as large-scale mining has the potential to “achieve higher levels of human well-being” over greater geographic and social distances (Malayang III et al. 2005:8). Networks often gloss over the “intricate whole” of the complex environmental and governance dilemma of large-scale mining across geographic and social landscapes as different organizations and interest groups disagree with each other (Malayang et al 2005:10).

Despite their drawbacks, “it would probably overstate the case to suggest that networks don’t ever work or that they simply propagate endlessly with no measurable impact” (Edelman
Indeed, they have achieved great success in training “sophisticated activists” and spin-offs learning from past mistakes, as they are developing less macrocephal organizational structures and are focusing more on local and grassroots concerns (Edelman 2005:40-41). Furthermore, Nash (“Introduction” 2005:1-2) argues for the necessity of “transnational activist networks” as social and environmental justice become increasingly global issues with increasing neoliberal globalization. The anti-large-scale mining protest movement in the Philippines is characterized by network organizational structures, especially as formal NGOs campaign together for environmental causes. These campaigns often grow overly sophisticated and bureaucratic for local concerns as they reach national and international levels, but they are effective at small-scale and local levels, especially as local activists campaign to educate and recruit local communities to their cause.

Furthermore, Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu (2002:7) assert that some NGOs perform important social functions, including “representation of the voiceless” and “mobilization of public opinion.” Indeed, communication and representation serve as essential roles of NGOs within civil society and social movements, as the recent NGO proliferation has resulted from the development of information technology, greater awareness of global interdependence, and the spread of democracy, especially within third-world and developing countries such as the Philippines (Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu 2002:5). Globalization and increasingly available and easy access to information technologies have had diverse and contradictory effects on social movements, as they have led to looser networks, weakening unified identification, reducing influence of ideology, the diminishing importance of local and national organizations, and the growth of permanent, but unfocused, campaigns (Tilly and Wood 2009:106). Ultimately, they
have led social movements to become “increasingly vulnerable” to problems of coordination, control and commitment (Tilly and Wood 2009:106). Indeed, according to Nash (2005:184), “paradoxically, the very processes of globalization that threaten the world they live in also generate the human rights movement of NGOs that help them to further their goals.”

Furthermore, local peoples and movements increasingly struggle to tie themselves to global causes, as “movements of indigenous peoples across the world benefitted substantially from that identification of themselves as participants in a worldwide cause, although their movements were in no way new,” and “activists and analysts became ever more likely, furthermore, to claim regional and national events for worldwide movements variously labeled antiglobalization, global justice, or global civil society” (Tilly and Wood 2009:115).

Within the context of the global environmental movements, including the anti-large-scale mining protest movement, and the recent spread of globalization, “non-state actors are critical to reaching sustainable development goals” (Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu 2002:6). NGOs provide valuable services to these movements, including integrating social and environmental goals to development and researching and presenting alternatives to weak or inadequate democratic institutions (Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu 2002:9), as they provide “data collection, on-the-ground investigative tasks, and in-depth research” (Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu 2002:12-13). Indeed, “the very legitimacy of international decision making may depend on NGOs as a way to ensure connectedness to the publics around the world and substitute for true popular sovereignty, which international bodies, devoid of elected officials, lack” (Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu 2002:19). However, NGOs continue to face many challenges in truly representing their constituencies, as special-interest groups distort policy and the presence of multiple NGOs complicates and slows
down intergovernmental decision-making processes (Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu 2002:9).

Furthermore, maintaining accountability and representation of constituencies remains the most significant challenge, especially as reaching consensuses and maintaining regional networks prove difficult (Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu 2002:9, 19-20). Such strengths and weaknesses of NGOs heavily influence the effectiveness of the anti-large-mining protest movement in the Philippines, as the many NGOs throughout the Philippines, particularly environmental NGOs, serve as the organizational structure of the movement and provide the movement with access to national and international organizations and interest groups.

Conversely, McAdam (1994) argues that the achievements and successes of social movements arise from their heterogeneity and appeal across geographic and social strata as they affect cultural change, rather than from narrowly defined and agreed-upon political and economic gains. Indeed, social movements arise out of the “cultural resonance of the frames advanced by organizers” as these organizers promote “acts of cultural appropriation,” employing existing cultural norms and features to create a new “movement culture” within which diverse, and even contradictory, peoples and interest groups unite under common general goals, even as their methods and specific goals clash (McAdam 1994:37-38). Furthermore, Nash (“Introduction 2005:3) asserts that social movements create “pluricultural” identity, “developed along with and in response to the changes brought about by global integration.” Indeed, “macropolitical opportunities,” “meso-level organizational structures,” and the micro-level “shared meanings people bring to their lives” prove essential to the fostering of such cultures (McAdam 1994:45). The overall goals and identities of movement cultures are often shifting and lacking focus, as “movement cultures are not static over time,” as they begin in one
geographic area and social stratum, then expand into broader geographic areas and social strata (McAdam 1994:46). Furthermore, “successful movements tend to be fairly heterogeneous,” and within this heterogeneity, diverse interest groups vie for influence as dominant groups wax and wane in influence and effectiveness (McAdam 1994:47-48). The shared “movement culture” of such diverse, heterogeneous and even contradictory social and interest groups often proves a major success for an effective social movement. Indeed, McAdam (1994:49) asserts that “given the entrenched political and economic opposition movements are likely to encounter, it is often true that their biggest impact is more cultural than narrowly political and economic.”

Furthermore, such “movement-based cultural change would seem to be numerous and extraordinarily diverse” and serves as a “source for new collective identities within society” (McAdam 1994:49).

Such movement cultures relate to the anti-large-scale mining protest movement in the Philippines as the movement has created a broad, general culture across a diverse, and often contradictory, group of local communities, activists and organizations, and regional, national and international networks of interest groups and NGOs.

Following this recent phenomenon of global processes of enculturation and culture and identity creation, Roggeband and Klandersmans (2007:8) argue that social movements need to be understood within the dominant themes of globalization, culture, identity and emotions which unite and motivate people. Globalization stimulates social movements to develop around initiatives to protect, secure, or purify local cultural heritages, as these heritages are threatened by transnational and global processes (Roggeband and Klandersmans 2007:8). On the other hand, it further leads to transnational globalization as local leaders, activists and intellectuals
become involved in transnational networks (Roggeband and Klandersmans 2007:8). Identity consists of the ideas, symbols, rituals, and emotions that are shared by a collective group of people, such as a social movement or movement culture (Roggeband and Klandersmans 2007:8). Culture remains the focus of much anthropological study of social movements, which focuses on “how processes of globalization affect and mobilize local identities” (Roggeband and Klandersmans 2007:9). This focus on the global influences on local cultures and movements relates to the anti-large-scale mining protest movement in the Philippines, as this broad social movement consists of local peoples and organizations united and connected to each other and to broader scale regional, national and international organizations and interest groups in their opposition to the processes of globalized neoliberal development projects and paradigms.

In conclusion, mining and its different industries deeply affect the development of organized social activism, or organized grassroots political action, as a response of indigenous peoples and communities to the imposition of neoliberal development. Specifically, this thesis investigates the proliferation of anti-mining social movements in the Philippines, particularly Benguet Province, following the passage of Republic Act 7942, or the Mining Act of 1995, which greatly liberalized the national mining industry. Ultimately, mining and its different industries ranging from small-scale traditional mining operations to large-scale industrial mining operations, have historically served as the basic fundamental distinguishing element of Cordillera life, indigenous identity, and social and environmental landscapes and concerns. Traditionally, it has provided the basis of economic and social exchange and communication with other communities and traders, both within and outside the Cordillera region. Even within communities, mining activities and mineral wealth have provided the basis for social
organization and stratification and ritual cycles and activities. While fortifying social and community bonds, these traditional mining practices have limited environmental impacts, as these practices are regulated by communal obligations and ritual sanctions. On the other hand, the imposition of externally influenced mining activities have increasingly led to social and environmental disruption, as mining techniques and technologies have become increasingly large-scale and environmentally intensive and polluting, and traditional social standards have been disregarded in the pursuit of neoliberal capitalistic development and profit. While indigenous communities have traditionally resisted such impositions, the increasing power and authority of the central Philippine state has continually expanded over the Cordillera region and is intent on aggressively developing the Philippines along globalized neoliberal standards.

Within this context of government-sanctioned world markets orientation of the mining industry of the Philippines, traditional mining activities have become increasingly limited, even among indigenous mining communities. The operations of incoming large-scale mining operations and small-scale migrant mining operations employ environmentally intensive and destructive techniques and technologies, which in turn prompt indigenous peoples to adopt these techniques and technologies, as they become increasingly available and necessary to economically compete and derive a livelihood from mining.

However, despite this use of modern mining techniques and technologies, indigenous communities remain galvanized in their opposition to large-scale, corporate mining and the introduction of new mining techniques and technologies into the Cordillera mining industry. They are united in their perception of the large-scale mining industry’s destruction of their physical environment, which further destroys their social environment, which is based on the
principle of “land is life,” traditionally manifested by communal and ritual obligations, standards and sanctions, regulating the use and exploitation of the environment. The blatant disregard for these obligations, standards and sanctions by government policies and international mining corporations has led to the degradation and erosion of the physical and social environments and landscapes of the Cordillera region.

These effects of corporate, large-scale mining have prompted much organized social action among indigenous communities throughout the Cordillera, as many community leaders, POs and NGOs have emerged to lead a movement of community gathering, organizing and education. Ultimately, however, following Edelman’s critique of social networks, this movement has had limited impact outside of these communities, as networks become further and further removed from indigenous communal livelihoods and concerns and increasingly exploit broader concerns with and movements for environmental conservation and indigenous rights to pursue their own agendas and advance their own concerns and causes.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the social movements which have arisen out of the protest to the proliferation of neoliberal large-scale mining policy throughout the Philippines continue to struggle to form and maintain a cohesive identity. They navigate a slippery slope, adapting to take advantage of the Philippines’ progressive and liberal, if not enforced, indigenous peoples’ rights legislation and policies which suit their cause while denouncing and vilifying the neoliberal globalized capitalist economic system from which current Philippine mining legislation and policies stem. The popular and idealistic rhetoric and goals, ranging from and tying together human rights,
environmentalism and local and indigenous resistance to globalization; of the movements against large-scale mining facilitate their widespread and enthusiastic support from multiple levels and sectors of society throughout the Philippines and around the world. Ultimately, however, such support often proves fleeting and superficial, leading to confusion and breakdowns in organizational structure as they attempt to realistically influence and change powerful and entrenched economic and political structures and policies.

As a formal, organized regional network of small, local people’s organizations throughout the Cordillera, the CPA exemplifies these strengths and weaknesses of organizing social movements through network structures. Formed in response to the effects of corporate, large-scale globalized economic and political development projects on local communities throughout the Cordillera and their environments and traditional livelihoods, the main mission of the CPA continues to center on the creation, maintenance and organization of an anti-large-scale mining social movement throughout the Cordillera and connecting it to larger national and global networks of environmental and human rights NGOs and activists. The CPA finds widespread support through creating and allying people’s organizations claiming to represent Cordillera communities under the single unified identity of “indigenous peoples.” Through education and recruitment campaigns of activists within these communities the CPA exploits this previously created political categorization and recasts it as an empowering and unifying identity for culturally diverse and geographically widespread communities and groups of people. The local peoples organizations, comprised of these activists, function as the manifestation of the widespread, “grassroots” social movement against corporate and large-scale mining and for indigenous rights. The creation and maintenance of this “grassroots” movement remains
ambiguous and messy, as it is comprised of local activists but under the recruitment, training and support of the regional network and the superimposed indigenous regional identity.

The CPA functions as a pluricultural network that claims to speak for the local indigenous communities within which it is represented by the local peoples organizations. While the CPA eschews formal government recognition and bureaucratization as an NGO, it provides the bridge between local people’s organizations and funding and activist NGOs at the national and international levels, such as the national Philippine Task Force for Indigenous Peoples and the global International Working Group on Indigenous Affairs, based in Denmark. In providing this bridge, the CPA struggles to continuously create and maintain a unified indigenous identity throughout the Cordillera while simultaneously appealing to broader societal, cultural, national and global concerns. Such broad-based appeal, due in part to avoiding the negative connotations of the NGO label, proves difficult to maintain as local, national and global organizations pursue divergent and sometimes contradictory goals, such as indigenous communities’ pursuit of economic rights, including the continuation of traditional and small-scale mining practices, which have become increasingly environmentally intensive, clashing with environmental activist NGOs’ pursuit of environmental protection and conservation. Thus, as a network connecting local populations to broader based and widespread funding and activist organizations, the CPA compromises the goals and voices of diverse agents along multiple levels of society, even as it claims to represent a unified social movement.

Framing such an anti-large-scale mining social movement within the paradigms and rhetoric of indigenous identity and indigenous rights leads to further complications of identity and unity among diverse individuals and interest groups within the movement, as well as their
relations with external actors and interest groups in local, national and global spheres of influence and power. Indigenous identity remains a highly contentious and ambiguous concept, especially as it relates to national and global politics and the development and assertion of social, economic and environmental rights. The development and assertion of this identity and these rights has itself evolved into a global social movement. According to Kingsbury (2008:110), “The existence of an indigenous peoples’ movement is a major factor in the diffusion and impact of ‘indigenous peoples’ as an international legal concept.” Mander (2006:3) praises the “impressive energy, scale, and clarity of purpose of a global indigenous resistance” to political and economic globalization, stating that “remarkably... because of the strength of their convictions... they are trying to reverse this tide” of capitalist economic and political globalization (5). However, as the anti-large-scale mining social movement throughout the Cordillera and the Philippines situates itself within this larger movement, it places itself within an ever-expanding web of political ambiguity and controversy. Indeed, “the level of controversy and the perceived political stakes [of indigenous identity and rights] are highest” at the global scale, and the international governing body of the United Nations has avoided adopting a standardized definition of “indigenous peoples” (Kingsbury 2008:108).

Significantly, “non-government organizations (NGOs), both international and local, and other international organizations... have played crucial roles in constructing the concept of indigenous peoples... through varied efforts directed at local, national, regional and international levels” as they “have provided key funding, networking, organizational and conceptual support to the ‘indigenous movement’, fundamentally influencing identity issues in Cambodia both directly and indirectly” (Baird 2011:158). Furthermore, “the support of important new
collaborations among indigenous groups of different regions and the help of indigenous and nonindigenous organizations within domestic and international venues” has proven instrumental in the growth of the indigenous movement and the formulation of a unified indigenous identity (Mander 2006:5). Indigenous peoples around the world, with the aid of their supportive and representative groups and organizations within the indigenous movement, have collectively attempted to create and develop their own unified identity around certain key concepts associated with marginalization from political and economic capitalist globalization and close identification with their lands and environments. Indeed, Kingsbury (2008:110) asserts that “groups and individuals participating in this movement have focused on elements of commonality that have helped the movement to cohere: connections with land and territory, aspirations for autonomy and self-determination, renewed interest in distinct cultures and languages… [and] the shared effects of modernity.” This self-definition reflects many of the paradoxes of claiming indigenous identity within an increasingly globalized world. As different indigenous peoples face the effects of modernity and pressures to integrate into globalized society, they experience both the negative and the positive effects of globalization to different extents (Hall and Fenelon 2009:4). The developments of communications technology and transportation and industrial infrastructure prove especially ambiguous and paradoxical to the indigenous movement, as they simultaneously alter customs of cultural preservation and provide for the development of indigenous social and economic inclusion in the modern world (Hall and Fenelon 2009:4). Many indigenous groups on resource-rich lands welcome the opportunity to profit from these resources. Furthermore, the definition of indigenous peoples intentionally unites, under one label, groups struggling to
maintain their distinct traditional identities, often in direct contrast with other groups of indigenous peoples.

Within the Cordillera, these paradoxes of unified indigenous identity prove especially problematic, as the region has no tradition of unification and different groups throughout the region face different opportunities to exploit their resources within the modern, globalized market. The peoples of the Cordillera first became lumped together as the minority population of “Igorots” due to the external pressures of Spanish colonization and their common resistance to cultural Hispanization and religious Catholic conversion. Indeed, indigenous identity throughout the Philippines is often associated with non-Catholic and non-Muslim conversion, though many indigenous populations, especially in the Cordillera, have converted to Protestant Christianity since the American colonial period in the early 20th century (Baird 2011:156; Frake 2014:197). Conceptions of such a minority status throughout the Philippines have evolved from derogatory to empowering over the past few decades with the growth of the indigenous movement and the passage of IPRA. According to Baird (2011:160), “At present, only a few countries in Asia explicitly recognize the international concept of indigenous peoples… The Philippines is one, and particularly since 1997, when the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act was promulgated, special land rights have been provided to indigenous peoples through applying the concept of ‘ancestral domain.’” However, the lack of traditional unity throughout the Cordillera remains problematic, as different indigenous peoples and groups pursue different goals in relation to their rights as indigenous peoples. Indeed, the development of a Cordillera Autonomous Region has failed to gain popular support, despite its provision in the 1987 Constitution. While the indigenous peoples and groups of the region remain united in their close connections to their lands and
resources and their assertion of ancestral domain, different groups confront differing opportunities to exploit and profit from their ancestral domains and resources, including mineral resources.

Within the anti-large-scale mining social movement, such differences and lack of unity have led to two significant, conflicting ideologies to unite indigenous peoples against foreign control of mining operations and exploitation of mineral resources while prompting a simultaneous fission of groups with differential access to ancestral domain lands rich in mineral resources. Many indigenous peoples and groups, especially in the mineral-rich and increasingly industrialized area of southern Benguet Province, profit from large-scale mining operations and their infrastructures. They find employment in the mining operations or utilize their infrastructures for their own mining operations and logistics. Thus, while opposing foreign control of their resources, they seek to profit themselves from the continuation of large-scale mining. The willingness of many indigenous peoples and their leaders to make concessions with national and foreign mining operations, and the contestation of the legitimacy of these concessions by neighboring indigenous peoples and leaders, reveal the ambiguities and tensions of such indigenous leadership and profit making (Tebtebba Foundation and the International Forum on Globalization 2006:159; Frake 2014:197). Ultimately, the anti-large-scale mining social movement in the Cordillera, as a part of the global indigenous movement, faces many conflicts of interest and ideology as it struggles to maintain a cohesive identity and unified goals.
Questions for Further Research

As a primarily library-based research thesis with limited access to field work and data, this thesis faces limitations in the clarity of its research and subsequent conclusions. The following are research questions to be addressed, using this thesis as background material, for further research in the field of the organization of indigenous resistance to neoliberal extractive industry development in the Cordillera of the Northern Philippines:

1. What are the perceptions of indigenous identity throughout the Philippines? What does this identity mean to the indigenous peoples themselves, to organizational leaders, to political leaders and to the general population?

2. How do indigenous peoples, miners, organizational leaders and political leaders distinguish between traditional small-scale mining and modern small-scale mining?

3. How many communities throughout the Cordillera region feature active peoples’ organizations and how representative are these organizations?

4. How do organizations proceed through the processes of funding, applying for and gaining state recognition as NGOs?

5. How many NGOs are active throughout the Cordillera region, and what are the missions of these NGOs?
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alternative Forum for Research in Mindanao (AFRIM)
2012 A Background Study on the Small-Scale Gold Mining Operations in Benguet and South Cotabato and their Impact on the Economy, the Environment and the Community. Quezon City: Bantay Kita.

Asian Development Bank

Azurin, Arnold Molina

Baird, Ian G.

Balisacan, Arsenio, Hal Hill and Sharon Faye Piza

Braganza, Gilbert C.

Broad, Robin and John Cavanagh

Broad Robin and John Cavanagh


Colchester, Marcus  

Cordillera Schools Group  

De la Cadena, Marisol  

Eccleston, Bernard and David Potter  

Edelman, Marc  

Edelman, Marc  

Eder, James F. and Thomas M. McKenna.  

Finin, Gerard A.  

Frake, Charles O.  
2014  How to be a Tribe in the Southern Philippines during the Advent of NGOs and the Invention of the Indigenous. Human Organization 73(3). 197-204.
Gemmill, Barbara and Abimbola Bamidele-Izu

Godoy, Ricardo A.

Hall, Thomas D. and James V. Fenelon

Hilhorst, Dorothea

Hilhorst, Dorothea

Hill, Hal

Hirsch, Philip and Carol Warren

Holden, William N. and R. Daniel Jacobson
2012 Mining and Natural Hazard Vulnerability in the Philippines: Digging to Development or Digging to Disaster? New York: Anthem Press.

Holland, Dorothy, Gretchen Fox and Vinci Daro
Inquirer.net  

Israel, Danilo C. and Jasminda P. Asirot  
2002  Mercury Pollution Due to Small-Scale Gold Mining in the Philippines: An Economic Analysis.  Makati City: Philippine Institute for Development Studies.

Keesing, Felix M.  

Kingsbury, Benedict  

Lansang, Liza G.F.  

Lewis, Martin W.  

Lim, Frinston L.  
2014  NPA rebels attack Apex Mining compound in Compostela Valley.  

Magno, Cielo and Dante B. Gatmaytan  

Malayang III, Ben, Evelyn Caballero, Leonardo Florence, Nicomedes Briones and Amy Lecciones  
2005  Large Scale Mining in a Subanen Tribal Area in Siocon, Zamboanga del Norte, Northern Mindanao, Philippines.  Pasig City, Philippines: Philippine Sustainable Development Network, Inc.

Mander, Jerry  
Mangahas, Mahar.

McAdam, Doug.

McKay, Deirdre

Mines and Communities (MAC)

Mines and Communities (MAC)

Mines and Communities (MAC)

Nash, June

Nash, June

Neher, Clark D.
Nevins, Joseph and Nancy Lee Peluso  

Pavlova, Pavlina and Joseph Hincks  

Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement  

PIPLinks  

PIPLinks  

Preda Foundation  

Ramos, Patria P.  

Republic of the Philippines  

Riles, Annelise  

Roggeband, Conny and Bert Klandermans  
Rovillos, Raymundo D., Salvador Ramo and Catalino Corpuz, Jr.

Rovillos, Raymundo D. and Victoria Tauli-Corpuz

Russell, Susan D.

Russell, Susan D.

Russell, Susan D.

Salman, Ton and Willem Assies

Sawyer, Suzana and Edmund Terence Gomez.

Scott, William Henry

Scott, William Henry
Scott, William Henry

See, Dexter A.

Tauli-Corpuz, Victoria

Tauli-Corpuz Victoria

Tauli-Corpuz, Victoria

Tebtebba Foundation and the International Forum on Globalization

Tilly, Charles and Lesley J. Wood

UCA News

UCA News

Vidal, Aida.
Vitug, Marites Danguilan.  

Wiber, Melanie G.  